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I
INTRODUCTION

The rise of the modern administrative state has been fueled by the
explosive growth of federal regulatory legislation. By shifting policymaking
authority from Congress to administrative agencies, regulatory legislation has
helped to transform "the system of shared powers created by the
Constitution" into "a system of shared influence over bureaucratic
decisionmaking."t Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in the
competition between Congress and the president for control of federal
environmental policy. This competition has stimulated the development of a
new tool for executive influence on regulatory decisions: review of agency
action by the Executive Office of the President. 2 Presidential use of
regulatory review and the congressional responses it has provoked pose new
challenges to theories of the impact of separation of powers on federal
policymaking.
This article explores the tension between the rule of law and the politics of
regulation reflected in Executive Office oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). Part II describes the history of the White House
review programs, which were established out of concern over the impact of
environmental regulation. Part III explores the broad impact of Executive
Office oversight on EPA's rulemaking and decisionmaking processes. Part IV
considers how Congress has responded to regulatory review by intensifying
its own oversight activities and adopting increasingly prescriptive
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environmental legislation. Part V then evaluates the rationales offered to
justify regulatory review and the limits of law as a constraint on the exercise of
Executive Office oversight.
Finally, Part VI proposes a more balanced model of executive oversight
that focuses on improving the process of regulatory decisionmaking rather
than altering the substance of regulatory outcomes-a model more consistent
with the president's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." Moreover, by restoring the public confidence EPA so
badly needs, more balanced executive oversight could also help diminish the
trend toward increasing legislative constraints on agency discretion.
II
THE EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT

Each of the five presidents who have served during EPA's twenty-year
history has required his Executive Office to conduct some form of review of
executive agency rulemaking. 4 These regulatory review programs were a
direct response to the rapid growth of federal environmental regulation in the
5
early 1970s.
3. US Const, Art II, § 3.
4. Each administration has had its own names for regulatory review and the analyses it has
required of agencies. The Nixon Administration called its program Quality of Life ("QOL") review.
Memorandum from George P. Shultz, Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines Pertaining to
Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety (Oct
5, 1971). While President Ford continued the QOL program, he also required agencies to prepare
Inflation Impact Statements ("IISs") as part of the administration's "Whip Inflation Now" ("WIN")
program. Exec Order 11821, 3 CFR 926 (1971-1975 Comp). In December 1976, the IISs were
renamed Economic Impact Analyses ("EIAs") and bore that name until December 1977 when
President Carter replaced them with Regulatory Analyses. Review under the Carter Administration's
program was conducted by an interagency body called the Regulatory Analysis Review Group.
Improving Government Regulations, Exec Order 12044, 3 CFR 152 (1979). The Reagan
Administration's program required agencies to perform Regulatory Impact Analyses reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The Bush
Administration has continued this program, which now authorizes appeals to the Council on
Competitiveness rather than to the presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief.
5. The environmental legislation Congress had enacted during the 1960s generally did not
authorize federal regulation, but rather confined the federal role to providing modest grants to assist
states with environmental planning. Following enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 853 (1970), codified at 42 USC § 4321 (1982), which was
signed into law on January 1, 1970, Congress enacted nearly all the other significant federal
environmental legislation in a ten-year burst of activity. These statutes mandated the establishment
of comprehensive, national regulations to control virtually all forms of pollution and to regulate toxic
substances and hazardous waste. See, for example, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Clean Air
Act), Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (1970), codified at 42 USC § 7401 (1982); the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816,
codified at 33 USC § 1251 (1982); the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub L No 93-523, 88 Stat 1660
(1974), codified at 42 USC § 300f (1982) to 300j-l 1 (1974); the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 (1976), codified at 15 USC § 2601 (1982); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 (1976), codified at 42
USC § 6901 (1982): and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), 42 USC § 9601 (1982).
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While the combination of forces that stimulated this extraordinary burst of
legislative activity is complex, 6 environmental protection clearly had become a
politically irresistible cause. 7 This development is reflected in the actionforcing structure of the environmental laws. Beginning with the Clean Air Act
in 1970, environmental legislation required the establishment of national
regulations, often by specified deadlines, with both regulations and deadlines
enforceable by citizen suits.8 While the Clean Air Act was in many ways "the
polar extreme from the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")," both
were founded on the conviction that action-forcing legislation was necessary
to overcome agency resistance to change. 9 NEPA sought to effect change
from within agencies by mandating changes in their decisionmaking
processes; the Clean Air Act sought to force action by dictating the kinds of
regulations agencies were required to issue by certain deadlines. White
House concern over the potential impact of those regulations on industry
stimulated the creation of the regulatory review programs.
A.

Regulatory Review in the Nixon Administration

By 1969, the enormous popularity of environmental issues had convinced
the Nixon Administration that sweeping new environmental legislation was
inevitable. To help the administration develop a comprehensive policy on the
environment, President Nixon created the Environmental Quality Council, a
cabinet committee coordinated by the White House Office of Science and
Technology.' 0 When it became apparent in the summer of 1969 that the
divided attentions of cabinet members and their lack of environmental
6. See, for example, Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L Rev
1189, 1278-95 (1986) (citing the climate created by public opposition to the Vietnam War but noting
that environmental legislation "was not the product of a social movement for reform, nor even the
outcome of pluralistic, interest group politics," id at 1293); E. Donald Elliot, Bruce A. Ackerman &
John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J L
Econ & Org 313 (1985) (describing federal environmental legislation as the product of "lawmaking
[as] characterized by unrestrained competition among presidential aspirants for the credit to be
gained from legislation assuring the public of a cleaner world," id at 328); Christopher C. DeMuth,
ConstrainingRegulatory Costs-PartOne: The White House Review Programs, 4 Regulation 13, 14 (Jan/Feb
1980), noting that reforms in Congress's committee structure and seniority system had eliminated
obstacles that previously had blocked enactment of new federal programs.
7. Former White House aide John Whitaker writes that "hysteria" is the only way "to describe
the Washington mood on the environment issue in the fall of 1969." John C. Whitaker, Striking a
Balance: Environment and NaturalResources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years 27 (Am Enterprise Inst for Pub
Policy Research, 1976) (emphasis in original). Describing the political climate that prevailed in 1970,
Theodore White has written that "the environment cause had swollen into the favorite sacred issue
of all politicians, all TV networks, all good-willed people of any party." Theodore H. White, The
Mlaking of the President 1972. 45 (Atheneum, 1973).
8. Elliot, Ackerman, and Millian note that industry opposition to national regulation was
weakened by fears that states would adopt their own conflicting state standards. They argue that the
absence of well-organized environmental lobbyists at the federal level actually contributed to more
stringent regulatory legislation because there was no coherent coalition that industry could force to
compromise. Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, 1 J L Econ & Org at 313 (cited in note 6).
9. Rabin, 38 Stan L Rev at 1288-89 (cited in note 6).
10. The Environmental Quality Council was created on May 29, 1969. Exec Order 11472, 3
CFR 792 (1966-70 Comp).
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expertise were precluding progress in developing a comprehensive policy,"
President Nixon established a task force composed of high-level agency staff
with experience in environmental issues. The task force was charged with
developing the President's first environmental message to Congress, which he
delivered in February 1970.
Following the enactment of NEPA and the delivery of the President's
environmental message, Nixon was eager to reassure a corporate community
concerned about (he cresting wave of environmental regulation. To ensure
that industry's input was considered in regulatory decisionmaking, the
President issued an executive order on April 9, 1970, creating the National
Industrial Pollution Control Council ("NIPCC"). 12 The stated purpose of
NIPCC, which was composed of sixty-three top corporate executives
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce,' 3 was to "allow businessmen to
communicate regularly with the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and other governmental officials and private organizations" with
respect to environmental matters and regulatory initiatives.' 4 Operating out
of the Department of Commerce, the council played a prominent role in
lobbying the White House to use the regulatory review process to block or
5
weaken environmental regulations.'
The newly enacted NEPA had sharpened the White House's focus on
environmental issues by creating a Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ') in the Executive Office of the President.' 6 NEPA directed CEQto
assist the president in preparing an annual Environmental Quality Report and
"to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal
government" in implementing Congress's newly declared national
11. Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 28 (cited in note 7).
12. Exec Order No 11523, 3 CFR 915 (1966-70 Comp).
13. All 63 members of the NIPCC were chairmen of the board or chief executive officers of
major corporations. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong, 2d
Sess 577-78 (1972) ("1970 Clean Air Act Hearings"); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., The National
Industrial Pollution Control Council: Advise or Collude?, 13 B C Indust & Comm L Rev 719, 720 (1972).
14. Statement by the president on Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control
Council, 6 Wkly Comp Pres Doc 502 (April 9, 1970). The executive order that created the council
designated five functions for it to perform: (1) to survey industry plans relating to environmental
quality, (2) to identify problems of the environmental effects of industrial practices, (3) to provide a
liaison among members of the business and industrial community on environmental quality matters,
(4) to encourage business to improve the quality of the environment, and (5) to advise on the
environmental policies of government agencies that affect industry when they are referred to it by the
secretary of commerce or the chairman of the CEQ. Exec Order 11523, 3 CFR 915 (1966-70 Comp).
15. Henry J. Steck, Private Influence on Environmental Policy: The Case of the National Industrial
Pollution Control Council, 5 Envir L 241 (1975). While noting congressional concern over having the
"fox in the chicken coop," former White House aide John Whitaker argues that the Council
performed a worthwhile function by improving communication between government and corporate
engineers concerning pollution control technology. Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 40 (cited in note
7). The NIPCC program eventually was terminated in 1975 by the Ford Administration after
Congress refused to provide funding for its staff. Steck, 5 Envir L at 279-80 (cited in this note).
16. 42 USC § 4342 (1982). Whitaker notes that the creation of CEQ eliminated some of the
shortcomings of the task force approach to environmental policy, including conflicts between the
interests of the departments represented by task force members. Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 30
(cited in note 7).
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environmental policy.' 7 Although President Nixon had not supported the
creation of CEQ,18 he publicly embraced the agency after NEPA's enactment.
Referring to CEQas "the keeper of our environmental conscience and a goad
to our ingenuity," the president declared that "it will have responsibility for
insuring that all our programs and actions are undertaken with a careful
respect for the need of environmental quality."' 9
While Congress had created CEQ to ensure that executive agencies
implemented NEPA, it was widely recognized that a major reorganization of
the executive branch was necessary to consolidate regulatory responsibilities
for environmental protection. Shortly after NEPA's enactment, the Nixon
Administration considered a proposal to create an agency called the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources that would replace the
Department of Interior and would consolidate the environmental and natural
resource management responsibilities of various federal agencies. 20 Roy Ash,
the chairman of the president's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(known popularly as the Ash Council), initially rejected a staff
recommendation to create an independent agency devoted solely to
environmental protection. Ash reportedly believed that a department that
combined competing interests for environmental protection and resource
development would be easier for the White House to control because it would
be less likely to be a strong advocate of environmental or development
2
interests. '
A bipartisan group of congressmen, however, already had endorsed the
creation of a separate agency devoted to environmental protection. 22 In
addition, existing agencies that would lose programs in a reorganization
forcefully opposed the creation of a superagency that would merge
environmental protection and resource development programs. 23 The Ash
17. 42 USC § 4344(1), (3) (1982).
18. President Nixon's creation of Environmental Quality Council, a cabinet committee, had
been viewed as an unsuccessful White House effort to block the creation of CEQ E. W. Kenworthy,
Environmental Council Dubious of SST Program, NY Times 74, Col 3-5 (Feb 6, 1970).
19. Robert B. Semple, Jr., President Offers Planfor Cleanup of Air and Water, NY Times 1 col 8, 33
col I (Feb 11, 1970). Nixon viewed CEQ as a vehicle for highlighting his administration's
commitment to environmental protection. The president directed CEQ to develop a federal
research program to invent a pollution-free alternative to the internal combustion engine within five
years and to establish a federal bounty payment program to promote the scrapping of old
automobiles. Id.
20. Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts & Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency:
Asking the Vrong Questions 30-32 (Oxford U Press, 1990) ("EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions").
21. Alfred Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in James Q. Wilson, ed, The Politics of Regulation
267, 294-95 (Basic Books, 1980).
22. Alfred A. Marcus, EPA's OrganizationalStructure, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 5, 9-22 (Autumn
1991).
23. The only enthusiastic supporter of the Ash Council reorganization plan was Secretary of
Interior Walter Hickel, whose agency stood to gain many new programs. John Quarles speculates
that President Nixon's ultimate decision to reject the Ash Council recommendation may have been
colored in part by Nixon's anger at Hickel for his criticism of the White House reaction to the Ohio
National Guard's killing of four Kent State University students protesting the invasion of Cambodia.
John Quarles, Cleaning Up America: An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency 17-19
(Houghton Mifflin, 1976). See also Whitaker, Striking a Balance at 56 (cited in note 7).
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Council and President Nixon ultimately rejected the superagency proposal in
favor of creating by executive order a separate Environmental Protection
Agency.
The most important rationale for creating a separate agency was the wide
agreement among government officials on the importance of having an
independent entity establish regulatory standards. Like the environmental
legislation that it has been charged with implementing, EPA was expressly
structured to overcome barriers to aggressive agency action. In announcing
the creation of EPA, President Nixon stressed the importance of establishing a
new, single-mission agency that could serve as a strong, independent, and
objective source of policy. 2 4 The importance of EPA's independence was

repeatedly stressed by a bipartisan group of witnesses who testified before
congressional committees in support of President Nixon's reorganization
plan. 2 5 EPA went into operation on December 2, 1970 in accordance with the
president's plan.
Among EPA's first responsibilities was implementation of the new
regulatory provisions in the Clean Air Act of 1970. Alarmed by the potential
cost of such regulations, the Commerce Department and the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") sought a mechanism to restrain EPA's
regulatory impulses. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans persuaded
President Nixon's chief domestic policy aide, John Ehrlichman, to establish a
task force to examine how to control EPA's regulatory activities. 26 OMB,
which had authority over the budgets of executive agencies, was alarmed by
the size of EPA's supplemental budget requests and by the perception that
24. In his statement creating EPA, President Nixon noted that each existing "department also
has its own primary mission-such as resource development, transportation, health, defense, urban
growth or agriculture-which necessarily affects its own views of environmental questions." Excerpts
from President's Message on Reorganization of Environmental Agencies, NY Times 14 (July 10, 1970). He
noted that "if the critical standard-setting functions were centralized within any one existing
department, it would require that department constantly to make decisions affecting other
departments-in which, whether fairly or unfairly, its own objectivity as an impartial arbiter could be
called into question." Id. Thus, he concluded, "in this case a strong, independent agency is
needed." Id. John Quarles notes that it is puzzling that Nixon, who was not a strong advocate of
environmental protection, was responsible for EPA's creation. He attributes this fact to the
enormous political popularity of environmental protection in 1970. Quarles, Cleaning Up America at
20 (cited in note 23).
25. Testifying in support of President Nixon's plan, Senator Edmund Muskie, chairman of the
principal Senate committee concerned with environmental protection, emphasized the importance of
EPA's autonomy and single-mission focus: "If the control of pollution is assigned to those
responsible for the promotion of polluting activities at the same time, we compromise our goal of
environmental protection. . . . The agency which sets environmental quality standards must have
only one goal-protection of this and future generations against changes in the natural environment
which adversely affect the quality of life." [Status of the Programs and Policies of the Environmental
Protection Agency], Hearing before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Public Works, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 13-14 (1977) ("Status Hearing"). Russell Train,
chairman of the CEQ, noted that "the public is increasingly questioning the vesting of promotional
and regulatory powers in the same agency," and concluded that EPA, "by assuming these regulatory
functions, should help restore public confidence in our ability to control pollution from these
sources." Id at 16, 19.
26. George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagans Regulatory Dilemma 47 (Urban Inst
Press, 1984).
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EPA's rulemaking responsibilities could dictate the size of the agency's
budget.
The complaints of the Commerce Department and OMB fell on receptive
ears; at that time President Nixon was continuing an effort to reorganize
substantially the entire executive branch in order to increase its accountability
to him. 2 7 The President had created OMB out of the old Bureau of the
Budget, renaming it to reflect the new management role he wanted it to
exercise over executive agencies. In his 1971 State of the Union message, the
President proposed creating four new superagencies to replace existing
domestic cabinet agencies. 28 When asked why the newly created EPA would
not be included in any of the proposed new superdepartments, OMB Director
George Shultz explained that "the basic idea is that it has a regulatory
function and, therefore, ought to have a degree of independence from the
29
programmatic efforts of the various departments.While publicly emphasizing the importance of EPA's independence, OMB
was acting to assert greater control over EPA's regulatory activities. On May
21, 1971, Shultz sent EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus a letter arguing
that OMB had authority to review and clear EPA regulations.3 0 Based on this
concept, President Nixon established a "Quality of Life" ("QOL") regulatory
review program under the direction of OMB.
The QOL program required that agencies submit regulatory proposals to
OMB for pre-publication review by other relevant agencies to ensure that
adequate consideration was given to the economic impact of regulation. 3 '
OMB was made responsible for mediating conflicts between agencies, but it
was not given ultimate decisionmaking power. A proposal that would have
shifted to OMB explicit decisionmaking authority had been rejected because
of concern over legal and political obstacles.3 2 Instead, the QOL review
process emphasized interagency comment by blocking the issuance of
proposed regulations until the concerns of other interested agencies were
fully aired and considered.
27. As part of his efforts to exert greater control over the bureaucracy, President Nixon also was
engaged in a spirited confrontation with Congress concerning his assertion of authority to impound
funds appropriated by Congress. Claiming that his power to withhold appropriated funds was
unlimited, the president "used the issue aggressively to provoke his political opponents who
controlled Congress." James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 203 (Brookings Inst,
1981).
28. When Congress balked at President Nixon's efforts to effect a massive reorganization of the
executive branch, he attempted to implement this program administratively by giving certain cabinet
officers the title of "Counsellors to the President." These reorganization plans, which ultimately
failed as the Watergate scandal engulfed the Presidency, are discussed in Richard P. Nathan, The Plot
that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency John Wiley & Sons, 1975).
29. Reorganization of Executive Departments, HR 6959, HR 6960, HR 6961, and HR 6962,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govt Operations, 92d Cong, Ist Sess
178 (1971).
30. Eads & Fix, Reliefor Refornt? at 47-48 (cited in note 26).
31. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the tVrong Questions at 37 (cited in note 20).
32. Eads & Fix, Relief or Refortn? at 48 (cited in note 26).
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Under the QOL process, agencies were to submit "significant" proposed

rules to OMB thirty days before draft publication, along with an analysis of
the rule's objectives, alternatives, and expected costs and benefits.3 3 OMB
then solicited comments from other agencies, which were forwarded to the
agency proposing the rule. A similar process, focusing on public comments
and any new issues raised during the rulemaking, was to be followed twenty
days before the publication of final rules.
The Clean Air Act provided the initial impetus for regulatory review, but
NEPA served as the model for the process by which QOL review was
conducted. 3 4 Rather than attempting to dictate the substance of agency
decisions, NEPA sought to change the decisionmaking process by requiring
agencies to prepare analyses of the environmental consequences of
alternative courses of action. 35 While the trend toward requiring more
systematic agency analysis of alternatives can be traced to budgetary planning
experiments initiated in the early 1960s, 3 6 NEPA institutionalized such a
requirement and made it enforceable by the public.3 7 In similar fashion, the
QOL program required agencies to prepare and consider analyses of the
economic impacts of regulation prior to proposing regulatory actions.
The QOL review process stimulated EPA's development of its own
internal review process as a means to assist the agency in justifying its
regulatory actions to external reviewers.3 8 EPA created the Office of Policy,

Planning and Evaluation ("OPPE") and staffed it with economists who
prepared analyses of the economic impacts of regulatory initiatives. OPPE
helped EPA articulate alternative regulatory options and substantially
improved the quality of the agency's regulatory analyses. Thus, the creation
33. Three categories of regulations were to be subjected to QOL review: (1) actions expected to
have a significant impact on the policies, programs, and procedures of other agencies, (2) actions
expected to impose significant costs or to remove significant benefits from nonfederal sectors, and
(3) actions expected to increase federal funding requirements beyond the levels provided for in the
most recent budget requests sent to Congress. Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in
Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External Review, 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) 693 (1976).
34. Although the influence of NEPA on the evolution of regulatory review has been largely
unexplored, the parallels between NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement and the
forms of regulatory analyses required by the regulatory review programs have been sufficiently
striking to elicit comment. See Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact
Statement Strategy of Administrative Reform 284 (Stanford U Press, 1984); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tex L Rev 1243, 1247-48 (1987).
35. As Robert Rabin has explained, although "NEPA may have been intended as a largely
symbolic enactment, [it] represented a wholly different strategy for controlling administrative
discretion." Unlike previous reform efforts such as the Administrative Procedure Act, "NEPA
anticipated an altered process of decision rather than simply better procedures for decision; the
environmental impact statement was to be 'action forcing' in that every federal regulatory agency was
to reassess its mandate in view of the environmental consequences of any major decision it might
reach." Rabin, 38 Stan L Rev at 1284, 1287 (cited in note 6).
36. See Alice M. Rivlin, Systematic Thinking for Social Action (Brookings Inst, 1971), discussing
planning-programming-budgeting concept introduced in the Defense Department in 1961, which
became an influential idea for improving domestic policy in part through the efforts of Charles
Schultz.
37. For an analysis of the impact of NEPA on agency decisionmaking, see Taylor, Making
Bureaucracies Think (cited in note 34).
38. Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency at 289-90 (cited in note 21).
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of an interagency review process stimulated a significant improvement in
EPA's analytical capabilities.
Although the QOL review process was supposed to apply to
environmental, consumer protection, and health and safety regulations, only
EPA regulations were actually subjected to QOL review. Urged on by the
corporate executives who comprised NIPCC, the Commerce Department
used the QOL process to raise vigorous challenges to EPA regulatory
proposals. The process featured "heated arguments between EPA and the
Department of Commerce, its principal antagonist," with the "main
'analysis' " of the reviews being "industry-prepared information presented by
the Commerce Department. " 3 9 OMB sometimes played "a mediating role"
and sometimes "press[ed] its own institutional interests (which generally were
40
opposed to EPA's)."
While the Commerce Department used the QOL review process to oppose
environmental regulation aggressively, the White House also kept a close
watch on EPA's activities. White House officials occasionally intervened
directly in environmental policy decisions. At the same time, however, EPA
Administrator Ruckelshaus sought to enhance the agency's independence
from the White House by courting favorable media attention. For example, a
presidential aide asked EPA to seek a stay of a court order EPA had won in
one of its first enforcement actions after the affected company's president, a
politically important Republican, had complained publicly that jobs would be
lost. 41

The White House backed off, however, after a newspaper report of the

incident triggered an immediate congressional hearing and a public threat by
Administrator Ruckelshaus that he would resign "if environmental decisions
42
are overruled because of political considerations."
While publicity could help blunt direct White House intervention, EPA did
not always prevail in the secretive QOL review process. Environmentalists
charged that QOL review was used to weaken regulations crucial to EPA's
early implementation of the Clean Air Act. In February 1972, a Senate
committee heard charges that OMB review had resulted in eleventh hour
changes that severely weakened EPA's guidelines for state implementation
plans ("SIPs") under the Clean Air Act. The final guidelines promulgated by
EPA were said to be substantially less stringent than the final regulations EPA
had prepared and submitted to OMB for QOL review. 43 In a statement that
now sounds like a familiar refrain, an attorney from the Natural Resources
Defense Council told the Senate committee:
The White House Office of Management and Budget is reviewing in secrecy every
major action of the Environmental Protection Agency. The public is completely
excluded from this review, but the most antienvironmental Federal agencies, such as
39.
40.
41.
against
42.
43.

Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 49 (cited in note 26).
Id.
This incident is described in Quarles, Cleaning Up America at 58-76 (cited in note 23) (action
Armco Steel for polluting the Houston Ship Channel).
Id at 68-70.
1970 Clean Air Act Hearings at 4 (cited in note 13).
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the Commerce Department and the Federal Power Commission, appear to have full
access to it. These agencies, acting as spokesmen for industrial interests, have
effective power to veto EPA's
actions. Now becoming routine, OMB review is gelding
44
the clean air amendments.

Responding to this charge, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus
admitted that the guidelines had been changed after QOL review, but he
branded as "categorically false" the notion that OMB had dictated the
changes. 4 5 In an effort to turn the tables on the committee, Ruckelshaus
noted that members of Congress also had suggested changes in the final
guidelines. 46 Sounding a theme often to be repeated in defense of OMB
review, Ruckelshaus asserted that he, not OMB, had made the final decision
about changes in the guidelines. 4 7 Confronted with a chart of the SIP process
prepared by EPA that had the words "OMB approval" as the last step in the
48
process, Ruckelshaus branded it "erroneous.Called back for a second day of hearings, the EPA Administrator admitted
that White House aides occasionally asked him to respond to complaints from
corporate officials. But he denied that a letter he had sent in response to such
a complaint was improper, even though it appeared to moderate EPA's
position concerning regulation of a Montana copper smelter. 49 The
Administrator complained that by airing such charges the committee had
damaged the agency's credibility by reinforcing public mistrust. 50 While
stating that he welcomed QOL review, Ruckelshaus emphasized that officials
of the Executive Office were not making decisions for EPA and "[i]f they were,
I would be breaking the law, and I would not function as Administrator of this
Agency if I let them do so."' 5 I The Administrator observed that QOL review
was beneficial because it permitted EPA to take advantage of the "expertise
that exists in other agencies of Government," and it informs the other
52
agencies of the reasons for EPA's actions.
EPA's retention of final authority for regulatory decisions subject to QOL
review was confirmed by OMB Director George Shultz. While he did not
appear at the hearing, Shultz sent a note advising the committee that "EPA
has final authority on plans for implementation of air quality standards under
53
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970."
Although Ruckelsh~aus had assured Congress that he had the ultimate
authority over regulatory matters, the White House was acting to give OMB
44. Id at 4 (statement of Richard Ayres, Natural Resources Defense Council).
45. Id at 230.
46. Id at 231.
47. Id at 243 ("OMB did not get any final crack at the regulation. OMB is nothing more than a
conduit to insure that other Federal agencies who want to comment on any regulation that we might
issue are given that right to comment. The final determination as to what ought to be in the
guidelines is mine.").
48. Id at 238-39.
49. Id at 297-306.
50. Id at 325.
51. Id.
52. Id at 325-26.
53. Id at 338.
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greater authority to review agency communications with Congress. On July
31, 1972, OMB Circular A-19 was promulgated, which required agencies to
submit proposed testimony, reports, or legislation to OMB prior to their
transmission to Congress.

54

Although Ruckelshaus defended regulatory review to the outside world,
conflict between EPA and the Executive Office was not infrequent. It has
been reported that during President Nixon's reelection campaign, his
campaign chairman, Maurice Stans, cited the potential threat a vigorous EPA
posed when soliciting campaign contributions from corporate officials. 5 5
Thus, it is understandable that EPA officials were concerned about the
agency's independence in the wake of President Nixon's landslide victory.
Quarles reports that as a condition for remaining as EPA administrator after
the 1972 election, Ruckelshaus requested written assurances from Nixon that
the EPA administrator would retain ultimate authority for EPA policy
EPA "bargained in vain
decisions. 56 Despite President Nixon's verbal assent,
57
with OMB to spell out the change in writing."Russell Train also insisted upon written assurances that the EPA
administrator retained ultimate policy authority when he was appointed to
succeed Ruckelshaus in the summer of 1973.58 In his confirmation hearing,
Train emphasized that it was "of crucial importance that EPA establish and
maintain at all times a strongly independent role."-59 Train voiced qualified
support for QOL review, by calling it "a perfectly appropriate part of the
decisionmaking process" to the extent that it elicits the view of other agencies,
but only when it is conducted, controlled, and directed by the EPA
administrator. 60 He announced that he had "already discussed this matter
with responsible officials in OMB" and that he had "full concurrence that all
processes of interagency comment, review, and suggestion with respect to
proposed regulatory decisions by the Administrator of EPA will be directed by
on his behalf, not
the Administrator of EPA and be conducted by him and
61
controlled by the Office of Management and Budget."
54. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 695 (cited in note 33).
55. James Q Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in Wilson, ed, The Politics of Regulation 357, 388
(cited in note 21). Noting that President Nixon was largely unsuccessful in his efforts to curb EPA's
aggressive commitment to strict environmental standards, Wilson suggests that "a vigorous EPA was
more valuable to Nixon than a passive one." Id. As Wilson explains: "There is a fine line between
bribery and extortion." Id.
56. Quarles, Cleaning up America at 117-19 (cited in note 23). Landy, Roberts, and Thomas
report that, prior to accepting a position as EPA administrator in 1973, Russell Train insisted on
obtaining written confirmation that he would have final authority over all EPA regulations. Landy,
Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Vrong Questions at 38 (cited in note 20).
57. Quarles, Cleaning Up America at 119 (cited in note 23).
58. Id at 119.
59. Nomination of Russell E. Train, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Public Works,
93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1973) ("I assure you that I, as Administrator, will make the final decisions. I
will seek and welcome comments and suggestions both from within Government and from the
public, but the final decisions will be mine.").
60. Id at 8.
61. Id at 8. Train also pledged close cooperation with Senator Muskie's committee, which
expressed a desire to perform detailed oversight of EPA's operations. As Senator Muskie told the
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Train's pledge that he would control the regulatory review process did not
insulate him from vigorous White House pressure on major regulatory
decisions. John Quarles has provided a detailed account of unrelenting
pressure from the White House to weaken EPA's initial regulations limiting
the lead content of gasoline. 62 Faced with a court-ordered deadline to
promulgate the regulations, Train had submitted draft regulations to OMB
for QOL review three weeks before the deadline. At an interagency meeting
held to discuss the regulations five days before the deadline, EPA stated that it
would proceed with the regulations despite opposition from other agencies
such as the Department of the Interior. Throughout the two days preceding
the deadline, a flurry of phone calls and White House meetings transpired as
presidential aides, OMB, and Interior officials sought to block Train from
promulgating any meaningful limits on the lead content of gasoline. EPA
ultimately promulgated the regulations it wanted only after agreeing, two
hours before the press conference announcing the regulations, to accept
OMB's request to delay the final target date for the lead phasedown program
63
by one year.
Quarles also recounts a wide range of disputes that occurred between
EPA and the White House over legislative and budgetary issues. In January
1974, in response to economic pressures caused by the Arab oil embargo, the
Nixon Administration developed proposed legislation to weaken the Clean
Air Act. White House staff engaged in a bitter dispute with EPA officials in an
effort to get EPA to endorse the proposal. EPA Administrator Russell Train
refused to support the legislation and threatened to resign. The White House
staff was forced to back down, increasing Train's reputation as a strong
advocate of environmental protection who was independent of White House
control. 64 Regardless of the impact of such incidents, Train's independence
undoubtedly increased due to the growing Watergate6 5scandal that weakened
President Nixon and ultimately forced him to resign.
B.

Regulatory Review in the Ford Administration

The Quality of Life review program was continued during the
administration of President Ford, who took office following President Nixon's
resignation in August 1974. Concerned about rising inflation, President Ford
expanded the scope of regulatory review by broadening the subjects of
administrator-designate, "I don't want to be sitting on your lap as you are making these decisions,
but I would like to think I know what is going on and that you share the same view." Id at 8-9. Train
noted, however, that as a member of the executive branch he also remained independent of
Congress. Id at 54.
62. See Quarles, Cleaning Up America at 117-42 (cited in note 23).
63. Id at 138.
64. Id at 141.
65. As Robert Sansom, who was EPA's assistant administrator for air pollution control
programs, notes, Train survived as EPA administrator "because Richard Nixon did not." Robert
Sansom, The .Vew American Dream Machine: Toward a Simpler Lifestyle in an Environmental Age 25 (Anchor
Press, 1976).
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regulatory analyses and by entrusting a new Executive Office agency with
responsibility for reviewing them.
Although the Nixon Administration had sought to moderate selected
regulations through QOL review, federal regulatory activity had grown
rapidly in the early 1970s. Seven new regulatory agencies had been created,
including EPA, OSHA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Between 1970 and 1974, twenty-nine major regulatory statutes had been
enacted and the number of pages in the Federal Register had more than
66
doubled from 20,036 to 42,422 per year.
Ford's staff was less directly involved in efforts to influence regulatory
decisions. A transition team that advised him had expressed concern over
OMB's growing influence over policymaking by agencies. It concluded that
"OMB was becoming too involved in departmental policy processes, and
limiting the department's ability to come up with innovative ideas. It was
moving into departments at [t]oo low a level, and preventing the free flow of
ideas." 6 7 Perhaps motivated by such concerns, the Ford Administration
shifted the focus of regulatory review away from prepublication review toward
review of proposed regulations during the public comment period. 68
Concerned about the growing inflation problem, President Ford
broadened the type of analyses agencies were required to undertake. In
November 1974, he issued Executive Order 11821, which required executive
agencies to prepare "inflation impact statements" prior to issuing major
rules. 6 9 OMB instructed agencies to include in the inflation impact
statements "an analysis of the principal cost or other inflationary effects of the
action," a comparison of these with "the benefits to be derived from the
proposed action," and a review of alternatives that were considered. 70
A new agency in the Executive Office, the Council on Wage and Price
Stability ("CWPS"), was given the role of coordinating agency compliance
with the executive order. 7 ' Unlike QOL review, CWPS's review occurred
during the public comment period, and it produced written statements by
CWPS that were added to the rulemaking record. CWPS was not authorized
66. James C. Miller, III, Lessons of the Economic Impact Statement Program, 1 Regulation 14, 15
(July/Aug 1977).
67. Quoted in a question submitted by Senator Ribicoff to OMB Director designate Thomas B.
Lance in Nominations of Thomas B. Lance and James T. McIntyre, Jr., Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 30 (1977) ("Nomination Hearings of
Lance and McIntyre").
68. George C. Eads, White House Oversight of Executive Branch Regulation, in Eugene Bardach &
Robert A. Kagan, eds, Social Regulation: Strategies for Reform 177, 192-93 (Inst for Contemp Stud,
1982).
69. Exec Order 11821, 3 CFR 926 (1971-1975 Comp). This program was later incorporated
into a revised Executive Order 11949, issued by the lame duck Ford Administration on December 31,
1976. This executive order renamed the basic regulatory analysis document an "Economic Impact
Statement." 42 Fed Reg 1017 (1977).
70. Evaluation of the Inflationary Impact of Major Proposals for Legislation and the
Promulgation of Regulations or Rules, OMB Circular No A-107 (Jan 28, 1975).
71. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub L No 93-387, 88 Stat 750 (1974), codified at
12 USC § 1904 (1982).
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to block agency rulemaking action; rather, it sought to influence the agency
through its testimony during the rulemaking proceeding. CWPS
representatives often testified in person at agency hearings. While CWPS's
activities generated considerable controversy, Congress expressly endorsed
CWPS's participation in rulemaking proceedings when it amended CWPS's
enabling act in 1975.72
Unlike QOL review, which had focused exclusively on EPA during the
Nixon Administration, CWPS reviewed the activities of a wide variety of
agencies, but focused most of its attention on economic regulations issued by
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Only
eighteen of the 180 public filings made by CWPS between December 1974
73
and November 1978 involved EPA regulations.
Although few substantive changes in regulations can be credited directly
to the Ford Administration's requirement that agencies prepare Inflation
Impact Statements, the program did help stimulate expanded use of economic
analysis by regulatory agencies. When CWPS solicited public comment on
the program, most agencies found the analyses helpful and supported
continuation of the program. 74 However, the analyses themselves were of
uneven quality and often were prepared after a regulation had been
75
developed in order to justify the agency's decision.
The Ford Administration's continuation of QOL review was more
controversial than its new Inflation Impact Statement requirement.
Reviewing OMB's management of the QOL review program, the Environment
Reporter concluded in 1976 that "[OMB] plays an influential part in shaping
federal environmental policies, frequently with little public awareness or
understanding of its role." 76 Repeating some of the same criticisms made

during the Nixon Administration, the report noted that EPA officials believed
that their agency had been unfairly "singled out" for QOL reviews and that
72. Congress confirmed CWPS's authority to "intervene and otherwise participate on its own
behalf in rulemaking, ratemaking, licensing and other proceedings before any of the departments
and agencies of the United States in order to present its views as to the inflationary impact that might
result from the possible outcomes of such proceedings." Council on Wage and Price Stability Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub L No 94-78, § 4, 89 Stat 411 (1975), codified at 12 USC § 1904 (1982).
See PresidentialM'anagement of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies 9 (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1987) ("NAPA,
Presidential Management").
73. Cost of Government Regulations to the Consumer, Hearings before the Subcommittee for
Consumers of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong, 2d Sess
53-55 (1978) ("Cost Hearings"). A total of 65 Inflation Impact Statements and Economic Impact
Analyses were prepared between December 1975 and April 1977. Fifty-seven involved proposed
regulations and eight involved proposed legislation. EPA prepared such analyses for 17 proposed
regulatory actions between July 1975 and January 1977. Miller, I Regulation at 14, 20-21 (cited in
note 66).
74. Miller, I Regulation at 17 (cited in note 66) (noting that only the Department of Agriculture
and the Federal Energy Administration opposed continuation of the program, and that organized
labor had criticized the program for delaying OSHA's issuance of regulations).
75. Id at 18 (noting that EPA and the Department of Transportation "devoted substantial
analytical resources to the task" of performing economic analyses, while many other agencies did
not, id at 16).
76. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 693 (cited in note 33).
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most other federal agencies generally used the review process to try to weaken
EPA regulations.
President Ford was not known as a strong advocate of environmental
regulation. He supported measures to relax environmental regulations,
particularly auto emission controls, and twice vetoed legislation requiring
regulation of strip mining. EPA Administrator Russell Train, who had argued
against the vetoes, later expressed the view that President Ford was
fundamentally bored by environmental issues and that EPA's opposition to
the vetoes seemed to be only a minor irritant to him. 77 While President Ford
did not become personally involved in regulatory decisions, friction continued
between EPA and the Executive Office during the QOL review process.
Administrator Train provided a congressional oversight committee with his
own candid assessment of the impact of QOL review on EPA in the waning
days of the Ford Administration: "It has certainly made our job more
difficult. Whether it has actually resulted in [our making] a decision which we
would not otherwise have made or not making a decision which we otherwise
would have made, I don't know. I think it simply prolonged the struggle very
often." ' 78 Train opined that "there has to be interagency review" and that
EPA benefitted from this review. 79 However, he concluded that EPA "has
been singled out for special attention" by OMB, and he urged that EPA,
rather than OMB, should control the regulatory review process in the
future. 80

Although Ford was the last president to employ the QOL review process
actively, QOL was an important precedent for the regulatory review programs
that followed. It also had some beneficial effects on EPA. EPA developed one
of the best capacities to analyze regulations of any federal agency 8' and
created an internal clearance process for regulations that increased the
82
administrator's control over the agency's regulatory agenda.
77. John Osborne, White House Watch: The Ford Years xvi (New Republic Books, 1977). Osborne
notes that in answer to a question about balancing environmental and economic considerations, Ford
once expressed the view that the best way to resolve such problems was to get Russell Train and
Federal Energy Administrator Frank Zarb together and "let them work it out." Id at 180.
78. Status Hearing at 45 (cited in note 25).
79. Id.
80. Id ("I believe that OMB can properly participate in such review sessions, but I don't see
OMB as controlling them, controlling the timetable, holding up, sitting on regulations or
proposals."). Train also noted that EPA clearly had not been given sufficient resources to fulfill its
broad statutory responsibilities, id at 8, 82-83, and that the agency needed more flexibility in its
regulatory authority. Id at 9.
81. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 50 (cited in note 26); Susan J. Tolchin & Martin Tolchin,
Dismantling America: The Rush to Deregulate 44 (Houghton Mifflin, 1983). Shortly before leaving office
in January 1977, EPA Administrator Russell Train told a Senate committee that the agency's
regulatory analyses had improved considerably and that EPA had "about the best economic
analytical capability in the Federal Government" at the time. Status Hearing at 10 (cited in note 25).
82. Outgoing EPA Administrator Train reported in January 1977 that EPA had "set up rather
stringent procedures for streamlining our regulations by asking not only of every regulation we have
already issued, but of every regulation we are thinking of developing: 'Is this regulation really necessao,?'
These procedures also include a requirement that all regulatory proposals must be approved by my
Office before their development." Status Hearing at 70 (cited in note 25).
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The Carter Administration's Regulatory Review Program

Because President Carter had supported environmental protectiora
measures during his campaign, it was widely anticipated that relations
between the Executive Office and EPA would improve dramatically during the
Carter Administration. Although the QOL review program was not officially
repealed when President Carter took office in January 1977, EPA felt free to
ignore it. Acting EPA Administrator John Quarles eventually notified OMB
that EPA would no longer participate in QOL reviews. When Douglas Costle
took over as EPA administrator in 1977, he indicated that EPA would
continue informal interagency consultation and strengthened the agency's
Office of Planning and Management, which had been responsible for
3
preparing EPA's regulatory analyses .
To the dismay of many environmentalists, President Carter played a
surprisingly active role in efforts to temper EPA regulations. In retrospect,
Carter's actions are not as surprising as they may have seemed at the time. In
the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, President Carter had campaigned as a
Washington outsider who pledged to reform the federal bureaucracy. He
promised to reduce the cost of government by reorganizing executive
agencies as he had done as governor of Georgia. Thus, it is not surprising
that he would support vigorous Executive Office oversight. When the
economic consequences of the second OPEC oil price shock led Carter to
question whether the economy could afford tighter environmental controls,
the Carter White House became more directly involved in regulatory review
than any previous administration.
President Carter nominated his friend Thomas B. ("Bert") Lance to be
OMB Director. At his confirmation hearings inJanuary 1977, Lance endorsed
the notion that OMB should play a major role in coordinating and reviewing
the actions of executive agencies to ensure their consistency with
administration policies.8 4 He stated his belief that OMB should not interfere
in agency rulemaking, but he noted that both "the agencies and the Congress
would benefit from OMB's role in coordinating-but not 'clearing'-agencies'
85
legislative and regulatory proposals."
At the hearings, Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie urged Lance to
abandon the QOL review process, arguing that, in the hands of OMB, QOL
review had "resulted in compromising agency positions prior to those
positions becoming public in order to accommodate special interests." '8 6 He
urged that any OMB oversight occur only after publication of a proposed rule
83. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 55 (cited in note 26).
84. Nomination Hearings of Lance and McIntyre at 31 (cited in note 67) (responses to
prehearing questions submitted by Sen. Ribicoff) ("With regard to substantive regulations of other
agencies, I think it would be appropriate for OMB to review them on a selective basis for consistency
with the president's overall policies.").
85. Id at 32. When asked whether OMB should seek to influence a regulatory agency's decision
in any rulemaking or adjudicative proceeding pending before the agency, he responded with a flat
"No." Id at 35.
86. Id at 84.
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in order to permit Congress and the public access to the agency's views
uncensored by OMB. 8 7 Although Lance gave Muskie a noncommittal
response, 8 the regulatory review program subsequently developed by the
Carter Administration generally adhered to that advice.
Despite strong opposition to regulatory review from organized labor,
President Carter in April 1977 directed agencies to give more detailed
consideration to "the economic cost of major government regulations" and
requested CWPS to continue to analyze the inflationary implications of
regulations.8 9 In August 1977, the Carter Administration circulated to federal
agencies a proposal for a new regulatory review process, a process designed
to require agencies to perform analyses that focused more on the costeffectiveness of regulations than on cost-benefit analysis.9 0 Under the
proposal, a committee of representatives of various federal agencies would
select a handful of significant rules for review. 9 ' Citing the bitterness and
distrust that the QOL program had engendered in the environmental
community, EPA Administrator Costle opposed the concept of formal
interagency review. But President Carter ultimately adopted such a program,
after decreasing the representation of the "economic agencies" on the review
panel and limiting the number of reviews per rule-proposing agency to four
92
each year.
On March 23, 1978, President Carter issued an executive order entitled
which created the most
"Improving Government Regulations,"
comprehensive regulatory review program that had ever been established.
Declaring that regulations should "not impose unnecessary burdens on the
economy," and should be issued only after consideration of meaningful
alternatives, Executive Order 12044 required all executive agencies to
prepare a "Regulatory Analysis" ("RA") for major regulations. Major
regulations were defined as those that may have major economic
or
consequences, such as an annual economic impact of $100 million or more
93
country.
the
of
sectors
individual
major increases in costs or prices for
Mindful that previous requirements for regulatory analysis often had
produced after-the-fact attempts to justify the regulations, 9 4 the Carter
Administration required agencies to develop RAs early in the decisionmaking
process and to make them available for public comment at the time the agency
published its proposed rule in the Federal Register. RAs were to include a
87. Id.
88. Id (noting that "it is easier to try to deal with problems at the outset rather than after they
get to be problems, and I would like for us to approach that from that viewpoint").
89. Miller, I Regulation at 14 (cited in note 66).
90. Cost-effectiveness analysis focuses on determining the least costly means for achieving a
given goal. Cost-benefit analysis focuses on balancing the costs and benefits of an action to
determine whether it is worth pursuing.
91. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 55 (cited in note 26).
92. Id.
93. Exec Order 12044, 3 CFR 152, 154 (1979).
94. Cost Hearings at 15 (cited in note 73) (testimony of Wayne Grandquist, associate director
for regulation, OMB).
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rigorous evaluation of alternatives to the proposed regulatory action, the
economic consequences of the proposed action and alternative actions, and
the agency's rationale for choosing one alternative over the others. Agencies
also were required to publish final RAs at the time a final rule was published
and to conduct a "sunset-type" review of existing regulations to determine
regulations that could be modified or eliminated. 0MB was made responsible
95
for ensuring agency compliance.
CWPS and the president's Council of Economic Advisors ("CEA") joined
OMB in conducting regulatory reviews through an interagency group called
the Regulatory Analysis Review Group ("RARG"). 9 6 Chaired by the chairman
of CEA, RARG was composed of representatives of seventeen major executive
agencies 9 7 and was made responsible for assisting agencies in analyzing the
economic consequences of major rules. A four-member executive committee,
including representatives of the CEA, OMB, and two rotating members (one
from an "economic agency" and one from a "regulatory agency"), were
directed to select ten to twenty major regulations each year for intensive
review. Economists from CWPS served as staff reviewers for RARG and
assisted in the preparation of RARG's formal comments that were submitted
to agencies as part of the public rulemaking record. 98
Unlike the QOL program, the RARG review process was structured to
respect the public rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative
Procedure Act and the underlying regulatory statutes. Unlike QOL reviewers,
RARG reviewers could not attempt to prevent agencies from issuing
rulemaking proposals because RARG review occurred only after an agency

95. Exec Order 12044, 3 CFR 152, 155-56 (1979). Although the Carter Administration's
Regulatory Analysis requirement was very similar to the Ford Administration's IIS and EIA
requirements, Carter Administration officials argued that their program would be more successful.
The old IIS-EIA "[t]oo often ... was seen as ex post justification of a previously chosen alternativea cosmetic add-on, . . . was not taken very seriously by enough senior officials, and was
misinterpreted by many [as requiring unrealistic cost/benefit analysis or resistance to any regulation
that raised prices]." The new RA requirement was intended to function as a "genuinely useful and
used decisionmaking tool as a regulation evolves, and as a clear track record of what factors are being
considered .... There is much greater focus on alternatives, .... " OMB had taken on an oversight
role, and "t]he public would be able to use the RA during the comment period to facilitate informed
public participation." Cost Hearings at 46 (cited in note 73) (statement of Thomas D. Hopkins,
assistant director for government operations and research, Council on Wage and Price Stability).
96. DeMuth, 4 Regulation at 16 (cited in note 6).
97. RARG's membership included representatives from five "economic agencies" (the Council
of Economic Advisers, OMB, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury), eight "regulatory agencies" (EPA,
Transportation, Agriculture, Energy, HEW, HUD, Interior, and Justice), the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and CWPS. Robert E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation
69 n18 (Yale U Press, 1983). CEQand the president's Domestic Policy Staff were to serve as advisers
to RARG.
98. Exec Order 12044, 3 CFR 155 (1979). The Carter Administration regulatory review
program had been structured to accommodate objections raised by EPA Administrator Douglas
Costle, who had argued that it would be dangerous to resuscitate QOL review, which " 'was used
more to frustrate EPA in the pursuit of its legal responsibilities than to ensure responsible economic
analysis.' " Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 56 (cited in note 26), quoting Memorandum from Douglas
Costle to President Carter, August 24, 1977.
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had published a proposed regulation in the Federal Register. 9 9 RARG's
reviews were designed to take place entirely during the public comment
period. 0 0 Unlike QOL reviews, which were conducted in secrecy, RARG
reviews produced public documents summarizing the reviewers' concerns.' 0 '
The RARG program was designed to force agencies to take a harder look at
regulatory alternatives, while leaving ultimate regulatory decisions to the
responsible agencies. In this respect, the program was similar to NEPA,
which sought to influence agency decisions by requiring preparation and
consideration of environmental impact statements without dictating any
substantive results. Yet when a proposed regulation was selected for review
by RARG, extraordinary efforts often were made to persuade the agency to
change the substance of its decision.
Although the Carter Administration program emphasized the importance
of avoiding unnecessarily burdensome regulations, it did not actually require
agencies to base regulatory decisions on cost-benefit analyses. Recognizing
the difficulties inherent in efforts to assess the costs and benefits of
environmental regulations, the program emphasized the use of costeffectiveness analysis to encourage agencies to select the least burdensome
means to achieve their goals.' 0 2 RARG reviews helped stimulate research into
improved methods for quantifying the benefits of environmental regulation,
though the program imposed largely procedural, and not substantive,
03
constraints on agency decisionmaking. 1
99. A briefing paper described the procedures used by RARG for choosing which regulations to
review:
When an agency publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") for a major
regulation, it sends a summary of the proposal to the Review Group so that any agency with
an interest in the economic impact of the proposal is promptly informed of the proceeding.
Any member of the Review Group can request that the Executive Committee consider a
review of the draft Regulatory Analysis. A decision to conduct a review is made within two
weeks after publication of the NPRM. If two or more Executive Committee members are in
favor, review will be held and notice to this effect will be submitted to the agency's public
record for this regulatory proceeding.
Cost Hearings at 58, 59 (cited in note 73).
100. Id at 10 (statement of Wayne Grandquist, associale director for regulation, OMB).
101. The process for conducting RARG reviews has been described in the following terms:
Once the Executive Committee votes to review a Regulatory Analysis, CWPS prepares a
draft statement of concerns which it submits to the Review Group for approval. After taking
into account any agency suggestions, CWPS then submits the Review Group's statement of
concerns to the agency's public record for this proceeding.
About two weeks beFore the rulemaking record closes, CWPS delivers a draft report that
focuses on these concerns of the Review Group, which meets to discuss the report and any
needed changes. CWPS has a week to revise this draft, incorporating written and oral
comments submitted by Review Group members.
Generally a second Review Group meeting then is held to go over the revised draft. The
Review Group decides whether to accept the revised draft. Any dissenting views of the
members are either incorporated in the report or attached separately.
CWPS submits the final Review Group report into the rulemaking record on that last day
of the public comment period.
Id at 59.
102. See id at 36-37 (statement of EPA Administrator Costle).
103. Christopher DeMuth attributes the lack of substantive standards for regulatory review under
the Ford and Carter programs to variations in the standards imposed by the regulatory statutes and
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RARG reviews of EPA regulations were highly controversial. The RARG
staff was composed of mission-oriented economists strongly committed to the
use of cost-benefit analysis in setting environmental standards., 0 4 EPA
officials reportedly had little respect for the RARG review process. Former
EPA Administrator Douglas Costle has been quoted as saying that "probably
three out of every four CWPS comments on our rule making were cribbed
right from industry briefs . . . partly because it suited their economic biases

about these issues, and their own perception that they were custodians and
5
keepers of the regulatory reform flame."' 10
RARG aggressively challenged several regulations, including EPA's
national ambient air quality standard ("NAAQS") for ozone and its new
source performance standard ("NSPS") for coal-fired power plants. RARG
argued that the NAAQS for ozone would cost $14-19 billion per year, nearly
twice EPA's estimates.' 0 6 After a series of meetings with White House staff
over a two-week period in January 1979, EPA Administrator Costle agreed to
relax the ozone standard but not by as much as the White House staff had
requested.

0 7

White House officials became involved in subsequent regulatory decisions,
including rules to implement the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act and the NSPS for coal-fired power plants. Environmental groups
challenged the decisions in court, questioning the president's authority to
influence agency decisions in a manner not reflected in the rulemaking
record. 0 8 When RARG argued that EPA's proposal to implement the best
available technology ("BAT") requirements of the Clean Water Act were
"prohibitively expensive," EPA officials protested to Congress and the press.
Some EPA officials reportedly felt that "continuing White House intervention
in the regulatory process [was] compromising their efforts to establish and
enforce antipollution laws."' 0 9 Senator Muskie's committee held oversight
10
hearingsto investigate these charges.'
Faced with criticism from the committee, President Carter pledged that he
would not compromise environmental standards for economic gain. He
doubt concerning the political feasibility of imposing more stringent substantive controls on
agencies. DeMuth, 4 Regulation at 16-17 (cited in note 6).
104. Susan J. Tolchin, PresidentialPower and the Politics of RARG, Regulation 44 (July/Aug 1979).
105. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the 1'rong Questions at 68 (cited in note 20).
106. Id.
107. In its notice of proposed rulemaking, EPA had proposed to relax the existing ozone
standard of .08 ppm by raising it to .10 ppm, indicating it might go as high as .12 ppm. Despite
pressure from industry and the White House staff to relax it even further, Costle ultimately adopted a
.12 ppm standard. See id at 63-73.
108. Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298 (DC Cir 1981).
109. Philip Shabecoff, Some in EPA Assail White House Moves, NY Times AI (Feb 22, 1979) (noting
that White House interference "has led several senior officials at the environmental agency to talk of
resigning," and that EPA officials complained that RARG's economists invariably represented
industry viewpoints: "This often amounts to giving industry one more shot at weakening the
regulations after the record is closed," an anonymous EPA official said).
110. Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong,
1st Sess 3 (1979) ("Executive Branch Hearings").
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endorsed the notion that he had a right to intervene in EPA decisionmaking in
the future but pledged that this power would be exercised very sparingly.'
Although Carter's statement did not entirely end White House efforts to
intervene in agency decisions,' 2 it was interpreted as substantially weakening
RARG's influence on agency officials.' 3
During the next year RARG
14
regulation.'
proposed
a
of
published only one analysis
Toward the close of the Carter Administration, the nation's growing
economic problems increased interest in measures to reduce the cost of
regulation. In 1979, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress
recommended that consideration be given to adopting a "regulatory budget"
that would limit the total costs a regulatory agency could impose on industry
in a given year. In its 1980 annual report, the president's Council of
Economic Advisors emphasized the desirability of measures to improve the
ability of regulatory agencies to set priorities.' 15
Efforts to reduce the burden of regulation on industry are reflected in two
laws enacted in 1980 at the close of the Carter Administration: the
Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act ("PRA"). 16 The
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to analyze the impact of their
regulations on small businesses. The PRA broadened OMB's prior authority
to prevent agencies from collecting unnecessary information'1 7 by requiring
that OMB review and clear all proposed information collection requests.,' 8
While the regulatory review programs previously had been a product of
executive orders, the PRA provided a statutory foundation for OMB review of
agency action. The act created the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA") in OMB, which now conducts regulatory reviews for the
Executive Office.
D.

The Reagan Administration Regulatory Review Program

President Reagan arrived in Washington determined to roll back what he
perceived to be excessive federal regulation. As one observer explains:
As a long-time opponent of the excesses of government waste, [President Reagan]
carried with him a long list of anecdotes about OSHA-designed toilet seats and

11.
Philip Shabecoff, Environment Vow Made by President, NY Times AI5 (Feb 28, 1979).
112. Two months later Stuart Eizenstat, director of the White House domestic policy staff,
reportedly phoned the Office of the Federal Register to block publication of Department of Energy
regulations encouraging coal conversions because they had not been reviewed by RARG. Tolchin &
Tolchin, Dismantling America at 46 (cited in note 81).
113. DeMuth, 4 Regulation at 20-21 (cited in note 6) (Carter's statement "was interpreted as a
clear signal that he wished to leave final regulatory judgments to his regulatory officials themselvesand that his staff regulatory reviewers were to function primarily as kibitzers rather than as superregulators threatening presidential intervention to force compliance with their own policy ideas.").
114. Id at 24.
115. Christopher C. DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, 4 Regulation 29, 30 (March/April 1980).
116. Respectively, Pub L No 96-354, 94 Stat 1164 (1980), codified at 5 USCA § 601 (1988); Pub L
No 96-511, 94 Stat 2812 (1980), codified at 44 USCA § 3501 (1988).
117. The Federal Reports Act § 3(d), Pub L No 77-831 (1942) (granting prior authority).
118. 44 USCA § 3520(c) (1988). Federal paperwork requirements cost private industry, state and
local government and individuals between $30 and $40 billion per year. Commission on Federal
Paperwork, Final Summary Report 5 (Oct 3, 1977).
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polluting trees. If there was any doubt about the Republican Party's intentions, it
should have been put to rest by the 1980 platform, which stated that "The Republican
Party declares war on government overregulation."1 19

Eads and Fix argue that the Reagan Administration's hostility to federal
regulation was motivated by two principal ideas. First, regulatory relief was
perceived as a way to stimulate the economy.' 20 Second, President Reagan
viewed government regulation as an unwarranted intrusion into private
conduct. As a result, while previous regulatory review programs had been
motivated by concern for improving the quality of regulations, the Reagan
Administration's principal objective was far more radical: to eliminate as
much regulation as possible.
On his first working day in office, President Reagan announced the
formation of a cabinet-level Task Force on Regulatory Relief chaired by Vice
President George Bush.' 2 1 The Task Force was charged with developing a
program to review new regulatory proposals, reassessing existing regulations
that were particularly burdensome to industry, and developing legislative
proposals "to codify the President's views on the appropriate role and
objectives of regulatory agencies." 122 Less than a week after its formation, the
Task Force announced it was suspending nearly 200 pending regulations.
Vice President Bush sent a letter to corporate executives throughout the
country asking them to identify existing regulations that were unduly
burdensome. 23 The Task Force used these responses during the next two
years to develop a "hit list" of 119 existing regulations identified as
24
candidates for reconsideration.
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order that
established the basic structure of the regulatory review program that remains
in effect today. Executive Order 12291 requires executive agencies to submit
25
all proposed rules and final regulations to OMB for prepublication review.1
Major rules, defined as rules with an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more, must be accompanied by a detailed cost-benefit analysis,
known as a regulatory impact analysis ("RIA"). Agencies must submit RIAs
119. Jeffrey A. Eisenach, A While House Strategy for Deregulation, in Charles L. Heatherly & Burton
Yabe Pines, eds, Aandate for Leadership III: Policy Strategiesfor the 1990s, 88 (Heritage Foundation,
1989).
120. David Stockman (OMB director), Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk (Dec 1980)
(Memorandum) ("A dramatic, substantial rescission of the regulatory burden is needed for the short
term cash flow it will provide to business firms and [for] the long term signal it will provide to
corporate investment planners."), quoted in Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 1-2 (cited in note 26).
121. The other members of the Task Force included the Director of OMB, the Secretaries of
Treasury, Commerce and Labor, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors and the Assistant to the President for Policy Development. Role of OMB in Regulation,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Energy &
Commerce Committee, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 43 (1981) ("OMB Hearings").
122. Id at 44.
123. Idat415.
124. NAPA, Presidential Management at 10 (cited in note 72).
125. 3 CFR 127 (1982), reprinted as a note in 5 USC § 601 (1982). OMB's Office of Information
and Regulation Affairs ("OIRA") has been delegated the responsibility for conducting regulatory
reviews under Exec Order 12291.
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and notices of proposed rulemaking to OMB at least sixty days prior to
publication of major rules. For nonmajor rules, all notices of proposed
rulemaking and final rules are to be submitted to OMB at least ten days prior
to publication.
The preamble to Executive Order 12291 states the objectives of the
Reagan Administration's regulatory review program: "to reduce the burdens
of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for
regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory
process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure wellreasoned regulations." 126 To accomplish these objectives, OMB is directed to
27
review regulatory actions based on a set of substantive criteria.'
The Reagan program significantly departed from its predecessors in
several important respects. First, it centralized power in OMB to an
unprecedented degree. Unlike previous programs that authorized review
only of selected regulations, the Reagan program required that all proposed
and final regulations be submitted to OMB for prepublication review.' 28 Even
more significantly, the Reagan program purported to give OMB the authority
to block publication of regulations for an indefinite period of time while
review was pending. Unlike RARG reviews, which were conducted during the
course of public rulemaking proceedings, the Reagan program directed
agencies to "refrain from publishing" any rule until OMB had completed its
29
review. '
Another significant feature of the Reagan program was that it established
substantive criteria for agencies to use in setting regulatory standards. The
criteria dictate that agencies should not issue regulations unless their benefits
exceed their costs, that agencies should choose regulatory alternatives that
involve "the least net cost to society," and that regulatory priorities should be
set to maximize "aggregate net benefits to society."' 3 0 Unlike Reagan's
program, the Carter Administration's regulatory review program had
encouraged agencies to develop cost-effective regulations but had repeatedly
3
emphasized that cost-benefit tests were not required.' '
Finally, the Reagan program was the first to attempt to effect a
comprehensive relaxation of existing regulations. Agencies were instructed
to suspend or postpone the effective date of rules that already had been
promulgated but not yet put into effect. 13 2 The majority of the 119 existing

126. Id.
127. Id at §§ 2(d), (e).
128. See, however, id at § 8(a) (purporting to exempt regulations that respond to emergency
situations and regulations for which review would conflict with statutory orjudicial deadlines); § 8(b)
(authorizing OMB to exempt certain types of regulations).
129. Id at § 3(f).
130. Id at § 2. This directive is qualified by the phrase "to the extent permitted by law."
131. Eads, lWhite House Oversight at 180-81 (cited in note 68).
132. This resulted in the suspension of 172 regulations. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reforin? at 121 (cited
in note 26).
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regulations on the "hit list" of regulations designated for reconsideration
33
were environmental or health and safety regulations.
Even more significant than the structure of the review program was the
type of people President Reagan appointed as agency officials responsible for
implementing the "regulatory relief" campaign. By appointing persons
philosophically hostile toward regulation, the President ensured that his goal
of "regulatory relief" would be zealously pursued. 13 4 It soon became
apparent that the new regulatory review process was well-designed to
facilitate this goal because it gave OMB unprecedented power over agency
decisionmaking.
While the executive order purported to leave ultimate decisionmaking
responsibility with the agencies, 13 5 as a practical matter it gave OMB
enormous power to influence the substance of regulatory decisions. "The
Government works using three things: money, people, and regulations; the
agency must get all three through OMB."' 1 6 The source of OMB's power
under Executive Order 12291 is the ability to invoke the "extended review"
provisions contained in section 3(f). Because Executive Order 12291 directs
agencies to "refrain from publishing" rules until OMB's review is concluded,
OMB can block regulations it finds objectionable for an indefinite period of
time.
Despite the vigorous denials of its officials, OMB has acquired virtual veto
power over regulations it reviews. 13 7 As a former OIRA administrator said,
"[i]f you're the toughest kid on the block, most kids won't pick a fight with
you.' 138 In August 1983, OMB officials could not cite a single instance in
39
which a rule disapproved by OMB had been promulgated by the agency.
Three years later OMB was able to cite only six instances in which proposed
or final rules had been promulgated over its objections. In four of them, the
agency acted under the compulsion of a judicial deadline. In the other two,
the agency had successfully appealed to the White House." 40 Former EPA
133. Id at 118-20. Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, [Year End Summary of the
Administration's Regulatory Relief Program] (Dec 30, 1981) (reporting that 54 of 91 existing
regulations designated for reconsideration during 1981 were environmental or health and safety
regulations) (copy on file with author).
134. See Roland Evans & Robert Novak, The Reagan Revolution 143-48 (Dutton, 1981).
135. Exec Order 12291, § 3(f)(3), 3 CFR 127 (1982) (specifying that the order is not to be
"construed as displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by law").
136. Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12291, 4 Va J Nat Res L 1, 6 (1984),
quoting Jim Tozzi, former OIRA Deputy Administrator.
137. Id at 43-46 n209.
138. Antonin Scalia, Deregulation HQ: An Interview on the NVew Executive Order with Murray L.
WVeidenbaum and James C. Miller IH, 5 Regulation 22 (March/April, 1981) (quoting former OIRA
Administrator Miller).
139. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 44 (cited in note 136).
140. Response of OMB Director James C. Miller, III, to written questions from Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg (Feb 19, 1986), attached to letter from Senator Mark 0. Hatfield to Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg (March 14, 1986) (on file with author) (citing four rules subject to court-ordered
deadlines: OSHA's ethylene oxide standard, EPA's fluoride drinking water standards, EPA's
regulations for heavy duty truck emissions of NOx and particulate matter, and HUD's lead paint
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Chief of Staff John Daniel has testified that when EPA promulgated a
regulation required by court order without obtaining OMB approval, he
received a late night phone call from an OMB official informing him that
"there was a price to pay for doing what we had done, and that we hadn't
begun to pay."'

4 1

Like the QOL review process, the Reagan program sought to shield
regulatory reviews from public view. By directing OMB to conduct its review
prior to publication of proposed regulations, the executive order deprived the
public of an opportunity to learn the unfiltered views of the agency. 42 Unlike
the RARG program, which produced public reviews, under the Reagan
program documents reflecting OMB's reviews were not incorporated into the
public record, even in rulemakings under the Clean Air Act where Congress
143
had explicitly required it.
In the early days of the Reagan program, congressional oversight hearings
lent credence to charges that OMB had served as a vehicle for secret, back
door lobbying by industry. John Daniel testified that he discovered that OMB
had leaked draft EPA rulemaking proposals to industry when an industry
representative mistakenly called EPA, rather than OMB, to provide his
comments.' 44 In response to such charges, OMB initially established policies
requiring OMB staff to advise the public to submit factual materials to the
relevant agency rulemaking docket and prohibiting low-level staff from
meeting with industry.' 4 5 A comprehensive study of the early years of the
Reagan program found that these policies often were honored in the
46
breach. 1
The Reagan Administration's regulatory review program was, at the least,
highly controversial. Former EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford,
originally an enthusiastic promoter of the program, later testified that while
presidential oversight of rulemaking is appropriate, "there were some serious
abuses" by OMB.' 4 7 The Reagan Administration's single-minded emphasis
standards; and two rules where the president or the Task Force on Regulatory Relief were consulted:
Interior's oil and gas lease lottery regulations and OSHA's cotton dust standard).
141. EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses (Part 3), Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Energy & Commerce Commission, 98th
Cong, Ist Sess 7-8 (1983) ("EPA Investigation Hearings").
142. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at Ill (cited in note 26).
143. Section 307(d)(4)(B)(ii) of the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1988), requires
that drafts of EPA's proposed and final rules submitted to OMB for review, all written comments by
OMB or other agencies, and all written responses to comments be placed in the public docket of
rulemakings under the act. Erik Olson's study found that compliance with this requirement is rare.
Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 71 nn 367-70 (cited in note 136).
144. EPA Investigation Hearings at 80 (cited in note 141).
145. Memorandum from David Stockman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Certain Communications Pursuant to Executive Order 12291 (June 11, 1981), reprinted in OMB,
Regulatory Program of the United States Government April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991 at 618 (1990)
("Stockman Memorandum").
146. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 62-64 (cited in note 136).
147. EPA Investigation Hearings at 234 (cited in note 141).
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on regulatory relief is now widely viewed as a critical mistake that forfeited a
rare opportunity for achieving truly beneficial regulatory reform.' 48
Critics of the Reagan program charge that it illegally delayed EPA
promulgation of regulations, displaced EPA decisionmaking authority,
subverted statutory standards, and excluded the public from full participation
in the regulatory process. 1 49 These and other criticisms contributed to the
atmosphere of scandal that surrounded EPA, culminating in the mass
resignation of agency officials, including Administrator Burford, in 1983.
Burford was replaced by former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus.
In response to questions submitted during the confirmation hearings for
his return to EPA, Ruckelshaus emphasized that OMB would not interfere
with his ultimate decisionmaking authority.150 While Ruckelshaus is generally
credited with restoring some measure of public confidence in EPA, he did not
succeed in insulating EPA from OMB's substantial influence.' 5' For example,
Ruckelshaus's plan to propose a modest acid rain control program was vetoed

after OMB Director David Stockman ridiculed it by arguing that it would cost
52
several thousand dollars per pound of fish saved.'
While continuing opposition to new regulatory initiatives, the Reagan
Administration gradually abandoned its ambitious plans for regulatory relief.
On August 11, 1983, the Task Force announced that it was disbanding,
claiming that its actions would save business, government, and consumers
more than $150 billion over ten years. Although the Task Force announced
that the Reagan Administration would now concentrate on changing the
regulatory statutes, the administration subsequently failed to pursue
significant changes in the environmental laws.' 53 Later that year, an omnibus
regulatory reform bill that would have codified regulatory review procedures
passed the Senate but died in the House. 54 This ended the administration's
hopes for legislation endorsing its regulatory relief objectives.
Subsequent environmental legislation imposed increasingly stringent
regulatory standards, while tightly constraining EPA's discretion by imposing

a multitude of deadlines and adopting "hammer" provisions that specified the
148. Robert W. Crandall & Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy, in Paul R. Portney, ed, Natural
Resources and the Environment: The Reagan Approach 56-77 (Urban Inst Press, 1984); Eads & Fix, Relief or
Reform? (cited in note 26); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at "Regulatory
Reform" in the Eighties, 61 U Colo L Rev 517, 524-26 (1990).
149. These charges are extensively documented in Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L 1 (cited in note 136).
A popular critical account of the EPA scandals and the Reagan Administration's regulatory relief
effort is contained in Jonathan Lash, et al, A Season of Spoils: The Reagan Administration's Attack on the
Environment (Pantheon Books, 1984).
150. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 45 n218 (cited in note 136) (response to written questions from
Senator Stafford following confirmation hearings).
151.
Critics of OMB review, many of whom have considerable respect for Ruckelshaus, concluded
that OMB interference with EPA continued even after his return. See, for example, Lash, et al, A
Season of Spoils at 322 (cited in note 149).
152. Lash, A Season of Spoils at 322 (cited in note 149).
153. Id at 5-6.
154. S 1080, The Regulatory Reform Act, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1981), in 127 Cong Rec 29,192
(Nov 30, 1981).
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precise consequences if EPA failed to meet the deadlines.' 55 Despite these
constraints, EPA occasionally proceeded with a new regulatory initiative. For
instance, Ruckelshaus won an important victory in March 1985 when EPA
promulgated regulations that drastically slashed allowable levels of lead
additives in gasoline. 156 A cost-benefit analysis performed by EPA staff played
a key role in convincing OMB to clear the regulation because it showed that
the regulation would generate more than a billion dollars of net benefits
annually.' 5 7 Ironically, in 1982 the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory
Relief had required EPA Administrator Burford to propose the repeal of the
58
very lead limits that Ruckelshaus strengthened.'
At the start of President Reagan's second term in office, a new executive
order was issued that expanded OMB's regulatory review responsibilities.
OMB officials had complained that they often did not become aware of
planned rulemaking actions until the eleventh hour when statutory deadlines
often compelled agencies to act quickly. To respond to this problem,
Executive Order 12498, issued on January 4, 1985, established a regulatory
planning process that authorized OMB review up to a year in advance of the
initiation of agency action.' 59 The order requires executive agencies to
submit annually to OMB a "draft regulatory program" that describes all
"significant regulatory actions" the agency intends to undertake during the
next year.' 60 If OMB determines that an agency's regulatory program is
consistent "with the Administration's policies and priorities," it is
incorporated into an annual document entitled "The Regulatory Program of
' 61
the United States Government."'
Clashes between EPA and OMB continued even after Ruckelshaus stepped
down as EPA administrator. Lee Thomas, who served as EPA administrator
during President Reagan's second term in office, had several celebrated
battles with OMB, including one clash over OMB's vigorous efforts to derail a
proposed rule banning most remaining commercial uses of asbestos. EPA
announced on February 1, 1985, that it would accede to OMB's demands that
the matter be referred to OSHA. However, harsh criticism from a

155. See, for example, Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. Pub L No 98-616, 98
Stat 3221, codified at 42 USC §§ 6401 et seq (1988).
156. 40 CFR 80 (1985).
157. Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline (EPA, 1984).
158. See Eliot Marshall, EPA May Allow More Lead in Gasoline, 215 Science 1375 (March 1982).
159. Exec Order 12498, 3 CFR 323 (1985)..
160. Id at 324. "Significant regulatory actions" subsequently have been defined by OMB to
include even actions taken to consider whether or not to initiate a rulemaking and actions to develop
guidelines, policy proposals, or similar documents that may influence rulemaking at a later date.
OMB Bulletin 86-4, at 3 (Dec 23, 1985).
161. 3 CFR at 326. The regulatory program has been described as "a regulatory budget without
numbers." Michael Fix & George Eads, The Prospectsfor Regulatoty Reform: The Legacy of Reagan"s First
Term, 2 YaleJ Reg 293, 312 (1985).
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congressional oversight committee and protests by EPA staff convinced EPA
to reverse the decision and to proceed with the proposed rule.

62

In the early days of the Reagan Administration, public interest groups
generally sought to avoid direct legal challenges to OMB's review
authority. 16 3 During the administration's second term, however, the groups
filed lawsuits directly challenging the legality of OMB's actions. 164 Congress
passed an even more serious threat to OMB's review authority when the
Democratic leadership threatened to stop funding OIRA's regulatory reviews.
This proposed action induced OMB to announce a new disclosure policy in
1986 that required OMB to make available drafts of regulations sent to OMB
65

for review. 1

E.

Regulatory Review in the Bush Administration

The Reagan Administration's regulatory review program continues under
the Bush Administration, which has not disturbed Executive Orders 12291
and 12498. Although the Bush Administration has not pursued an avowedly
deregulatory agenda, controversy between EPA and OMB continues,
generating familiar criticism from Congress. OMB's reviews have been a
prominent focus of the congressional debate over reauthorization of the
Paperwork Reduction Act.' 6 6 Congressional leaders reportedly reached an
agreement with White House officials to reauthorize the act in exchange for
the enactment of new limits on OMB reviews. These limits included a time
limit on OMB review and a requirement that OMB disclose the positions it
had taken during the review. Implementation of this agreement was blocked
when unidentified Republican senators placed a last minute hold on the
162. See EPA's Asbestos Regulations, Report on a Case Study on OMB Interference in Agency
Rulemaking, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations of the House Energy
& Commerce Committee, HR Rep No 99-2, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 1 (1985) ("Asbestos Hearings").
163. A few courts had held that regulatory review under Executive Order 12291 did not excuse
agencies from meeting their statutory obligations. Centerfor Science in the Public Interest v Dept of the
Treasury, 573 F Supp 1168, 1175 (D DC 1983), reversed on other grounds, 797 F2d 995 (DC Cir
1986) ("the broad thrust of [12291] provides an insufficient basis for the defendants to disregard
their statutory duties"); NRDC v Gorsuch, Nos 2153 et al (D DC Aug 25, 1982); NRDC v Ruckelshaus,
14 ELR 20817, 20819 (D DC Sept 14, 1984) (OMB review no justification for extending time for
compliance with statutory deadlines).
164. See, for example, Dole v United Steelworkers of America, 110 S Ct 929 (1990) (OMB has no
authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act to block OSHA regulations mandating disclosure of
hazards); Wolfe v Dep't of Health and Human Services, 839 F2d 768 (DC Cir 1988) (en banc) (information
about whether or not a proposal for regulation has been sent to OMB for review is exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act); Public Citizen Health Research Group v Tyson, 796
F2d 1479 (DC Cir 1986) (OSHA's deletion of short-term exposure limit from regulation limiting
workplace exposures to ethylene oxide, which was undertaken at OMB's behest, was unsupported by
the record); Environmental Defense Fund v Thomas, 627 F Supp 566 (D DC 1986) (OMB has no authority
to block EPA promulgation of regulation once a statutory deadline has expired).
165. See Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority of the Office of
.Mlanagementand Budget, 17 Envir L Rev 10017, 10023 (1987).
166. See, for example, Reauthorization of the Paperwork Reduction Act, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Govt Information and Regulation of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 1 (1989).
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reauthorization bill.' 6 7 As a result, the Paperwork Reduction Act has not been
reauthorized and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has refused to
68
confirm the Bush's nomination of a new OIRA administrator.'
The most significant change made by the Bush Administration in the
regulatory review program has been the creation in 1989 of an interagency
task force known as the Council on Competitiveness. Chaired by Vice
President Quayle, the council is designed to serve as the successor to the
Reagan Administration's Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 16 9 In this capacity,
the council's responsibilities include coordinating administration regulatory
policy and hearing appeals of disputes between OIRA and agencies that arise
in the course of regulatory reviews.
Council members' agency ties make it unlikely the council will be
sympathetic to environmental regulation. The council's six permanent
members are the director of OMB, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the chairman of the President's Council of Economic
Advisers, the White House Chief of Staff, and the Attorney General. In its
first major regulatory decision, the council upheld OIRA's disapproval of a
new source performance standard for municipal incinerators that required
recycling of 25 percent of the waste streams.' 7 0 This rejection of a major
regulatory initiative, one that EPA had spent years developing and that
previously had been cleared by OMB, has been interpreted as presaging a
resurgence of the kind of anti-regulatory fervor that prevailed in the early
days of the Reagan Administration. While it is still too early to tell how
frequently the council will be asked to intervene in disputes between EPA and
OIRA,' 7 ' the council's composition and its veto of the recycling requirement
will undoubtedly increase EPA's hesitancy to appeal an OIRA veto. The
existence of the council is likely to strengthen OIRA's hand in disputes with
EPA, making questions concerning the desirability and appropriate scope of
regulatory review even more important.

167. The White House reportedly agreed to accept new restrictions on OMB review only after the
chairman of the House Government Operations Committee threatened to "defund" OIRA. See
Defying Bush, GOP Senators Block Deal to Curb OMB Power over EPA Rules, Inside EPA 1, 7 (Nov 16,
1990). The hold on the reauthorization bill reportedly was placed by Republican Senators who are
seeking an amendment that would overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Dole v United Steelworkers
of America, 110 S Ct 929 (1990), which held that the Paperwork Reduction Act did not give OMB
authority to review regulations requiring companies to disclose information to private individuals.
168. Inside EPA at 7 (cited in note 167).
169. OMB, Regulatory Program at 5 (cited in note 145) (President Bush confirmed that "[in
reviewing regulatory matters, the Council will be continuing the work of the former President's Task
Force on Regulatory Relief ..
").
170. Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on Recycling Is Trashed, Washington Post A17 (Dec 20,
1990).
171. Encouraged by the veto of the recycling rule, opponents of EPA regulation are now pressing
the Competitiveness Council to review additional EPA regulations. See, for example, EPA Staff Ilorr'
First Visibility Call 3lay Go Before Competitiveness Council, Inside EPA 1 (Jan 25, 1991).
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III
THE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT ON

EPA

The impact of Executive Office oversight has been a controversial subject,
but this controversy is not due to a lack of data. OMB's annual reports
provide considerable statistical data on the regulatory review process during
the Reagan and Bush programs, though such data obviously cannot capture
the full impact of regulatory review. The voluminous literature includes a few
careful studies of the impact of Executive Office oversight on agency
decisionmaking. t72 Accounts provided by former participants in the process
also facilitate analysis of its effects. Three principal concerns about the impact
of regulatory review on EPA warrant further exploration: (1) that it has
delayed EPA rulemaking; (2) that it has usurped EPA's decisionmaking
authority and produced weaker environmental regulations; and (3) that it has
reduced the public's ability to monitor the rulemaking process and influence
73
regulatory decisions. '
A.

The Speed of the Rulemaking Process

The most widely recognized impact of regulatory review has been
significant delays in agency rulemaking. The Nixon Administration's QOL
74
review was often criticized for delaying EPA's issuance of regulations.
During the Ford Administration, EPA officials identified "lengthy delays" as
the worst problem generated by QOL review.' 7 5 An EPA study estimated that
QOL review added nearly two months to the time required to issue a typical
76
regulation.'
The Carter Administration's regulatory review program was designed to
avoid delay in rulemaking by conducting review during the normal course of
the public comment period. While it was not always successful in avoiding
delays, 177 the program was rarely criticized on this ground because the delays
it generated were not as egregious as those caused by QOL review. By
172. These include NAPA, PresidentialManagement (cited in note 72): Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform?
(cited in note 26) (focusing on the impact of the Reagan Administration's initial regulatory relief
program); and Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L I (cited in note 136) (focusing on the impact of the Reagan
regulatory review program on EPA).
173. See, for example, Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L Rev 1059, 1064 (1986).
174. Executive Branch Hearings at 3 (cited in note 110) (John Quarles testifying that QOL review
"added substantial delay to an already lengthy process.").
175. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) 693 (cited in note 33).
176. Id at 694. The study found that EPA's own internal process had contributed to delays. Of
the median time of more than three months between sending regulations out for QOL review and
sending them to the Federal Register, "56 days is for OMB review after the regulation was initially
sent to the agencies, and the remaining 54 days is spent on final review prior to signature of the EPA
administrator." Id (recommending that EPA shorten the long delay between OMB review and final
approval by assuming other EPA officials do not object to proposed regulations if they are not heard
from within two weeks of receiving a proposal).
177. For example, although RARG's efforts to force OSHA to promulgate a weaker permissible
exposure limit for cotton dust in the workplace in 1978 were largely unsuccessful after Labor
Secretary Ray Marshall appealed in person to President Carter, RARG review prevented OSHA from
meeting a court-ordered deadline. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 58 (cited in note 26).
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contrast, the Reagan Administration's program encountered harsh criticism
for causing delay.' 78 A study of the program by the National Academy of
Public Administration ("NAPA") found that the "clearest impact of the
regulatory management process has apparently been in slowing down
79
rulemaking activities." '
An important distinction can be made between programs requiring
prepublication clearance (such as the QOL and Reagan review programs) and
the Carter program that did not. By adding another step to the rulemaking
process, programs that require prepublication clearance inevitably lengthen
the time it takes for EPA to promulgate regulations. By requiring
prepublication clearance for both proposed and final regulations, the
80
Reagan/Bush program compounds this problem.'
Table 1 provides data on the average length of OMB review for EPA
regulations. The data indicate that the average OMB review now takes
substantially more time than the ten-day and sixty-day periods contemplated
in Executive Order 12291. The data also indicate that OMB takes
considerably longer to review EPA regulations than those of other agencies.
TABLE

I

EPA RULES
12291

AVERAGE REVIEW TIME (DAYS) OF
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
Year

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1981-1989
All Govt
Source:

Major

Non-Major

All

12
88
14
58
78
41
49
51
104
64
40

9
17
22
30
33
41
35
48
49
26
21

9
19
22
31
35
41
37
49
52
28
21

0MB, Regulatory Program of the United
States Government April 1, 1990-March 31,
1991, 647 (1990).

When it established its regulatory review program, the Reagan
Administration acknowledged that the program would slow down the
rulemaking process but defended such delays as "necessary-and well worth

178. See, for example, Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulator) Reform, 57 Wash
L Rev 409, 409-10 (1982).
179. NAPA, PresidentialManagement at 7 (cited in note 72).
180. See Scalia, 5 Regulation at 17 (cited in note 138) ("What all that adds up to is that-making
very conservative assumptions with respect to time periods ... it will ordinarily take an agency at
least seven months (210 days) to get a rule into effect-that's 90 days longer than under the previous
system.").
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it-to make sure that new rules do more good than harm."' 8 ' Much of the
delay under the Reagan program can be attributed to OMB's propensity to
extend review for regulations it deems objectionable. By March 1984, these
delays had become so egregious that EPA began compiling statistics to
demonstrate their impact. These statistics showed that average extension
time per rule fluctuated between fifty and one hundred days in 1984 and
1985.182 Based on this data, the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works reported that for rules in which review was extended "0MB
holds minor rules for an average of over two months and major rules for over
four months."

1 83

EPA's new source performance standards ("NSPS") have been a particular
victim of OMB delay, apparently because of OMB's opposition to technologybased standards. A December 6, 1985 EPA memorandum revealed that OMB
had been reviewing arsenic standards since February 19, 1985, despite a
January 7, 1984 statutory deadline; NSPSs for sewage treatment plants since
March 19, 1985, despite a November 27, 1983 statutory deadline; and NSPS
for volatile liquid storage since August 19, 1985, despite an August 7, 1982
18

statutory deadline.

4

OMB officials argue that the agencies cause much of the delay by failing to
respond to questions raised by OMB. 8 5 Sensitive to accusations of politically
motivated delay, OMB in 1989 instituted a policy of "suspending" review of a
rule when it believes that the promulgating agency has not responded in a
timely fashion to OMB requests for additional information.' 86 This policy
should allow OMB to report a decline in average length of time taken for its
regulatory reviews, because OMB will no longer consider "suspended" rules
in its calculations. In 1989, the first year this policy was in effect, OMB
suspended review of four EPA regulations, 8 7 yet the average length of time
OMB took to review EPA rules set an all-time high, as indicated in Table 1.
181. Id at 17.
182. Memorandum, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, OMB Extended Reviews for the
Week of December 6, 1985 (on file with author) ("OPPE Memorandum").
183. OMB Influence on Agency Regulations, Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1986).
184. OPPE Memorandum (cited in note 182).
185. Demystifying Environmental Polio, Review at OMB:, A Forum Interview with OIRA AdministratorS.
Jay Plager, 6 Envir Forum 27, 30 (July/Aug 1989), quoting Plager as complaining that "[i]f an agency
wants to game us, what they will do is when we ask them a bunch of questions about a rule they've
sent over, they'll just not answer."; NAPA, PresidentialManagement at 37 (cited in note 72), quoting
former OIRA Deputy Director Robert Bedell as conceding that "[o]n the delays, much is our mistake
because we did not drive to get them done," but noting that "[miore are a result of the agency not
giving us the information we need."
186. Exec Order 12291, Annual Report for 1989, reprinted in OMB, Regulatory Program at 634
(cited in note 145).
187. The EPA rules whose review OMB suspended included four hazardous waste regulationsincluding EPA's standards for performing corrective action at hazardous waste management
facilities, a centerpiece of the new regulations required by Congress in the 1984 Amendments to
RCRA designed to prevent the proliferation of Superfund sites in the future. This regulation was not
cleared until nearly two years after OMB had received it, long after the statutory deadline for
promulgating the regulation had expired. Id at 646.
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EPA's perspective on why regulatory review contributes to delay is
somewhat different from OMB's.
The problem is not one of failure in resolving issues that are brought up to OMB. The
problem is that OMB has no incentive whatsoever to keep the process moving and no
one to which they are accountable for failures of responsiveness.
At the present time, OMB can unilaterally extend the comment period on EPA
packages .... When an extension is requested, the time period is indefinite and lasts
until OMB is ready to respond. This can be more than a year. Once a dialogue has
begun, OMB tends to repeatedly find new issues each time the last issue is settled,
often with long intervening delays. Often, as was the case in the beverage can NSPS
these issues involve questioning the technical judgment
of EPA rather than the
88
implications of costs, benefits, and impacts to society.'

The charge against the QOL process that "OMB sometimes use[d] delay
as an intentional strategy" to influence the substance of regulations' 8 9 has
also been frequently directed toward the Reagan/Bush program. After a
certain point, continued delay tends to confirm that OMB is simply using
delay to block regulation until EPA adopts OMB's views. Although they
previously had denied that they used delay as a strategic tool, OMB officials
implicitly confirmed that charge when they announced in 1989 that they
would pursue a "new direction" that would not use delay to block rules.
OMB Director Richard Darman reportedly instructed OMB staff that, rather
than delaying rules indefinitely, they are to negotiate directly with agency staff
in cases where "genuine disagreement exists."' 90
Except in cases of extended OMB reviews, Executive Office oversight is
not the principal reason why the rulemaking process takes so long. Other
procedural requirements l '' and incentives that encourage strategic
behavior' 9 2 have contributed to the glacial pace of the process.' 9 3 A great
deal of the blame lies with the agencies themselves; some lies with the
courts. t94
188. New Source Performance Standards: Beverage Can Industry-A Case Study (Emissions
Standards and Engineering Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Office of Air,
Noise and Radiation, EPA, Aug 23, 1983), quoted in OMB Influence on Agency Regulations at xvi
(cited in note 183).
189. Id at 695, citing delays in responding to the markup of what became § 404 of the Clean
Water Act and noting that OMB prohibited EPA from transmitting to Congress proposed legislation
when Congress considered what became the Toxic Substances Control Act.
190. OMB Official Promises End to Rule Delays, But RCRA Rule Still at Agency After Seven Months, Envir
Rptr (BNA) 8 (May 5, 1989).
191. But see William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale LJ 38, 55
n73 (1975)(noting that the QOL "review process causes far longer delays in rulemaking than
anything the Administrative Procedure Act standing alone requires").
192. Groups opposed to development frequently have benefitted from delays engendered by
NEPA's requirement that environmental impact statements ("EISs") be prepared before federal
agencies take actions that have a significant impact on the environment. See Environmental Quality1983, at 265 (Council on Environmental Quality, 1983) (reporting that nearly half the injunctions
obtained in 277 NEPA lawsuits delayed projects by more than one year). For most environmental
regulations, delay benefits the regulated community by postponing the need to incur costs to comply
with the regulation.
193. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U Chi L Rev 407, 415 (1990).
194. Judicial review can create substantial delays in the promulgation of regulations, often with
little corresponding gain in their quality. For example, by striking down OSHA regulations
establishing permissible exposure limits ("PELs") for asbestos and benzene, the Fifth Circuit and the
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As a result of widespread concern over the slow pace of EPA's
implementation of its regulatory responsibilities, Congress has imposed
numerous statutory deadlines. While section 8(a)(2) of Executive Order
12291 purports to exempt from OMB review regulations that must be issued
to meet statutory deadlines, OMB often has blocked EPA action despite the
expiration of such deadlines. In 1984, a federal district court found that
EPA submitted 169 regulations to OMB which were subject to statutory or judicial
deadlines, and on 86 occasions OMB extended its review beyond the time periods
outlined in Executive Order 12291. OMB's propensity to extend review has become
so great that EPA keeps a running record of the number of its rulemaking actions
under extended review by OMB and the resulting delays. The average delay per
regulation is 91 days; total delays were more than 331
weeks. Apparently Section
9 5
8(a)(2) of Executive Order 12291 is simply ignored.1

While the court held that OMB has no authority to delay EPA's
promulgation of regulations after a statutory deadline has expired, the
decision has not stopped OMB from reviewing such regulations. For
example, EPA was required by statute to promulgate revisions to the National
Contingency Plan governing Superfund cleanups by April 17, 1988, but OMB
objections delayed EPA's publication of proposed revisions until December
1988.196 Apparently fearful of further litigation, OMB now rapidly clears such
97
regulations when threatened with a lawsuit.1
Statutory or judicial deadlines can impose some additional constraints on
the length of OMB review. Indeed, Congress nearly enacted a requirement to
limit the length of time OMB could take to complete its regulatory reviews to
sixty days with a one-time thirty-day extension upon request of OMB. 9 8 In
circumstances where OMB review continues after a statutory or judicial
Supreme Court effectively delayed for several years the eventual promulgation of standards at least
as stringent as the ones invalidated. See Asbestos Information Assn/North America v OSHA, 727 F2d 415
(5th Cir 1984) (invalidating asbestos PEL of 0.5 fibers per cubic centimeter; in 1986 OSHA
promulgated a new PEL of 0.2 f/cc); Industrial Union Dep t,AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448
US 607 (1980) (striking down OSHA's May 21, 1977 attempt to lower the PEL for benzene from 10
ppm to 1 ppm; OSHA finally promulgated the new PEL at the same 1 ppm level in 1987, after
concluding that workers exposed to benzene of 10 ppm had been experiencing additional risks of
death from leukemia of 95 per 1000).
195. EDF v Thomas, 627 F Supp at 565-71.
196. The Superfund National Contingency Plan: Report on a Case Study of OMB Involvement in
Agency Rulemaking, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 8-9 (1989).
197. For example, during the first five years of the regulatory review program, OMB had entirely
ignored the provisions of Executive Order 12291 that exempt regulations for which review would
conflict with a statutory deadline. After a federal district court ruled that OMB had no authority to
delay promulgation of such regulations, OMB has rapidly cleared some subsequent regulatory
packages when deadline suits were brought. See, for example, 0MB Approves RCRA Rule, Staving Off
Possible Challenge to its Review Power, Inside EPA 16 (Feb 23, 1990); Environmental Defense Fund v Reily,
No 89-598 (D DC Oct 12, 1990). This may account for the fact that 12% of all EPA regulations
released in 1989 were exempted from OMB review because of statutory or judicial deadlines. Exec
Order 12291, Annual Report for 1989, reprinted in OMB,Regulatory Program a( 636 (cited in note
145).
198. S 1044, [he Federal Information Resources Management Act of 1991. 102d Cong, 1st Sess
I (May 14, 1991), in 137 Cong Rec S5967-01 (May 15, 1991).
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deadline has expired, judicial intervention is possible, 19 9 but in the absence of
a fundamental change in the structure of the current review program,
regulatory delay is likely to remain a principal impact of regulatory review.
B.

The Impact of OMB Review on EPA Decisionmaking

One of the most significant concerns about regulatory review is that it has
permitted the Executive Office effectively to usurp EPA's decisionmaking
authority. The president's appointment and removal powers guarantee that
his views will carry considerable weight with his appointees at EPA. However,
the president does not have the authority to direct EPA officials to contravene
statutory directives,2 0 0 and his ability to dictate the substance of EPA
decisions may be circumscribed by statutes delegating decisionmaking
authority to EPA. Concern over legal constraints on the exercise of the
president's supervisory authority has carefully shaped the structure of each
administration's regulatory review program. Each program has sought to
preserve, at least on paper, the notion that Executive Office oversight will not
displace the decisionmaking authority of the EPA administrator.
Regulatory review has made it more difficult for EPA to issue regulations,
however, and Executive Office reviewers have consistently sought to make the
regulations EPA does issue less stringent. This is hardly surprising since
regulatory review was developed as a mechanism to temper the impact of
environmental regulation. What is surprising is the dearth of evidence to
suggest that regulatory review has resulted in truly significant improvements
in EPA regulations.
Regulatory review has inspired EPA to increase its analytic capabilities,
which has increased its ability to withstand pressure from the Executive
Office. Although the review process has clearly had some impact on the
substance of EPA decisions, the magnitude of that impact is open to debate.
An EPA official observed in 1976 that QOL review had produced regulations
that were "more reserved, more scientifically aggressive, less environmentally
aggressive. ' ' 2 0

An EPA assistant administrator claimed that the changes

resulting from QOL review "tend to be fairly small" and that he knew of "no
case where a regulation has been gutted." 202 "Delays and fairly marginal
199. See, for example, Environmental Defense Fund v Thomas, 627 F Supp 566. The Justice
Department has recently asked a federal district court to extend the judicial deadline for
promulgating a new source performance standard for municipal incinerators for 30 days to allow
EPA to revise the regulation as a result of the Council on Competitiveness's decision to uphold
OMB's rejection of EPA's proposed recycling requirement. New York v Reilly, No 89-1729 (D DC
1991). The judicial deadline was imposed as an outgrowth of a settlement agreement between
NRDC and EPA in New York v Thomas, No 87-1463 (DC Cir 1987).
200. See, for example, NationalFederation of FederalEmployees v Brown. 645 F2d 1017. 1025 (DC Cir
1981) ("Under the structure of government-the separation of powers-established by the
Constitution, the president has no authority to alter policy and principles declared by Congress even
if, at the time the president acts. signals from Congress suggest it would approve the president's
action.").
201. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 693 (cited in note 33).
202. Id.
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changes are the usual result" of QOL review, concluded another EPA
official.

20

3

Clearly, however, regulatory review is designed to increase the ability of
the Executive Office to influence the actions of agency heads. When disputes
between EPA and the Executive Office arise, it has often been unclear who
retains ultimate authority over regulatory decisions. In 1976, EPA
Administrator Russell Train confirmed that the issue had never been finally
resolved because "no regulation has ever been so vigorously opposed by
20 4
OMB, and so strongly backed by EPA, that the issue has been raised."
Were the issue to arise, "Train said EPA would insist on having final say, in
part to protect what he sees as the 'regulatory integrity' of the agency in the
eyes of the public, the Congress, and other federal agencies." 20 5 In response
to Train, OMB staff told reporters that they agreed that "EPA would have
final say on whether to adopt a specific regulation," and they cited an example
20 6
of a regulation that Train had promulgated despite OMB opposition.
Under the Carter Administration program, the Executive Office lacked the
authority to block regulations indefinitely when disputes arose during
regulatory review. Yet considerable political skirmishing occurred
nonetheless as the reviewers tried to persuade agencies to modify their
regulations.
What has happened in practice, in any event, is that enforcement of the regulationreview programs has consisted of political skirmishing within the executive branch,
with the staff agencies of the Executive Office of the President (CWPS, CEA, and
RARG) conducting economic search-and-destroy missions against the line regulatory
agencies, stalking through the FederalRegister and the accumulating regulatory analyses
207
after proposals that appear particularly costly, ill-advised, or politically vulnerable.

Because review did not take place until after a regulation had been proposed
and the reviewers had no authority to delay a final decision, the choice of
which regulations to review depended in part on whether the reviewers
thought their input could have an impact in a relatively short period of
time.

20 8

Under the Reagan and Bush Administrations' review programs, agencies
have been directed to refrain from publishing rules until after OMB has
completed its review. OMB has used this authority to gain virtual veto power
over EPA regulations, as indicated by the fact that only a handful of
regulations ever have been promulgated over OMB's objections. 20 9 In an
effort to maintain its image as "the toughest kid on the block," OMB officials
203. Id at 694.
204. Id at 696.
205. Id.
206. Id at 696-97 (selective enforcement audit regulations for the auto industry).
207. DeMuth, 4 Regulation at 18 (cited in note 6).
208. Cost Hearings at 45 (cited in note 73) (CWPS selects as its "targets new proposals with (1)
large costs (generally over $100 million in any year), and (2) the prospect that we can have a useful
policy impact through a I- to 3-month review.") (testimony of Thomas D. Hopkins).
209. See notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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admit that they "yell and scream, jump up and down, do whatever we can to
2 10
get [the agencies] to listen to us."
Statistics released by OMB indicate that EPA is one of the agencies whose
regulations are most frequently modified during the review process. Less
than half of the EPA regulations reviewed by OMB in 1989 were approved
without change (ninety-seven of 201, or 48 percent). OMB approved 29
percent (fifty-nine of 201) of the EPA regulations after changes were made;
returned 11 percent for reconsideration; and suspended review of 4 percent.
EPA withdrew 5 percent of the regulations it submitted for review.2 1 ' Only
the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Labor (which
includes OSHA) had smaller percentages of regulations approved without
change in 1989.
TABLE

2

ACTIONS TAKEN ON EPA RULES BY PERCENTAGE

Year

Total
Reviews

Consistent
Without
Change

Consistent
with
Change

Withdrawn
or
Returned

Deadline

Other

1984

302

74.5%

20.9

4.3

0.3

0.3

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

302
197
205
210
201

66.2
66.5
60.0
51.0
48.3

28.5
24.9
29.3
27.6
29.4

4.3
6.1
4.4
6.2
8.0

0.7
1.5
5.9
14.8
11.9

0.3
1.0
0.5
0.5
2.5

Source:

OMB, Regulatory Program of the United States Government 1985, 1986, 1987,

1988, 1989, 1990.

Table 2 contains a summary of OMB's statistics on actions taken on EPA
regulations from 1984 through 1989. These statistics do not accurately
measure the significance of OMB's impact on the substance of EPA decisions,
however. OMB's statistics combine both proposed and final rules and
therefore understate the proportion of all rules that are modified during the
review process. 21 2 OMB now appears to be returning rules to EPA for
reconsideration somewhat more frequently (eleven in 1989 versus one in
1984), which may reflect OMB's heightened sensitivity to charges that it uses
delay as a tool to displace agency decisionmaking authority. 21 3 The declining
percentage of EPA regulations approved without change can be accounted for
by OMB's more frequent exemption of regulations from review due to
statutory or judicial deadlines. The total percentage of regulations modified,
210. Bedell Says OMB Uses Pressure to Shapi Environmental Rulemaking; Thomas Sees Budget Office Role as
Legitimate But Says He Has Final Say, 16 Envir Rptr (BNA) 2050 (March 7. 1986).

211. Exec Order 12291, Annual Report for 1989, reprinted in OMB, Regulatory Program at 636
(cited in note 145) (numbers are rounded). See also Table 2.
212. Joseph Cooper & William F. West, PresidentialPower and Republican Government: The Theory and
Practice of 0MB Review of Agency Rules, 50 J Politics 864, 875 (1988).
213. This may represent somewhat of a return to OMB's previous more aggressive stance toward

EPA regulations.

During the period from 1981-83, OMB returned 34 rules to EPA for

reconsideration and 24 were withdrawn during review. Id at 875.
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withdrawn, or returned for reconsideration has increased only slightly in
recent years.
Even in cases where rules are not modified during the review process, the
anticipation of OMB review can have a subtle, but powerful, influence on the
substance of EPA rulemaking proposals. In 1976, an EPA official said "[t]here
is a 'perceived threat' hanging over all EPA regulations . . . concerning

reactions to those regulations by both OMB and other federal agencies. The
result . . .is that EPA attempts to anticipate other agencies' reactions to
2' 1 4
regulations before EPA completes the draft proposal.

Erik Olson's study confirmed that the Reagan regulatory review program
did influence EPA's rulemaking:
The Executive Order has effectively institutionalized OMB input, especially where
OMB has a strong policy interest. Of course, most rules receive little OMB attention.
It is, however, OMB's goal to induce in EPA staff the understanding that rules in
certain form will never clear OMB, and therefore should not even
be sent there for
2 15
review. This goal seems to have been at least in part achieved.

Disputes between the Executive Office and EPA usually have been
resolved through a frequently adversarial bargaining process. Because the
QOL process in the Nixon and Ford Administrations focused on interagency
review, EPA officials often had to defend their proposals against criticisms by
representatives of other agencies with competing interests. Then, as now,
disputes often centered on uncertainties concerning estimates of
environmental impacts and the costs of regulation. In his description of QOL
review of EPA's original lead phasedown regulations, John Quarles explains:
As usual, basic disagreements existed concerning the severity of the health risks, as
well as the fuel penalties that might result from the regulations. It also was entirely
typical that the participants in the final round of interagency argument were not
experts in these issues. Yet we all argued with vehemence that the questions should
be so resolved as to give maximum protection to the concerns within our spheres of
2
responsibility. 16

EPA is not entirely without leverage in bargaining with OMB. The
agency's expertise and powerful congressional and public support for its
environmental mission give it some bargaining power. 21 7 While OMB has
recently returned EPA rules for reconsideration more aggressively, EPA has
shown some willingness to endure a lengthy battle with OMB when it
considers a regulation particularly important. By leaking details of the
dispute to congressional committees and the public, EPA can generate
external pressure on OMB, as EPA did recently during an extended dispute
over standards for corrective action for hazardous waste facilities. 2' 8
214.
215.

7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 693, 694 (cited in note 33).
Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 50 (cited in note 136).

216. Quarles, Cleaning Up Amenca at 140 (cited in note 23).
217. Cooper & West, 50j Politics at 877 (cited in note 212).
218. At his confirmation hearing on Februarv 1,1989, EPA Administrator William Reilly pledged
that "If OMB has not completed its [then four-month] review by the time I am sworn in as
Administrator, I will take the necessary steps to quickly resolve the remaining issues and have the
rule published promptly." Reauthorization of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 752 (1990)
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Because of the enormous public support that currently exists for
environmental protection, EPA has generally succeeded when it has gone
public with major disagreements with OMB. Although the use of media
attention as a strategic device has its limits, 21 9 congressional pressure on
OMB has also helped EPA win some battles. 2 20 EPA rarely has suffered the
humiliation that OSHA did when OSHA acceded to OMB's last minute
insistence that it delete a short-term exposure limit from its ethylene oxide
regulations. 22 ' EPA nearly suffered such an embarrassment when it initially
decided to accede to OMB's request to refer the asbestos phaseout rule to
OSHA, a decision EPA ultimately reversed as a result of congressional

pressure.2 2 2 EPA's decision to delete a recycling requirement from a new
source performance standard for municipal incinerators at the request of the
2 23
Competitiveness Council represents an important exception.
When regulatory review is conducted outside public view, it is easier for
OMB to influence the outcome of regulatory decisions. The QOL review of
EPA's original lead phasedown regulations illustrates how an agency
supposedly assured of its independence gave in to intense pressure from the
("Reauthorization Hearings"). Nearly a year later, the committee requested documents concerning
discussions between OMB and EPA and issued a press release criticizing the continued delay. The
regulation was cleared several months later. See EPA Releases Delayed Corrective Action Rule, Calls It
"Milestone" in Cleanup of RCRA Facilities, 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 475 (July 13, 1990).
219. Marcus, Environmental ProtectionAgency, in Wilson, ed, The Politics of Regulation at 287 (cited in
note 21) (noting that Ruckelshaus followed an explicit strategy of courting favorable media attention
in order to increase EPA's independence from White House influence, and that the strategy worked
in the short run particularly because it energized EPA staff but the media's short attention span made
it of less value for the long-term implementation problems).
220. When asked for information by Congress concerning an agency position that OMB is apt to
oppose, EPA employees often send Congress material without OMB clearance either by transmitting
unsigned and undated copies of letters or by leaking material to the press. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 697
(cited in note 33) ("The practice is well enough understood in Washington that some congressional
staffers ask for EPA's position prior to OMB clearance as well as its position following that
clearance."). EPA also allegedly has used "guidance" documents to avoid OMB review of positions
that would be subject to review if issued as regulations. See id (citing EPA'sJanuary 6, 1976 "legal
interpretation and guideline" stating that tall smokestacks or other supplementary air pollution
control systems would be permitted only for complying with the Clean Air Act by sources that also
employ best available control technology).
221. OSHA had submitted an EtO standard to OMB that included a short term exposure limit
("STEL") 24 hours before a court-ordered deadline for promulgation. When OMB objected to the
SI1EL, OSHA simply crossed out all references to it in the draft rule sent to the Federal Register for
publication, without explaning the reasons for its deletion. The DC Circuit subsequently struck
down OSHA's failure to include a STEL in the regulation as unsupported by the record. Tyson, 796
F2d 1479.
222. See Asbestos Hearings (cited in note 162). Congress, of course, is not always the champion
of EPA or environmental concerns. Some members of Congress "are very comfortable passing
broad, remedial legislation, but also willing to bend to the desire of powerful regulated industries by
ensuring that rules needed to carry out such legislation are never effectively implemented, or at most
impose minimal burdens on the industries." Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1071 (cited in note 173);
see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Red Squinel: Consenss and BetraVal in the Environmental
Statutes. 5J Contemp Health L & Policy 161 (1989) (legislators pursue strategies that hide provisions
in "consensus" environmental legislation that later will undercut its effective implementation);
William H. Rodgeis, Jr.. The Leson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the
EtionolatalStatutes, 4 J Land Use & Envir 1. 377 (1989).
223. See note 170 and accompanying text.
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Executive Office, agreeing to OMB's demand for a one-year delay in the
224
regulations hours before they were issued in compliance with a court order.
Under the Reagan/Bush regulatory review program, the pressure on
agencies to satisfy OMB's concerns can be intense. If OMB refuses to
approve a rule without the requested modifications, the agency may face an
indefinite delay in the issuance of the regulation, and, in effect, usurp EPA
decisionmaking authority. While noting that the president was entitled to a
"certain degree of deference" in exercising his supervisory authority, a
federal court has noted that
the use of Executive Order 12291 to create delays and to impose substantive changes
raises some constitutional concerns. Congress enacts environmental legislation after
years of study and deliberation, and then delegates to the expert judgment of the EPA
Administrator the authority to issue regulations carrying out the aims of the law.
Under Executive Order 12291, if used improperly, OMB could withhold approval
until the acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of any new EPA
regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence and expertise of EPA.
Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol Hill can still be pursued
administratively by2 25
delaying the enactment of regulations beyond the date of a
statutory deadline.

Concerns about displacement of EPA decisionmaking have been given new
force by the Competitiveness Council's veto of EPA Administrator William
Reilly's proposal to require municipal incinerators to recycle a portion of the
waste streams they receive. Although OMB previously had approved a
proposed EPA regulation that contained the recycling requirement, OMB
refused to approve it in the final regulation. 2 26 EPA then appealed OMB's
decision to the presidential council. Prior to the council's meeting on
December 19, 1990, Reilly supported the recycling requirement, which he had
touted as an indication of EPA's commitment to stimulating greater recycling
efforts. Following the council meeting, however, Reilly
withdrew the
requirement because of objections from the council.2 2 7 Under these
circumstances, it is clear that OMB and the Council on Competitiveness
clearly affected the substance of an EPA regulation in a significant manner.
Whether this illustrates illegal displacement of EPA decisionmaking is less
clear.
Although it seems unlikely that Reilly was simply persuaded by the council
that inclusion of the recycling requirement was not warranted on the basis of
the administrative record before EPA, the EPA Administrator has been very
careful to state that he now accepts the consensus that the recycling
224. Quarles, Cleaning Up America at 138 (cited in note 23) ("1 pointed out that the modified
standards would accomplish our basic objectives; not only would they defuse the potentially
explosive confrontation with the White House, but they would strengthen our defensive position
against attacks by the oil industry, and its supporters in Congress, that we were being irresponsible
in the face of the sharpening oil crisis."). Quarles nonetheless believes that regulatory review by
OMB has been a useful mechanism for forcing EPA and other agencies to reach more balanced
results that are sufficiently sensitive to competing economic and social values. Id at 142.
225. Environmental Defense Fund z, Thomas, 627 F Supp at 570.

226.

56 Fed Reg 5488 (1991).

227.

Weisskopf, Washington Post at A17 (cited in note 170).
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requirement not be promulgated. 2 28 Thus, he apparently has taken the
position that the final decision to withdraw the recycling requirement was his.
Although it is likely that Reilly's true motivation for withdrawing the
regulations is that he did not want to risk being fired by the President for
defying representatives of the Executive Office, courts are reluctant to sustain
challenges to regulations based on questioning of the decisionmaker's
motivations. 22 9 Moreover, courts are eager to avoid what the District of
Columbia Circuit has characterized as "difficult constitutional questions
concerning the executive's proper role in administrative proceedings and the
appropriate scope of delegated power from Congress to certain executive
2 30
agencies."
This judicial deference would tolerate potentially severe intrusions by
OMB or the Council on Competitiveness on the substance of EPA
decisionmaking judgments, but it would not remove all constraints on the
Executive Office's ability to influence EPA policymnaking. The EPA
administrator can always take his case to the public, threaten to resign, or
even defy the Executive Office and run the risk of being fired. Each of these
strategies would increase the political costs of Executive Office intervention.
The true magnitude of these costs depends on the public reputation of the
EPA administrator. 23 ' Russell Train employed this strategy with some success
during the Nixon Administration. 23 2 Presidents who seek to acquire or
enhance reputations as supporters of strong environmental protection will
not lightly intervene to weaken EPA regulations.
The requirements that agency decisions must be consistent with the
underlying regulatory statutes and supported by evidence in the
administrative record place further constraints on the ability of the Executive
Office to displace EPA decisionmaking. The Executive Office cannot legally
dictate a result that is inconsistent with the regulatory statute or the
rulemaking record. If the agency accedes to a change in a regulation dictated
by OMB which is not supported in the record, the action may be struck down
23 3
if challenged in court.
228. Id.
229. Courts traditionally have not permitted private parties to conduct discovery that "probes the
mind of the [government] decisionmaker." See United States v Morgan, 304 US 1 (1937).
230. Public Citizen Health Research Group v Tyson, 796 F2d at 1507.
231. Ironically, the loss of a highly publicized battle with the Executive Office can enhance the
EPA administrator's reputation in the environmental community, as occurred when William
Ruckelshaus's proposal for a modest acid rain control program was vetoed by the Reagan White
House in 1984.
232. See note 64 and accompanying text. For example, President Nixon was criticized by
environmentalists when he fired Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel who had become an aggressive
advocate of environmental protection efforts. When the Interior Department then tried to issue
relaxed oil spill regulations sought by the White House, William Ruckelshaus, who was awaiting
confirmation as EPA administrator, blocked the initiative by complaining that he should have a voice
in the matter. Faced with rumors that Ruckelshaus's confirmation hearings could be delayed by
congressmen upset over the Interior Department's initiative, the White House agreed to have the
regulations pulled back. E. W. Kenworthy, Revision Delayed in Oil Spill Code, NY Times I col 7 (Dec 1,
1970).
233. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v Tson, 796 F2d 1479 (DC Cir 1986).
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Decisions reached at the behest of Executive Office reviewers are likely to
be more vulnerable to judicial challenge than are other regulations because
regulatory review usually emphasizes different factors than do the statutes and
the administrative record. For example, the decision by the Council on
Competitiveness to reject EPA's incinerator recycling proposal was reportedly
based on grounds that are not necessarily relevant to the establishment of
new source performance standards. 2 34 An unidentified observer at the closed
meeting said that the chief basis for the decision was philosophical: "There
was the strong sense that they needed to give business something. Business
23 5
has a lot of concern that we lost our commitment to deregulation.C.

Secrecy and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process

Because they were designed to prevent agency inertia and capture by
regulated industries, the federal environmental laws enacted during the last
two decades encourage broad public participation in the rulemaking process.
During both of his terms as EPA administrator, William Ruckelshaus
emphasized the importance of public participation. Noting that citizens must
be well-informed "[in order to participate intelligently in regulatory
proceedings," Ruckelshaus instructed EPA "to make the fullest possible
disclosure of information, without unjustifiable expense or delay, to any
interested party.- 2 36 During his second term as EPA administrator,
Ruckelshaus declared that he would operate the agency as a "goldfish bowl."
This policy represented a conscious effort to overcome damage done to the
agency's credibility by the scandal that led to the resignation of Administrator
Burford.
The openness that EPA has long pledged for its rulemaking proceedings
has not extended to the regulatory review process. While prominent in the
early years of the Reagan Administration's program, fears that regulatory
review could serve as a back channel for private interests to influence
rulemaking outside the public record existed from the inception of the Nixon
Administration's program. Indeed, the Nixon Administration had created an
extraordinary mechanism for facilitating secret industry lobbying by
establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council ("NIPCC").
The explicit purpose of this body, which was composed entirely of corporate
237
executives, was to provide industry input on environmental regulation.
The deputy assistant secretary of commerce, who served as executive director
of NIPCC, told a Senate oversight committee in 1972 that the council allowed
234. A press release issued by the Council cited three reasons for the decision: (1) the recycling
requirement was not a performance standard, (2) the regulation interfered with local government
decisionmaking, and (3) it was not cost-beneficial under Executive Order 12291.
235. Weisskopf, Washington Post at A17 (cited in note 170).
236. William Ruckelshaus, The Citizen and the Environmental Regulatory Process, 47 Ind 1- 636, 637
(1972).
237. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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companies to comment on draft environmental regulations before they were
released for public comment. 2 38 A former OMB official explained that
[NIPCC] was made up exclusively of industrial leaders, who met in secret, refused
access to both reporters and environmental groups, and was quite clearly an illegal
inside track for business leaders to oppose regulations they did not like. It was not
just that OMB let the Commerce Department review EPA's regulatory proposals, but
that the industrial community itself was getting a direct and illegitimate bite at them
before they were even announced as proposals so that other affected groups could
comment.239

After discovering that NIPCC would be meeting on October 14, 1970,
representatives of ten consumer and environmental groups showed up at the

Department of Commerce and sought to attend the meeting. The Commerce
Department not only refused to allow them to attend the meeting, but it also
refused their request to receive a transcript. 240 This refusal required an
express waiver of the provisions of Executive Order 11007, designed to

prevent collusion by corporate executives meeting as members of federal
advisory committees. 2 4' Executive Order 11007, an outgrowth of antitrust
24 2
concerns over advisory committees formed during the Korean War,
required that a verbatim transcript be kept of all meetings of industry advisory
committees.2 4 3 The Secretary of Commerce had waived this requirement by
finding that it would interfere with the proper functioning of NIPCC, 24 4 which
William Rodgers describes as a "highly dubious" claim that undermined the
2 45
council's credibility.
Because of the secrecy that surrounded its operation, it is difficult to assess
what impact NIPCC had on EPA regulations. Rodgers cites two examples
where EPA policies were inexplicably altered to conform with positions taken
by NIPCC. 2 46

He notes that by providing a vehicle for top corporate

executives to assemble to plot a coordinated strategy for responding to
238. 1970 Clean Air Act Hearings at 581 (cited in note 13) (statement of Walter A. Hamilton).
239. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 269 n9 (cited in note 26) (Letter from Richard N. L. Andrews
to George C. Eads, Jan 18, 1984).
240. E. W. Kenworthy, U.S. Pollution Control Panel Bars Environmental and Consumer Observers, NY
Times 40 col 2 (Oct 15, 1970). Commerce Department officials also refused a request for a press
conference. Noting that Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans had cited NIPCC as evidence of his
department's concern for the environment, a representative of the Public Interest Research Group
asked, "What have they got to hide?" NIPCC subsequently released summary minutes of some of its
meetings. See 1970 Clean Air Act Hearings at 583-94 (cited in note 13). These summaries, however,
amounted to little more than "a skeletal outline of the issues discussed, evidently thoroughly
sanitized." William H. Rodgers, Jr., The National Industrial Pollution Control Council: Advise or Collude?,
13 BC Indust & Comm L Rev 719, 727 (1972).
241. 3 CFR 573 (1959-63 comp).
242. Rodgers, 13 BC Indust & Comm L Rev at 722 (cited in note 240).
243. 3 CFR 575 (1959-63 comp).
244. 1970 Clean Air Act Hearings at 598 (cited in note 13).
245. Rodgers, 13 BC Indust & Comm L Rev at 725 (cited in note 240).
246. Rodgers cites changes sought in air pollution regulations by the Mining and Non-Ferrous
Metals Sub-Council of NIPCC and the September 1971 reversal of the government's policy to
discourage use of phosphates in detergents in accordance with the requests of NIPCC's Detergents
Sub-Council. Id at 734-43.
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environmental
regulations, NIPCC supplied valuable "inside-track
24 7
opportunities" for industry to redirect environmental policies.
Members of NIPCC sought to justify the need for secrecy by arguing that
disclosure would chill the free exchange of advice. 2 48 Yet, as Rodger notes,
this rationale is particularly dubious when applied to contacts by private
industry with government officials. As reflected in Executive Order 11007,
disclosure had been viewed as necessary to prevent private industry from
engaging in collusive practices as members of federal advisory committees.
"When members of an industry set out to influence their government, they
'24 9
should be required to do so publicly."
Congressional oversight committees and environmental groups made
similar criticisms of regulatory review during the Ford and Carter
Administrations. In 1976, a staffer for a House oversight committee
complained that the secrecy surrounding QOL reviews unfairly tilted the
regulatory process in the direction of industrial interests. He stated that
regulatory review has "provided industry with an opportunity to review,
comment on, delay, and change EPA actions behind closed doors. The public
has not been afforded this opportunity and consequently faces industryinfluenced and weakened guidelines, regulations, and standards difficult to
modify.'"250

Although the Carter Administration's RARG review program involved
submissions to the public rulemaking dockets, environmental groups charged
that White House staff repeatedly met with EPA officials to influence
regulatory decisions after the close of the public comment period. A lawyer
for an environmental group told a congressional committee that as a result of
these meetings:
we have two rulemakings that are going on within EPA on significant issues. We have
one which is a public rulemaking, and we have another one which is a private
rulemaking, a shadow rulemaking, if you will. A rulemaking which is characterized by
little or no record, by secret 25
meetings behind closed doors and by no opportunity for
public comment or rebuttal. '

Concerned over the secrecy of the regulatory review process, Congress
sought to force greater disclosure of the Executive Office's role in regulatory
decisions when it amended the Clean Air Act in 1977. Congress amended the
Act to require that drafts of proposed and final regulations sent to OMB for
review be placed in the rulemaking docket 252 so that the public can determine
how, if at all, the regulations were changed during the review process. The
amendment also requires that all documents accompanying such drafts and all
written comments on the drafts from other agencies, and responses from
247. Id at 743.
248. Id at 725.
249. Id at 747.
250. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 695 (cited in note 33).
251. Executive Branch Hearings at 58 (cited in note 110) (testimony of Robert Rauch, staff
attorney, Environmental Defense Fund).
252. 42 USC § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1977).
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EPA, be placed in the rulemaking docket. However, a study of regulatory
found that OMB and EPA often
review during the Reagan Administration
253
ignored these docketing requirements.
The history of regulatory review demonstrates that the visibility of the
review process can have an important impact on its outcome. 2 54 Presidents
have been reluctant to intervene directly in the rulemaking process because
2 55
Congress and the public tend to be suspicious of such intervention.
Concerns that the Reagan Administration was trying to conceal the regulatory
review process from public scrutiny forced OMB to agree to progressively
more liberal disclosure policies.
In June 1981, OMB Director David Stockman issued a memorandum
directing OMB staff to advise members of the public that "relevant factual
materials submitted to them should also be sent to the agency for inclusion in
the rulemaking record." 256 This policy did little to defuse criticism that OMB
was serving as a back channel conduit for industry input into regulatory
decisions. In May 1985, EPA and OMB agreed that OMB would routinely
send to EPA copies of documents concerning agency rulemakings that OMB
had received from members of the public. While rejecting creation of a
"logging requirement" that would inform EPA of contacts between OMB and
members of the public, OMB pledged to inform EPA's general counsel
whenever a meeting or phone call with an outside party provided OMB with
factual information that OMB officials were not confident was provided to
EPA. 25 7

These policies had little effect on the amount of information

available to the public concerning OMB's review of EPA regulations.
Faced with a congressional threat to eliminate funds for OMB's Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, 2 58 on June 13, 1986, OMB announced a
new disclosure policy.2 59 The policy pledged to make available for public
examination, upon written request made after publication of proposed or final
regulations, the drafts of regulations sent to OMB for review. OMB also
pledged to release all written correspondence exchanged between OIRA and
253. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 59-60, 71, 73 (cited in note 136).
254. See notes 110-15, 162 and accompanying text.
255. See notes 108-10 and accompanying text. See also Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug
Administration, in Wilson, ed, The Politics of Regulation at 212 (cited in note 21) (describing how an
administration attempt to intervene in an FDA decision backfired when news leaked to Congress and
concluding that this "is the kind of exception that proves the rule: it suggests that attempts to
intervene in favor of industry are likely to be politically unrewarding").
256. Stockman Memorandum (cited in note 145).
257. Letter from Robert P. Bedell to A. James Barnes (May 30, 1985), reprinted in OMB,
Regulatory Program at 619 (cited in note 145).
258. See Judith Havemann, House Moves to lWipe out OMB Unit, Washington Post A23 (July 31,
1986).
259. Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm (then-OIRA administrator), Additional Procedures
Concerning OIRA Reviews under Executive Orders Nos 12291 and 12498 (June 13, 1986) (outlining
the disclosure policy). The policy was amended on August 8, 1986 to clarify that it would apply only
to regulations for which OMB completed review subsequent to June 13, 1986. Memorandum from
Wendy L. Gramm, Revised June 13, 1986 Memorandum on Certain New Procedures of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (Aug 8, 1986).
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an "agency head," as well as information on the dates it commenced and
completed reviews of proposed and final regulations.
The new policy allows scrutiny of "unfiltered" regulations and enables
determination of what changes were made after their submission to OMB for
review. However, the policy is unlikely to provide the public with specific
information concerning bargaining between 0MB and EPA except in an
unusual case where OIRA communicates in writing with the EPA
administrator. 2 60 Indeed, EPA refused to permit the inclusion in a
rulemaking docket of documents obtained by a congressional oversight
committee relating to OMB's review of EPA's proposed revision of the
National

Contingency

Plan.2 6 1

Although

EPA

normally

includes

any

information submitted by outside parties, the agency argued that disclosure of
the information "would harm EPA's ability to engage in frank and open
discussions with 0MB in matters such as these, thereby injuring the quality of
2 62
agency decisions."
Moreover, the new disclosure procedures do not apply to regulations
blocked by OMB, and 0MB refuses to disclose the status of regulatory
reviews until after it has cleared final regulations. A sharply divided District of
Columbia Circuit sitting en banc ruled that a log indicating when regulations
were sent to 0MB for review is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information

Act. 263

The circuit

held that exempt

as material that

is

predecisional and deliberative, reasoning that disclosure of whether a
regulation had been sent to OMB for review "will generally disclose the
recommended outcome of the consultative process at each stage of the
process, as well as the source of any decision not to regulate." 2 6 4 The court
expressed fear that disclosure of such information would allow parties to
identify and publicize agencies and officials responsible for regulatory delays,
leading to "hasty and precipitous decision-making." 2 65 Noting that plaintiffs
"seek access to the information, in part to issue themselves an invitation to
agency deliberations," the court stated that agencies need not operate in a
fishbowl. 26 6 Thus, the public does not have a ready vehicle for determining
what has happened to regulations indefinitely delayed by OMB.
260. The Superfund National Contingency Plan at 11 (cited in note 196) (under OMB's new
disclosure policy "the details of OMB's communications with agency officials are largely hidden from
public view" because 15 oral conversations between EPA and OMB officials and OMB's written
comments on EPA's proposed plan never appeared in the rulemaking docket).
261. Porter Blocks Dingell Effort to Put Documents into Docket that Allegedly Show OMB Influence, 19 Envir
Rptr (BNA) 2115 (Feb 10, 1989).
262. Letter from EPA Assistant Administrator J. Winston Porter to Congressman John Dingell
(Feb 6, 1989), reprinted in The Superfund National Contingency Plan at 2 (cited in note 196).
263. 1o/e z, Department of Health and Human Serices, 839 F2d 768 (DC Cir 1988).
264. Id at 775 (footnote omitted). The court majority likened the information that a regulation
had been sent to OMB for review to a slip of paper "memorializing a judiciall panel's tentative
decision by stating 'Reverse; I will write.' ' Id.
265. Id at 776.
266. Id.

Page 127: Autumn 1991]

EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

IV
THE CONGRESSIONAL BACKLASH AGAINST EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OVERSIGHT

One of the most ignored, but significant, consequences of regulatory
review has been its contribution to intensifying institutional competition

between the presidency and Congress for control of federal policymaking.
The concept of regulatory review by the Executive Office was developed
during President Nixon's unprecedented efforts to expand presidential
policymaking authority through administrative action. 26 7 As the White House
staff grew in size and influence, Congress expanded the size of its own
bureaucracy and developed new devices for asserting its influence. 2 68 With
Congress and the presidency long under the control of opposite political
parties, partisan rivalry has exacerbated the institutional rivalry for control
over environmental policy.
Alarmed by the impact of regulatory review on the implementation of
ambitious environmental legislation, Congress has become increasingly
aggressive in attempting to influence EPA's implementation of the
environmental laws. The hearings held by Senator Muskie's committee in
1972 to explore the impact of QOL review on implementation of the Clean
Air Act 2639 presaged the intensified congressional oversight of EPA that was to

follow.
Despite institutional and partisan rivalries, Congress has supported some
aspects of Executive Office oversight and specifically endorsed participation
by CWPS in agency rulemaking proceedings. 2 70 Congressional hostility
toward regulatory review has focused largely on concern that such review
delays implementation of the laws and induces agencies to base regulatory
decisions on factors not identified as relevant by the statutes. Even when
Congress and the presidency were in the hands of the same political party,
congressional committees did not hesitate to embarrass the president by
holding oversight hearings to explore White House intervention in EPA
27
regulatory decisions. '
The Reagan Administration's "regulatory relief" program has generated
the most vociferous congressional reaction. It has resulted not only in
intensified congressional oversight of EPA, but also in amendment of the
already action-forcing environmental laws to constrain EPA's discretion even
267. Nixon's efforts to reorganize the Executive Office of the president to increase its control
over the federal bureaucracy are described in Nathan, The Plot that Failed at 45 (cited in note 28). An
important part of these efforts was the creation of OMB by executive order on July 1, 1970, and a
doubling of the size of the White House staff during Nixon's first term. Sidney M. Milkis & Michael
Nelson, The American Presidenc'v 313-14 (Cong Q Press, 1990).
268. For example, OMB's growing influence and the controversy caused by President Nixon's
assertion of authority to "impound" appropriated funds resulted in Congress's creation of the
Congressional Budget Office through the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974.
269. See notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
270. See note 72 and accompanying text.
271.
See note I10 and accompanying text.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

more severely. By championing "regulatory relief" at a time when there was
genuine interest in Congress in "regulatory reform," the Reagan
Administration review program sacrificed an opportunity to improve
substantially the structure of environmental regulation.
The action-forcing structure of the environmental laws has constrained
EPA's flexibility from the start. Beginning with the Clean Air Act in 1970,
statutory deadlines, technology-forcing regulatory mandates, and citizen suit
provisions in the laws have restricted the agency's ability to decide what to
regulate and how to regulate it. Despite the acknowledged inefficiencies of
this approach, its proponents argued that it was justified on the ground that a
national assault on long-neglected environmental problems had to be jump2 72
started to achieve success.
By 1980, after nearly a decade of experience with federal environmental
regulation, there was substantial interest in improving its structure. The
Carter Administration's Regulatory Council sought to begin improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of regulation by encouraging EPA's development
of an emissions trading, or "bubble," policy and by exploring other
regulatory innovations. 2 73 Congress was receptive to measures to reduce
unnecessary regulatory burdens, as indicated by its enactment of the
Paperwork Reduction Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act 2 74 at the close of
the Carter Administration and the Senate's approval of "regulatory reform"
legislation 2 75 at the outset of the Reagan Administration. However, under the
Reagan Administration's regulatory program, OMB's efforts to roll back
environmental regulation provoked Congress to amend the laws to
incorporate more demanding and increasingly explicit regulatory directives.
The congressional backlash toward the Reagan program was a direct
consequence of the manner in which the administration chose to implement
its strategy for providing "regulatory relief." Rather than seeking new
legislation to modify environmental laws that it found objectionable, the
Reagan Administration sought to effect major change in federal
environmental policies by dramatic administrative initiatives. Viewing these
actions as threats to legislative prerogatives, Congress responded by
increasing its own "micromanagement" of EPA. In short,
[t]he various elements of the Reagan regulatory relief strategy that played so well
politically during the first few months of the administration-the freeze on effective
dates for rules, the regulatory hit lists, the appointment of politically attuned rather
than professionally competent administrators, the targeted budget cuts and personnel
actions, the meetings with business groups to the virtual exclusion of any other
272. In 1977, outgoing EPA Administrator Russell Train told a congressional oversight
subcommittee that although this approach "carries with it certain penalties in terms of efficiency,
both technological efficiency and economic efficiency . .. up to now these have been costs that have
been well worth paying in order to get the country moving on these programs." Status Hearing at 9
(cited in note 25).
273. Innovative Techniques in Theory and Practice: Proceedings of a Regulatory Council
Conference 21 (now defunct U.S. Regulatory Council, July 22, 1980).
274. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 USC § 101 (1980); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 USC
§ 601 (1980).
275. S 1080 (cited in note 154).
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interested parties-all tended to undermine the perception that the Reagan
Administration could be counted on to use in a reasonable way any additional
discretion it might be granted. Indeed, the opposite impression was created.
ratchet" and to
Congress was put in a mood to tighten, not loosen, the "regulatory
276
scrutinize every action of administration regulatory officials.

While it is impossible to tell how much of Congress's intensified oversight
of EPA is a response to regulatory review, OMB's impact on the agency is
cited frequently as a justification for Congress's actions. 2 77 A study of
congressional oversight by the National Academy of Public Administration
found that between 1984 and 1986, EPA officials had been summoned to
appear at 198 hearings held by twenty-six different congressional
2 78
committees.
The Reagan program has itself been a subject of several investigations by
congressional oversight committees. These investigations have produced
numerous hearings 2 79 and congressional committee reports sharply critical of
the program. 280 More significantly, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction
with the consequences of regulatory review by adding more specific statutory
controls on agencies' discretion every time it has reauthorized the
environmental laws.
The result has been a distinct trend toward reduced flexibility for agencies
charged with implementing the federal environmental statutes. 28 1 This
congressional desire to control agency discretion is reflected in an increase in
the proliferation of statutory deadlines and the specification of more detailed
substantive criteria in such legislation.2 82 Shapiro and Glicksman have noted
that such congressional efforts to control agency discretion employ three
models: a coercive model under which the agency's discretion concerning
whether or not to regulate is removed while the agency is permitted to choose
the appropriate method of regulation; a prescriptive model under which the
agency retains its regulatory discretion but must regulate in accordance with
276. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 256 (cited in note 26).
277. CongressionalOversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need to Strike a Balanceand Focus on Performance
29 (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1988) ("Oversight is necessary, from the committee staff member's
perspective, because of the power of OMB and the Reagan Administration's 'deep hostility toward
effective environmental regulation.' ") ("NAPA, Congressional Oversight").
278. Id at 22.
279. See, for example, OMB Hearings (cited in note 121); OMB Control of OSHA Rulemaking,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, 97th Cong, 2d
Sess (1982); EPA Investigation Hearings (cited in note 141); Asbestos Hearings (cited in note 162);
Oversight of the OMB Regulatory Review and Planning Process, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong, 2d
Sess (1986) ("OMB Oversight Hearing"); OMB Review of EPA Regulations, Hearings before a
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, 99th
Cong, 2d Sess (1986).
280. See, for example, Asbestos Hearings (cited in note 162); OMB Influence on Agency
Regulations (cited in note 183); The Superfund National Contingency Plan (cited in note 196).
281. See generally RichardJ. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the JIatchers Themselves)?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 205
(Autumn 1991); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental
Law, 54 L & Contemp Probs 311 (Autumn 1991).
282. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution
in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L J 819.
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relatively detailed substantive criteria if it chooses to regulate; and a ministerial
model, which couples a statutory deadline with a detailed substantive standard
28 3
defining the appropriate manner of regulation.
OMB's impact on agency decisions is frequently cited in the legislative
history that accompanies the enactment of more detailed statutory controls on
agency discretion. For example, when Congress amended the Endangered
Species Act in 1982 to remove much of the secretary of interior's discretion to
refuse to add species to the endangered list, the Conference Committee
report explained that the amendments were intended to preclude application
of Executive Order 12291 and the Paperwork Reduction Act to listing
decisions.

284

The congressional backlash against the administration's regulatory
policies is illustrated most dramatically by the 1984 Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments, which impose dozens of new deadlines for regulatory
action, occasionally accompanied by hammer provisions that specify the
default regulations that will take effect automatically if EPA fails to meet a
deadline. 2 8 5 While this legislation was in part a response to the scandal that
led to the resignation of EPA Administrator Burford, it also was clearly a
response to congressional frustration with OMB's role in the regulatory
review process. The House Committee report on the 1984 amendments
specified that EPA's ability to meet "this deadline as with all other deadlines
in this bill, shall not be impaired in any way whatsoever by Executive Order
12291 ."286
The 1986 Superfund amendments also illustrate this phenomenon. As
one congressman remarked when explaining the myriad deadlines and
directives in the final version of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986: "It limits the discretion of the EPA and OMB to
procrastinate, delay or thwart the will of Congress and the American
2

people."

87

Congress has also used the threat of legislative action to counter OMB
efforts to block EPA regulatory initiatives. For example, in September 1985 it
was revealed that OMB had been blocking EPA's efforts to promulgate
283. Id.
284. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, HR Conf Rep No 835, 97th Cong, 2d
Sess 20 (1982). "The 1982 revision of listing procedures was intended as a direct slap at the
performance of the Reagan Administration, and in particular its application to the listing process of
'regulatory impact analyses' under Executive Order 12291 .....
Michael J. Bean, The Evolution of
National Wildlife Law 336 n77 (Praeger, 1983).
285. See Richard C. Fortuna & David J. Lennett, Hazardous W1'aste Regulation: The New Era 10-13
(McGraw Hill, 1987) (describing the history of EPA's failures to meet previous deadlines for
promulgating federal hazardous waste regulations implementing RCRA); see also J. William Futrell,
Hazardous IWastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from Supeifund, RCRA, and Other Environmental Laws. 24
Houston L Rev 125, 134 (1987) (calling the RCRA Amendments a "classic example of
intergovernmental distrust" that is "lengthy and unparalleled in thel[] level of detail, intrusion into
EPA's management practices, and prescription of new regulatory practices").
286. Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983, HR Rep 98-198, House Committee
on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 35 (1983).
287. 132 Cong Rec H9599 (Oct 8, 1986) (Rep. Scheur).
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maximum contaminant levels for forty substances in drinking water. In
response, the Senate adopted an unusual amendment that required OMB to
288
release the proposal.
Not surprisingly, Congress's increasing use of statutory deadlines has not
been popular with EPA officials, despite the fact that many of the deadlines
"were negotiated [by Congress] with EPA, and modified at EPA's behest." 28 9
Some EPA officials have questioned whether Congress has limited their
discretion so severely as to "impinge upon the constitutional authority of the
0
executive branch to establish and implement its own regulatory agenda." 29
Others have noted that environmental legislation is becoming like the tax
code in which "the administrative discretion of the [IRS] is severely
proscribed by hundreds of specific congressional directives that mandate
special treatment of favored localities and certain industries. ' 29'
The congressional backlash against OMB review is not the only factor
contributing to the trend toward increasingly prescriptive environmental
legislation. The demise of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha2 9 2 has
removed from the congressional arsenal what had been one of Congress's
favorite tools for influencing agency action. Thus today, as the Supreme
Court noted in Bowsher v. Synar, once it has enacted legislation, "Congress can
thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by passing
new legislation.-

293

The trend toward increasingly prescriptive environmental legislation is
likely to continue until public and congressional confidence in EPA's
independence is restored.
The Reagan Administration failed to realize that a crucial element in generating and
sustaining the perception of a good-faith administration of social regulation is an open
and relatively transparent process of regulatory decision-making, including
regulatory oversight as exercised by the White House ....
Indeed, a regulatory
decision-making process that is (or merely appears to be) biased to favor any one
interest group (especially the entities supposedly being regulated) invites Congress
and the courts to further constrain existing administrative discretion and to engage
increasingly in second-guessing individual administrative actions. Given the nature of
the issues involved, the potential for arbitrary decisions and abuse of discretion is so
inherently great in social regulation that faith in the fairness of the decision-making
294
process is an absolute prerequisite to increased regulatory flexibility.

While EPA has suffered the brunt of the congressional backlash against
regulatory review, OMB is becoming a target as well. In 1986, Democratic
committee chairmen in Congress threatened to eliminate funding for OIRA.
288. Senate Accepts Amendment to Superfund Bill to Force 0MB to Release Drinking Water Rules, 16 Envir
Rptr (BNA) 933 (1985).
289. Fortuna & Lennett, Hazardous Waste Regulation at 16 (cited in note 285).
290. F. Henry Habicht, II, Responses to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 Houston L Rev 11, 116 (1987).
291. Futrell, 24 Houston L Rev at 133 (cited in note 285).
292. 462 US 919 (1983).
293. 478 US 714, 733-34 (1986) (striking down provisions in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Deficit Reduction Act that delegate certain functions to the Comptroller General on the ground that
they violate separation of powers principles by authorizing a legislative branch official to perform
executive functions).
294. Eads & Fix, Relief or ReformP at 258-59 (cited in note 26).
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Although they did not succeed in eliminating OIRA's appropriation,
Congress did s~ek to restrict OIRA's activities to performing reviews under
the Paperwork Reduction Act. In language added to OMB's appropriations
bill, Congress specified that funds appropriated for OIRA be used for "the
review of a rule or regulation ...

only to the extent that such review is for the

sole purpose of reviewing an information collection request contained in, or
derived from, such rule or regulation.- 2 9 5 OIRA, however, was able to
continue performing regulatory reviews under the executive orders (following
an internal reorganization) by using funds available to OMB for other
purposes.

More recently, Congress's insistence that reauthorization of the

Paperwork Reduction Act be accompanied by new limits on OMB review has
resulted in expiration of that act due to a last minute hold placed on the

legislation by Republican senators opposed to the deal worked out between
29
the White House and congressional leaders.

6

The activities of the Bush Administration's Competitiveness Council have
itensified congressional resentment of Executive Office review. In early 1991
congressional committees held two lengthy oversight hearings to explore the
council's role in Executive Office interference with EPA's implementation of
the Clean Air Act. Members of Congress denounced the council's actions in
weakening EPA regulatory proposals as "sinister," "Orwellian," "a serious
breach of the separation of powers," and dubbed the council "a polluter star
chamber.' '297
V
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT:

A LEGAL AND POLICY ASSESSMENT

The Reagan Administration's regulatory review program has sparked
considerable commentary that seems almost schizophrenic in its assessment
of Executive Office oversight.2

98

While scholars have praised the theoretical

desirability of improving regulatory policy through regulatory review, critics

295. 44 USC § 3520, as amended by Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act, Title VIII, § 820,
Pub L No 99-500, 100 Stat 1783 (1986).
296. See note 167 and accompanying text.
297. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, White House Competitiveness Council Provokes Sharp Anger Among Democrats in
Congress, Wall StJ A8 col 1 (July 8, 1991).
298. See, for example, Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialAlanagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo Wash
L Rev 533 (1989); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tex L Rev 1243
(1987); Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority of the Office
of
Management and Budget, 17 Envir L Rptr 10017 (1987); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of
the President and 0MB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin L Rev 181 (1986); Christopher C. DeMuth &
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1975 (1986); Morrison,
99 Harv L Rev at 1059 (cited in note 173); Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Resources L I (cited in note 136);
Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 Wash L Rev 409 (1982); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz L Rev 1267 (1981); Norton
Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControl of Agency Rulemaking under Executive
Order 12291, 80 Mich L Rev 193 (1981).
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have charged that the Reagan program has served as a vehicle for
299
immeasurable abuses.
Some controversy over regulatory review is virtually inevitable in light of
institutional and partisan rivalries that exist in a system of government with
separation of powers. The schizophrenic assessments of regulatory review
stem not only from differences between theoretical and empirical perspectives
on its purposes and effects, but also from different attitudes toward regulatory
policy in general.3 0 0 Thus, any assessment of regulatory review must examine
carefully not only the rationales for regulatory review but also the models of
regulatory policy upon which those rationales are founded.
A.

Rationales for Regulatory Review

Regulatory review has been defended on both procedural and substantive
grounds. The rationale most frequently offered in support of regulatory
review is that it improves interagency coordination and increases
accountability for regulatory decisions.3 0 ' A more controversial rationale is
that it improves the substance of regulatory policy by requiring that
regulatory decisions satisfy certain substantive criteria, such as cost-benefit
analyses. 3 0 2 This second rationale is founded on competing diagnoses of
agency failure that are a source of considerable controversy.
1. Enhanced Coordination and Increased Accountability. Improved interagency
coordination was a major rationale for the development of the first regulatory
review program. In October 1971, then-OMB Director George P. Shultz
explained that the purpose of the QOL review program was to "establish a
procedure for improving the inter-agency coordination of proposed agency
regulations, standards, guidelines, and similar materials pertaining to
environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public
health and safety." 3 0 3 The programs that followed in subsequent
administrations also have emphasized the desirability of minimizing
duplication of effort and increasing agency accountability. 30 4
The regulatory review programs employed during the Nixon, Ford, and
Carter Administrations facilitated interagency coordination by using the
299. See, for example, Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 173) (noting that "the
system of OMB control imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased health and
safety of the American public . . .[] places the ultimate rulemaking decisions in the hands of OMB
personnel who are neither competent in the substantive areas of regulation, nor accountable to
Congress or the electorate in any meaningful sense[, and] operates in an atmosphere of secrecy and
insulation from public debate that makes a mockery of the system of open participation embodied in
the Administrative Procedure Act.").
300. See Bruff, 57 Geo Wash L Rev at 565 (cited in note 298) (While most of the debate over
regulatory review has focused on regulatory procedures, "the real disagreement usually concerns the
substance of regulatory policy.").
301. See, for example, Strauss & Sunstein, 38 Admin L Rev at 189-91 (cited in note 298).
302. See, for example, DeMuth & Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1080-1082 (cited in note 298).
303. 7 Envir L Rptr (BNA) at 693 (cited in note 33).
304. See, for example, Exec Order 12291 preamble, 3 CFR 127 (1982); Exec Order 12498
preamble, 3 CFR 323 (1986).
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Executive Office as a clearinghouse for comments solicited from other
agencies. The semiannual Regulatory Calendar initiated in the Carter
Administration (called a Regulatory Agenda in subsequent administrations)
also has improved interagency coordination. While the Reagan and Bush
programs have deemphasized interagency comments by centralizing review
responsibility in OMB, the annual Regulatory Program put together under
30 5
Executive Order 12498 also facilitates coordination of regulatory action.
Supporters of regulatory review by the Executive Office maintain that the
president is in the best position to coordinate the overall scheme of regulation
by federal agencies and to hold agency personnel accountable. They note
that the proliferation of federal regulatory agencies in the last two decades has
made coordination imperative and that the president is directly accountable
to the electorate. Based on the assumption that OMB possesses a broader
perspective on environmental protection than EPA, they maintain that the
regulatory review process permits a more balanced accommodation of the
30 6
competing values affected by regulatory proposals.
Even critics of regulatory review acknowledge that improved coordination
and increased accountability are desirable goals. They argue, however, that
these have not been the principal aims of regulatory review, particularly
during the Reagan Administration.3 0 7 Moreover, they note that there is an
inherent tension between the breadth and depth of regulatory review that
poses a dilemma for any review program. While the president may be in the
best position to enhance accountability, virtually no regulatory review is
conducted by the president or his close advisers; instead it inevitably must be
delegated to lower-level staff, particularly in a system like the Reagan program
in which all regulatory actions are reviewed routinely. One reason regulatory
review had consistently been so controversial in previous administrations is
that it is inherently selective in nature.30 8 While only the president has a
sufficiently broad mandate to integrate and coordinate the activities of all
regulatory agencies, the White House can not become involved in every
regulatory issue. The "necessary selectivity inevitably raises the suspicionsometimes with very good reason-that political considerations rather than a
desire to achieve coordination have been the primary reason that a particular
30 9
regulation has been singled out for attention."
John Quarles has argued that even the QOL review process, which
reviewed only selected EPA regulations, undermined accountability and
305. See Strauss & Sunstein, Admin L Rev at 187 (cited in note 298) (explaining that Executive
Order 12498 may facilitate the oversight capacity of agency heads by allowing them to supervise their
staffs' development of an annual regulatory plan).
306. See, for example, id at 187-90.
307. See, for example, Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1064 n22 (cited in note 173) (noting that
"OMB can perform some useful functions in the rulemaking process . . ." including "coordinating
related proceedings between agencies..." and ensuring that relevant information is shared between
agencies and that agencies consider the needs of small business as required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act).
308. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 46 (cited in note 26).
309. Id.
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diffused responsibility by requiring staff from EPA to negotiate regulatory
issues with subordinate staff from other agencies and OMB. He concluded
that
it is preferable to rely on the political process to hold the Administrator accountable
rather than to create complex mechanisms which attempt to establish additional
checks and balances within the executive branch, but which also inevitably fragment
responsibility and in the end undermine3 achievement
of the very accountability for
10
which those mechanisms are established.
By requiring that all regulations be submitted to OIRA for review, the
executive orders respond to the selectivity issue by sacrificing some of the
visibility and accountability of overt selective regulatory review and entrusting
any necessary selection to OIRA's desk officers. Critics question whether
these reviewers have an institutional perspective that is broader than EPA's.

They note that in performing its review function, OIRA has focused almost
exclusively on the cost of regulation and its economic impact. 31 1 Concerns

also have been raised that OIRA staff lack the technical expertise required to
analyze health and safety issues.3 1 2 By contrast, EPA's program offices are
charged by law with responsibility for considering a broad range of values
implicated by environmental policy decisions, including public health and

31 3
welfare effects and ecological impacts.
Some argue that 0MB staff need not be "experts" because their primary

job is to ask hard questions "that a sophisticated layman would ask."3 1 4 Yet it

is clear that many of OIRA's reviews involve the assessment of scientific and
technical information, 3 15 and that the reviewers are rewarded in part on how
successful they are in generating reasons for disapproving of regulation. As a
former OIRA desk officer confessed to congressional investigators:
I didn't have the technical expertise to work on EPA issues. I would receive studies on
both sides of a [toxics] issue and I just didn't know [how to evaluate the conflicting
arguments]. I knew I would
do well from my boss' perspective if I got rid of rules on
3 16
[the toxic substances].

310. Executive Branch Hearings at 4 (cited in note 110).
311. See, for example, Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 173).
312. InJanuary 1986, OMB reported that only one of OIRA's 82 staff members had a degree in a
health-related field; most have backgrounds in economics, business, or finance. OMB Oversight
Hearing at 180 (cited in note 279) (table with testimony of OMB Director Miller). While the statistics
reported indicate that 25% of the staff had prior work experience in a health-related field, it is
unclear how significant such work experience had been since the OIRA staff on average are reported
as having had work experience in nearly four different fields. Id.
313. See, for example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, § 6(c)(1), 15 USC § 2605(c)(1), the
source of EPA's regulatory authority to ban asbestos products. This statute requires EPA, before
regulating chemicals, to consider and to make findings concerning the chemicals' health effects,
magnitude of human exposure, magnitude of environmental exposure and environmental effects,
benefit of the chemical for various uses, availability of substitutes, and "the reasonably ascertainable
economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national econmomy,
small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health."
314. DeMuth & Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev 1083-84 (cited in note 298).
315. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 14 (cited in note 136).
316. OMB Influence on Agency Regulations at 19 (cited in note 183) (comment included in
committee report).
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Serious questions about OIRA's competence to handle complex scientific
issues have been raised as a result of one of the few instances when OIRA's
substantive views on regulatory policy have been articulated publicly. When it
prepared the annual Regulatory Program of the United States Government for the
1991 fiscal year, OIRA staff inserted a section containing remarkably harsh
criticism of risk assessment policies employed by federal agencies.3 1 7 The
document argued that risk assessment practices employed by federal agencies
typically overestimate risks by employing assumptions that are far too
conservative. While risk assessment has been highly controversial and some
scientists have raised concerns similar to those made by OMB, what was
38
The
particularly disturbing about the OMB report was its lack of balance.
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis criticized OMB's presentation as "onesided," "misleading," and "confusing," and recommended that more
balanced treatment of risk assessment issues be provided. 31 9 This episode
indicates that OIRA has not won sufficient respect in the scientific community
to justify a major substantive role in shaping and coordinating federal risk
assessment policy.
In order to be comprehensive, regulatory review inevitably involves
delegation of responsibility to lower level staff who may not have a clear sense
of the priorities of the president whom they purportedly represent. Thus,
they may be inclined to impose their own personal preferences on agency
decisions. As a RARG staffer confessed: "Since I never knew what decision
the president would make, or would have made if an issue ever got to him, I
' '3 20
had no choice but to pursue my own vision of what was good.
One of the few examples that OIRA officials have cited to illustrate the
benefits of improved coordination due to the regulatory review program is
EPA's asbestos phasedown rule. 3 2' DeMuth and Ginsburg note that OMB
officials met with Canadian government officials "presumably in order to
discuss not the scientific or technical issues, in which EPA is expert, but the
foreign policy implications of the proposed rule." 3 22 They conclude that in
such circumstances, "an agency with a broader perspective is better suited to
represent the administration than the program agency in which rulemaking
323
authority is lodged."
While a claim of foreign policy expertise for OMB seems far-fetched,324 it
is particularly strained in the context of the asbestos example. The Canadian
government, which has heavily promoted its asbestos industry, had requested
317. OMB, Regulatory Program at 13-26 (cited in note 145).
318.
Management
Management 4 (Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health, Dec 17, 1990).
319. Id.
320. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions at 67 (cited in note 20).
321. DeMuth & Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1084 (cited in note 298).
322. Id at 1087.
323. Id.
324. A subsequent OIRA administrator told an interviewer that "OMB rends to be much more
domestically focused than internationally focused." 0MB is "responsible for the budget of the State
Department and the international agencies, but in terms of international policy development and
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the meeting with OMB after learning that EPA had decided to proceed with a
proposal to ban most remaining uses of asbestos. 32 5 0MB previously had
tried to block this proposal by parroting the asbestos industry's argument that
EPA should be required, as a matter of law, to refer asbestos risks to OSHA
for regulation. 32 6 A congressional oversight committee obtained a copy of a
telex sent by the Canadian embassy to the Canadian External Affairs
Department that revealed that OMB had encouraged Canadian opposition to
EPA's proposed asbestos ban. The telex reported that "while OMB found it
necessary for several reasons to approve the proposal, the agency remains
opposed to [the] banning approach and it will actively work toward this end in
the regulatory process." It noted that "OSHA regulation is a key element in
[the] OMB plan to avoid banning" because OMB believed that if OSHA
tightened the standard for workplace exposures, the benefits of an asbestos
32 7
ban would be greatly reduced.
While some may find it disturbing to learn OMB would confide to a
foreign government that it planned to manipulate one federal agency against
another to avoid regulation phasing out a toxic substance, the most
unfortunate aspect of this incident is that it suggests that OMB had little
genuine concern for achieving better interagency coordination of regulation.
EPA had been considering an asbestos ban since 1979 because it believed that
this was the most efficient way to control the extremely serious risks posed
throughout the entire life cycle of asbestos use.3

28

OSHA, however, may not

have the authority to ban products, since it is directed to set permissible
exposure limits ("PELs") for workers as low as is "feasible" to protect worker
health. 3 29 While OSHA had proposed lowering its PEL for asbestos from two
fibers per cubic centimeter of air to 0.2 f/cc, it concluded that this would only
reduce the cancer risk faced by exposed workers from sixty-four in 1000 to 6.7
in 1000. OSHA considered a risk of nearly seven in 1000 to be unacceptably
review, OMB has historically not been a terribly big player in that area." 6 Envir Forum at 28 (cited
in note 185).
325. The vast majority of the asbestos used in the United States came from foreign sources,
principally Canada.
326. See Asbestos Hearings (cited in note 162). OMB had briefly persuaded EPA to refer
asbestos risks to OSHA under § 9 of TSCA, despite EPA's previous position that § 9 did not require
such a referral. After congressional oversight hearings were announced, EPA Administrator Lee
Thomas conceded that the agency had made a mistake in announcing the referral OMB wanted, and
EPA decided instead to proceed with its proposal to phaseout asbestos under § 6 of TSCA. While
one commentator has suggested that OMB review may serve as a kind of substitute for "hard look"
judicial review of agency action, Peter L. Strauss, Considering the Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review,
1989 Duke LJ 538, 548, one wonders whether OMB also should defer to EPA's interpretations of its
statutory authority, since courts have been directed to do so by Chevron, U.S.A. v NRDC, 467 US 837,
844 (1984).
327. OMB Review of EPA Regulations at 137-41 (cited in note 279).
328. See 44 Fed Reg 60061 (Oct 19, 1979); 51 Fed Reg 3738 (Jan 29, 1986).
329. OSHA is required "in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents" to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such
standard for the period of his working life." Occupational Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 USC
§ 655(b)(5) (1988) (emphasis added).
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high, but it concluded that this was the lowest feasible level to which worker
330
exposure could be reduced given the present state of technology.
Had OMB been seriously interested in coordinating regulatory action by
EPA and OSHA, it would not have impeded EPA's asbestos phaseout
proposal because it could have avoided the need for investments in extremely
expensive occupational exposure controls that admittedly were inadequate to
protect asbestos workers. Instead, OMB's actions succeeded in substantially
delaying EPA's asbestos phaseout proposal.3 3 ' Thus, while there may be
sound theoretical grounds for supporting regulatory review as a means for
improving coordination and increasing accountability, in practice regulatory
review has often worked against these goals.
2. Increasing the Net Benefits of Regulation. The Reagan Administration's
regulatory review program had far broader goals than simply improving
coordination and increasing accountability. It represented a sharp departure
from its predecessors because it sought to require that regulatory decisions
satisfy particular substantive criteria.3 3 2 The ostensible objective of the
Reagan Administration's review program was to maximize the net societal
benefits of regulation. A poorly disguised goal of the Reagan program was to
use regulatory review as a tool for providing "regulatory relief" to
industry. 3 Despite the bitter criticism of the Reagan program, there is
surprisingly little evidence to suggest that the program was successful on
either count.
Clearly, OMB review has increased the cost of regulation by making it
more difficult and expensive for EPA to issue regulations. The question is
whether society is better off today as a result of incurring these increased costs
and modifying or disposing of proposed EPA regulations. Although there is
an extensive literature on regulatory review, remarkably few specific examples
of dramatic benefits produced by OMB review have been offered.
While the Reagan program sought to make cost-benefit analysis the central
guiding principle of the regulatory review program, the Reagan
Administration never subjected the program itself to cost-benefit analysis
prior to promulgation of the executive orders. This analysis apparently was
330. 51 Fed Reg 22612 (June 20, 1988); 53 Fed Reg 35610, 35611 (Sept 14, 1988).
331. EPA ultimately promulgated the asbestos phaseout regulation in somewhat modified form.
54 Fed Reg 29459, 29492 (July 12, 1989). OSHA's occupational exposure controls for lead are also
clearly inadequate to protect workers against significant risks, as illustrated by one company's
establishment of a "fetal protection" policy banning fertile women from workplaces because of the
risk of lead exposure to fetuses. This policy was eventually overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court,
citing "evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive
system." Automobile Workers vJohnson Controls, Inc.. Ill S Ct 1196 (1991), reversing, Int'l Union, UA 1'
vJohnson Controls, Inc., 886 F2d 871, 874 (7th Cir 1989). In recognition of the pervasive risks posed
by lead, EPA has indicated that it is conducting a "Regulatory Investigation of Lead" to explore the
use of § 6(a) of TSCA for controling the lifecycle of risks from uses of lead. OMB, Regulatory
Program at 469 (cited in note 145). See also Strategy for Reducing Lead Exposures (EPA, 1990).
OMB reportedly has resisted EPA's efforts to implement this initiative. 0MB Doubts Over Leads Health
Risks Aiay Threaten Future EPA Regs, Staff Say, 12 Inside EPA 1 (Feb 22, 1991).
332. See note 130 and accompanying text.
333. Fix & Eads, 2 YaleJ Reg at 312 (cited in note 161).
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deemed unnecessary despite OMB's nearly religious belief in cost-benefit
analysis, because of the implicit assumption that anything that made
regulation more difficult was an unambiguous good. 3 34 By turning a blind eye

to the potential benefits of regulation, the Reagan Administration seriously
undermined the economic foundation of the regulatory review program by
intertwining it in the administration's ill-fated crusade for regulatory relief.
One discernible impact of regulatory review is that it has stimulated more
rigorous regulatory analysis by EPA. The Nixon Administration's QOL
program played a major role in stimulating the early development of EPA's
in-house analytic capabilities as well as the creation of a more formalized
regulatory development and clearance process within the agency. 33 5 Erik

Olson's study of the impact of the Reagan Administration program found that
"a more rigorous internal review has developed" within EPA. 33 6 "EPA has
beefed up its economic analyses" and "had spent $2.45 million on a stilluncompleted ...

33 7
RIA for the RCRA land disposal standards."

Not surprisingly, the extensive internal and external reviews that EPA

regulations receive have been credited with improving their overall quality. 3 38

The more difficult question is whether the benefits outweigh their additional
costs. Paul Portney has argued that the costs EPA regulations impose are so
enormous that if regulatory review results in even a small reduction in the
cost of regulation, it will have more than paid for itself. 33 9 While Portney's

analysis supports having some form of regulatory review to ensure that
regulations are not unnecessarily costly, it does not address the questions of
how much economic analysis agencies should perform and who should
340
conduct regulatory review.
One of the ironies of the Reagan Administration's regulatory review
program is that it adopts a command and control approach to regulatory
review by requiring that all regulations be submitted to OMB for review and
by prohibiting publication of regulations until OMB has completed this
review. 34 ' This has produced frequent complaints that OMB review has
delayed regulation pending the development of information that is
334. See Scalia, 5 Regulation at 14, 17 (cited in note 138) (James C. Miller, III: regardless of how
long review delays regulations, it is "necessary-and well worth it-to make sure that new rules do
more good than harm").
335. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 50 (cited in note 26).
336. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res 1, at 49 (cited in note 136).
337. Id.
338. 7 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 694 (cited in note 33), quoting OMB and EPA officials as crediting the
extensive review process with the excellent quality of most EPA regulations.
339. Paul R. Portney, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Analysis, in Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental
Policy under Reagan's Executive Order 226-38 (U North Carolina Press, 1984).
340. Portney notes that CWPS studied the impact of its participation in 31 agency rulemaking
proceedings during the Carter Administration and found that significant improvements in
regulations had occurred in eight cases and moderate improvements in nine cases. Id at 234. While
Pormney notes that CWPS did not attempt to measure the monetary benefits of its activities, it is
conceivable that CWPS's approach to regulatory review, which had been expressly endorsed by
Congress, generated substantial net benefits in the absence of a prepublication clearance
requirement.

341.

See note 125 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary or unhelpful. In his study, Erik Olson found that "in general,
EPA staff interviewed believed that a full-blown cost-benefit RIA is of little
value to EPA decisionmakers and is essentially a waste of EPA's scarce
resources." 3 4 2 As McGarity notes, "although regulatory analysis
unquestionably has enhanced regulatory decision making in many instances, it
also has led to some poor decisions;" 3 4 3 one of the "gravest threats to
regulatory analysis is the perception that it is biased against regulation," 34 4 a
problem that has infected OMB's review program because of its association
with the Reagan Administration's regulatory relief program. Shortly after
announcing his plans to leave EPA, Administrator Lee Thomas complained
that "OMB is important but they are more of a pain in the ass because it takes
a long, long time to get anything through."3 4 5 Thomas conceded that
regulatory review is generally necessary but complained that the reviews often
resulted in unnecessary repetition of answers to questions that had already
3
been settled within EPA.

46

The expense of increased analytical study necessary for the regulatory
34 7
review program has not been accompanied by an increase in EPA's budget.
RIAs may cost several hundred thousand, if not millions, of dollars.3 48 At the
same time the Reagan program was launched, the enactments of TSCA,
RCRA, and CERCLA were expanding EPA's statutory responsibilities
dramatically. 349 Yet the Reagan Administration slashed EPA's budget. This
exacerbated the gulf between EPA's responsibilities and resources. This gulf
impeded innovations in market-based mechanisms that, although expensive
to develop, could have provided society with real cost savings in the long
3 50
term, and increased public and congressional distrust of EPA.

Perhaps the most glaring problem with the Reagan Administration's
regulatory review program was its lack of balance. From its inception, the
program focused almost exclusively on reducing costs to industry. OMB's
342. Olson, 4 VaJ Nat Res L at 49-50 (cited in note 136).
343. McGarity, 65 Tex L Rev at 1246 (cited in note 298) (citing the way cost-benefit analyses were
used by the Army Corps of Engineers to justify virtually any development project). Compare CostBenefit Analysis Can Be Useful in Assessing Environmental Regulations Despite Limitations 13, 21
(U.S. Gen Acct Office, 1984) (finding that cost-benefit analysis could improve the quality of
environmental regulations).
344. McGarity, 65 Tex L Rev at 1332 (cited in note 298).
345. Thomas Tells of Frustration with OMB, Predicts Mfore Rules But Urges Prevention, 19 Envir Rptr
(BNA) 1617 (Dec 9, 1988).
346. Id.
347. By requiring EPA to expend time and resources on further analysis, the executive orders
reduce the remaining resources available to the Agency for promulgating rules. See McGarity, 65
Tex L Rev at 1270 n140 (cited in note 298), citing Regulatory Reform Legislation of 1981, Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 255 (1981) (statement of
Lester Lave).
348. See Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1066 (cited in note 173).
349. One indication of the expansion of EPA's statutory responsibilities is the growth of the
cumulative page length of federal environmental statutes from approximately 200 to more than 400
pages between 1975 and 1980. Curtis Moore, Second Step on a Thousand Mile Journey: The Case for
Creating a Department of Environmental Protection 56 (unpub manuscript, 1989) (copy on file with
author).
350. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 148-49 (cited in note 26).

Page 127: Autumn 19911

EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

blindness to the potential benefits of environmental regulation is illustrated
by the claim of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief that it had saved the
economy 150 billion dollars in costs. This claim does not mean that net
societal benefits increased by a corresponding amount because it fails to
consider any of the benefits foregone by relaxing regulations. 3 5 1 Even OMB's
estimates of cost savings are exaggerated. Former OIRA Administrator Miller
admitted that OMB's initial claim that regulatory review had saved nine to
eleven billion dollars in capital expenditures and six billion dollars in
recurring annual costs, was derived "mainly from industry sources" and that
"it is conceivable" that OMB's efforts actually may have generated net
costs.

35 2

The claim that the task force saved 150 billion dollars over ten years

is also suspect. Eads and Fix note that the task force counted transfers as cost
savings, claimed credit for rescinding regulations that were unlikely ever to
have been implemented, claimed credit for savings connected with
regulations ordered reinstated by the courts, and employed double
3 53
counting.
This imbalance in the Reagan Administration's regulatory review program
meant that it presumed that relaxation of environmental regulations could not
possibly result in net costs to society. Because the program was premised on
the notion that regulatory relief was urgently needed, Executive Office
oversight of EPA has rarely focused on the very end emphasized by Executive
Order 12291: maximizing net benefits to society.3 54 Rather, the Reagan
Administration "principally used the system of OMB review created by the
executive orders to implement a myopic vision of the regulatory process

which places the elimination of cost to industry above all other
considerations." 35 5 For example, OMB has interpreted Executive Order
12291's requirement that cost-benefit analysis be performed for "major"
regulatory actions as applying only to actions that strengthen regulations, not
to actions that repeal them.3 56 Thus, agencies must prepare RIAs before

proposing to promulgate major regulations, but not when they are proposing
to repeal them.
EPA's lead phasedown regulations provide the most stunning illustration
of the potentially disastrous consequences of OMB's anti-regulatory bias. At
the direction of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, EPA in February 1982
Id at 245. The rask Force sought to justify this claim by arguing that "the changes have not
351.
sacrificed any values protected by the relevant statutes," Reagan Administration Regulatory
Achievements 70 (Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Aug 11, 1983), a claim Eads and Fix
dismiss as "clearly untrue." Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 245 (cited in note 26).
352. OMB Hearings at 114-15 (cited in note 121).
353. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 237-45 (cited in note 26).
354. Exec Order 12291 § 2(c), 3 CFR 127 (1982).
355. Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 173).
356. This interpretation apparently stems from the fact that Executive Order 12291 defines a
"major rule" only in terms of its effect on the economy ("[Alny regulation that is likely to result in an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more." Exec Order 12291 § l(b)(1), 3 CFR 127
(1982)) and not in terms of its value in protecting human health or the environment. See also Miller,
I Regulation at 14, 17 (cited in note 66) (OIRA administrator states that relaxation of a major rule
would be exempt from the RIA requirement).
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proposed to repeal existing limits on the amount of lead that could be used as
an additive in gasoline. The proposal to relax or rescind the lead limits was
cleared by OMB even though EPA had not performed an RIA and had not
3 57
assessed the consequences to public health of increasing lead emissions.
Despite OMB's vigorous support for this proposal, protests from the
environmental and public health communities convinced EPA not to relax the
3 59
lead limits. 3 58 OMB later tried to claim credit for the reversal.
The lead phasedown controversy startingly demonstrates that OMB's antiregulatory bias effectively precluded agencies from even contemplating
whether a strengthening of environmental regulations would generate net
benefits to society. Throughout the controversy, the Environmental Defense
Fund argued that a cost-benefit analysis would demonstrate that sharp
reductions in the lead content of gasoline would yield enormous net
benefits.3 60 Indeed, evidence from the second National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey ("NHANES II") demonstrated a dramatic correlation
between changes in levels of lead used in gasoline and levels of lead in
children's blood. 3 6 ' This evidence was so dramatic that the court reviewing
EPA's decision not to relax the lead limits stated, in a highly unusual bit of
dicta, that "the demonstrated connection between gasoline lead and blood
lead [and] the demonstrated health effects of blood lead levels . . . would

36 2
justify EPA in banning lead from gasoline entirely."
EPA did not consider strengthening the lead limits until more than a year
later, when EPA's auto inspection survey revealed that misfueling with
cheaper leaded gasoline had poisoned the catalytic converters in more than
12 percent of vehicles designed to burn unleaded gasoline. 363 After it was
suggested that the misfueling problem could be dealt with by phasing lead out
of gasoline, EPA Deputy Administrator Al Alm initiated a cost-benefit analysis
of further lead phasedown. 364 EPA's analysis demonstrated that nearly $1
billion in annual net benefits (mainly reduced medical care and automobile

357. EPA, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed Reg 7812 (1982) ("This proposed
action is not 'major' under Executive Order 12291 in that it is not likely to have significant adverse
economic impact and, therefore, is not subject to the requirement of a [RIA]," id at 7813 (emphasis
added)).
358. A crucial and influential ally was conservative columnist George Will, who decried the
administration's failure to consider the impact of increased lead emissions on the incidence of lead
poisoning in children. George F. Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, Washington Post A23 (Sept
16, 1982).
359. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 134 (cited in note 26) (referring to this as seeking "to turn
lemons into lemonade by citing the lead phase-down decision as a significant victory for the oversight
process").
360. Comments of the Environmental Defense Fund on Proposals to Relax or Rescind
Regulations Limiting the Lead Content of Gasoline 8-9, US EPA, Docket No A-81-36 (May 17, 1982).
361. Joseph L. Annest, et al, Blood Lead Levels for Persons 6 Months-74 Years of Age: United States,
1976-80, in II Vital Health Statistics No 233 (Natl Ctr Health Statistics Advance Data, May 12, 1982).
362. Small Refiner Lead Phase-down Task Force v EPA, 705 F2d 506, 531 (DC Cir 1983); see also the
chart "Lead Used in Gasoline Production and Average NHANES II Blood Lead Levels," id at 528.
363. Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline 1-2 (EPA, 1984).
364. See Al Aim, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible Dream?, in Mlultimedia
Approaches to Pollution Control: Symposium Proceedings (NatI Res Council, 1987).
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maintenance expenses) would result from virtually eliminating lead from
gasoline.3 6 5 OMB did not seek to block EPA's subsequent proposal virtually
3 66
to eliminate lead additives from gasoline.
OMB's failure to consider the potential benefits of regulation also is
illustrated by the decidedly asymmetrical way in which OMB has granted
categorical exemptions from its regulatory review procedures. In general,
OMB has only exempted from its review process those EPA actions that make
regulations less stringent or that unconditionally approve state submissions
that EPA cannot legally require to be weaker. Thus, EPA' decisions increasing
allowable pesticide tolerances are exempted from OMB review while
decisions strengthening an existing tolerance are not exempted.3 6 7 Rules that
unconditionally approve state water quality standards, State Implementation
Plans under the Clean Air Act, or state underground injection control
programs are exempt from review; decisions disapproving or imposing
conditions on approval of such submissions are not exempted.3 68 Decisions
approving hazardous waste delisting petitions or deleting pollutants from the
list of toxic pollutants under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act are exempt
from review; decisions denying delisting petitions or adding pollutants to the
3 69
list are not exempted.
3. Regulatory Review as a Response to Agency Failure. Proponents of regulatory
review have generally sought to justify such programs as a means for
correcting systemic flaws in the structure of the regulatory process. The
development of economic theories of bureaucracy that focus on the incentives
of institutional actors 37 0 has given rise to several different theories of agency
failure, each involving a distinct diagnosis of the source of agency failure and
37
dictating a distinct remedy. '
365. Costs and Benefits (cited in note 363). See Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in
Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 L & Contemp Probs 113, 120-21 (Autumn 1991).
366. OMB reportedly insisted that EPA eliminate from its subsequent lead phasedown proposal
the option of banning lead additives from gasoline entirely, allowing OMB to assure the multitude of
protesting antique car owners that EPA would not consider a ban on lead additives. Conversation of
author with OIRA analyst Wayne Leiss. The dangers of a single-minded focus on reducing the cost
of regulation are also illustrated by the fallout from the savings and loan scandal. When the
chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board told OMB that deregulation of financial institutions
had created an urgent need for a doubling of the number of bank examiners, OMB's associate
director reportedly "chided him for not understanding President Reagan's mission of trimming
government and said he should be thinking about making do with fewer examiners rather than
more." Besides S & L Owners, Host of Professionals Paved Way for Crisis, Wall StJ Al, A4 (Nov 2, 1990).
367. Exec Order 12291, Annual Report for 1989, reprinted in OMB, Regulatory Program at 648
(cited in note 145).
368. Id.
369. Id at 648-49.
370. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (U of Mich Press, 1962);
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little, Brown, 1967).
371. Distinct theories of agency failure are derived from experiences with different kinds of
regulation. They are "to a substantial degree irreconcilable," and they have very different
implications for the design of a regulatory review program. Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1267, 1269-70
(cited in note 298) (citing theories of agency capture by regulated industry, agency vindictiveness
against regulated industry, and agency self-aggrandizement).
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Proponents of the Reagan regulatory review program most frequently cite
an agency failure theory that views regulatory agencies as captives of special
interests that use them to "favor narrow, well-organized groups at the
expense of the general public." 3 72 DeMuth and Ginsburg explain why this
view justifies centralized regulatory review under a cost/benefit standard:
Without some countervailing restraint, EPA and OSHA would "spend"-through
regulations that spend society's resources but do not appear in the federal
government's fiscal budget-"too much" on pollution control and workplace safety.
This tendency is reinforced by the "public" participation in the rulemaking process,
which as a practical matter is limited to those organized groups with the largest and
most immediate stake in the results. Although presidents and legislatures are
themselves vulnerable to pressure from politically influential groups, the rulemaking
process-operating in relative obscurity from public view but lavishly attended by
3 73
interest groups-is even more vulnerable.

While DeMuth and Ginsburg did not identify the specific interest groups
that presumably have captured EPA, their thesis represents a dramatically
different diagnosis than the original agency failure theories that focused on
capture by regulated industries. The traditional agency capture theory
implies that regulators will favor the interests of concentrated producer
groups at the expense of the more diffuse interests of consumers. Applied to
environmental regulation, this theory suggests that business interests would
be more likely to "capture" EPA because the enormous potential compliance
costs of regulation provide greater incentives to business for lobbying
activities than the diffuse benefits of regulation provide to the general
public.

374

Traditional agency capture theory would predict that "statutes are

underenforced or perverted, and the implementation process yields to
37 5
regulated industries a victory they failed to obtain in Congress."
Environmentalists had long argued that mission-oriented agencies had
become prime enemies of environmental protection because these agencies
were the captives of business interests. In 1970 Joseph Sax argued that the
New Deal model of entrusting policymaking to the expertise of "an incredible
tangle of agencies with noble-sounding mandates and small budgets" had
failed because the "expert" agency had supplanted the public to such an
372. DeMuth & Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 298). This theory originated in
studies of economic regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ
& Mgmt Sci 3 (1971), but has been extended by public choice theorists to social regulation as well.
See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J L & Econ 211 (1976). While efforts
to find empirical support for this theory in the field of environmental regulation have emphasized
one case study involving a provision of the Clean Air Act that has subsequently been repealed, Bruce
A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (Yale U Press, 1981), other examples
probably can be found if for no other reason than environmental regulations inevitably create
distributional impacts that can be viewed as creating winners and losers. Pollution, of course, also
has a differential impact on different societal groups. See, for example, Annest, et al, Blood Lead Levels
at 7-9 (cited in note 361) (reporting that levels of lead in children's blood are far higher among
minority and low-income groups based on sample of more than 16,000 children in the NHANES I1
study).
373. DeMuth & Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1081 (cited in note 298).
374. James C. Miller, III, William F. Shughart, II & Robert D. Tollison, A Vote on Centralized
Regulatory Review, 43 Pub Choice 83, 84 (1984).
375. Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1269 (cited in note 298).
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extent that "[t]he public itself is thought to possess no expertise about the
public interest."3 76 Thus the environmental legislation enacted by Congress
in the 1970s sought to counteract agency capture by requiring agencies to
incorporate environmental considerations in their decisionmaking and by
authorizing citizen suits and judicial review to provide stricterjudicial scrutiny
of agency decisions. Indeed, as noted above, EPA was expressly structured as
3
a single-mission agency to avoid capture by the regulated community.

77

The notion implicit in DeMuth and Ginsburg's theory that the pendulum
had swung to the point where EPA had become the captive of environmental
groups contrasts sharply with the disappointment of environmental groups
with EPA's failure to implement aggressively the early federal environmental
legislation. The problems that were manifest in environmental regulation by
1980 included lengthy delays in issuing standards, widespread noncompliance
by the regulated community, and an abysmal monitoring and enforcement
system.3 78 As a result, Congress had resorted increasingly to the enactment
of statutory deadlines in an effort to force more expeditious agency action. 379
President Reagan clearly misjudged public demand for environmental
regulation. 3 80 As Eads and Fix note, the Reagan Administration
fundamentally miscalculated by extrapolating from the experience of
economic deregulation, where agency capture theories had considerable
validity, to arrive at its belief that the public wanted to deregulate the
environment.
In contrast, the failure of social regulation to achieve its stated goals was generally
perceived not as a reflection of any fundamental flaw with either the goals or the
regulatory techniques employed but as a failure of will. Various administrations just
had not tried hard enough to make social regulation work. Trying harder, not scaling
back programs, was seen as the generally acceptable solution. In such an
environment, appointing administrators who were openly hostile to social regulation's
goals and who, whether fairly or not, were perceived as prepared to do everything in
be
their power to make certain that social deregulation did not work could hardly
38 1
expected to call forth cries for a scaling back of social regulatory programs.

The administration responded to the public's chronic disappointment with
EPA's performance by appointing executive officials who were hostile to the
very environmental protection goals the public believed had not been
376. Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment. A Strategyfor Citizen Action 60-61 (Alfred A. Knopf,
1970); see also Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 745-46 (1972) (Douglas dissenting) (reviewing
literature concerning agency capture).
377. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
378. Crandall & Portney, Environmental Policy, in Portney, ed, Natural Resources and the Environment
at 47-48 (cited in note 148).
379. One study has found that federal environmental laws enacted between 1976 and 1980 added
200 new statutory deadlines for agency action. Statutory Deadlines in Environmental Legislation:
Necessary but Need Improvement D-5 (Envir & Energy Study Inst, 1985) ("EESI, Statutory
Deadlines").
380. See Philip Shabecoff, Ruckelshaus Says Administration Misread Mlandate on Environment, NY
Times Al (July 27, 1983) (quoting William Ruckelshaus as saying that the Reagan Administration
had confused the public's desire for better environmental regulation with a desire to lessen
regulation).
381. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 255 (cited in note 26).
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pursued aggressively enough. 3 2 In these circumstances, Congress and the
public perceived OMB not as a politically responsive champion of the public
will, but rather as a dangerous guerilla challenging the fundamental premises
of environmental regulation.3 8 3 Thus, it is not surprising that the Reagan
Administration failed to achieve any fundamental change in the
environmental statutes that it decried.
Another variant on the agency failure theory suggests that EPA has some
kind of institutional bias in favor of "too much" regulation. This idea may
stem from the perception that some of the statutes EPA administers contain
unrealistically ambitious regulatory standards. 38 4 Yet EPA's track record in
implementing such legislation suggests that sufficient deterrents already exist
to prevent it from regulating too extensively. The example usually used to
illustrate this point is that EPA has regulated only seven hazardous air
pollutants during the twenty years it has had to implement the provisions of
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act.3 8 5 A similar pattern appears to prevail at
OSHA. OSHA established new workplace exposure limits for only ten toxic
chemicals during the same period that the private standard-setting
organizations upon whose recommendations OSHA had relied in establishing
its original standards lowered their recommended exposure limits for
3
hundreds of chemicals.

86

John Mendeloff argues that the slow pace of standard-setting is due in part
to laws that require standards to be set too strictly. Asserting that
"overregulation causes underregulation," he maintains that agencies are
reluctant to implement laws that require standards to be set without regard to
cost considerations. 38 7
Although OMB's actions may have contributed to
this pattern, Mendeloffis thesis suggests that larger political forces already
deter agencies from implementing statutes perceived as requiring overly
broad regulation, even in the face of explicit statutory directives.
An examination of EPA's performance in implementing some of its other
statutory guides indicates that allegedly overbroad statutes cannot be the
382. Id at 141.
383. Perhaps public choice theorists could explain OMB's role as promoting quiet wealth
transfers to industry supporters of the administration by making behind-the-scenes changes in
regulations. In light of OMB's ideological emphasis on the principle of economic efficiency, its role
could be viewed more benignly as an attempt to redress inefficiencies generated by democracy's
initial allocation of political power on the basis of a one person-one vote rule and to promote
regulatory policies more consistent with the perceived products of dollar voting.
384. See, for example, John Q. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233, 23435 (1990).
385. See id at 269 n154. 42 USC § 7412. Congress has just amended the Clean Air Act to
require that a list of 189 airborne toxics be regulated by EPA. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, § 301, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2533.
386. John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation 2 (MIT Press, 1988). OSHA
subsequently employed a generic rulemaking approach to update and establish permissible air
exposure limits for 376 toxic substances in a single rulemaking that was completed with remarkable
expedition. The final regulation adopted in January 1989, occupied an entire 650-page volume of
the Federal Register. 54 Fed Reg 2332 (1989).
387. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 8-11 (cited in note 386). See also
Sunstein, 57 U Chi L Rev at 413-16 (cited in note 193) (endorsing Mendeloff's thesis).
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exclusive cause of underregulation. Two examples cited in MendelofPs own
study are revealing: EPA's experience implementing the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA") and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 38 8 EPA regulated only four existing chemicals
during TSCA's first decade and had completed reregistration under FIFRA of
fewer than a dozen of the 600 active ingredients of pesticides in seven
years. 38 9 These examples are significant because both statutes require EPA to
balance the environmental benefits of regulation against its economic
impacts. 390 Moreover, TSCA requires EPA to employ the "least burdensome
39
requirements" that will protect adequately against an unreasonable risk. '
Indeed, the structure of TSCA makes it, at least in theory, precisely "the kind
of law that would encourage cross-media analysis and integrate environmental
decisionmaking." 39 2 EPA's difficulties in implementing risk-benefit balancing
statutes suggest that factors other than a perception of unreasonable statutory
3 93
commands are responsible for underregulation.
388. TSCA, 150 USC §§ 2601 et seq (1988); FIFRA, 7 USC §§ 136 et seq (1988).
389. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 2 (cited in note 386). See also
Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens 134 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1987). EPA's
testing program under TSCA is also abysmally behind schedule. A recent General Accounting Office
report notes that in 1980 EPA and the Interagency Testing Committee established by TSCA had
identified 2,226 chemicals that might pose unreasonable risks. Yet the report found that "EPA has
compiled complete test data for only six chemicals since the enactment of TSCA [in 1976] and has
not finished assessing any of them." EPA's Chemical Testing Program Has Made Little Progress 3,
15 (Gen Acct Office, 1990).
390. See, for example, TSCA § 6(a)(c)(l)(D), 15 USC § 2605(a)(c)(1)(o). In determining whether
or not a chemical substance presents an "unreasonable risk," EPA must consider "the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national
economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment and public health. FIFRA
§ 3(c)(5)(D), 7 USC § 136a(c)(5)(D) (1988). Under FIFRA, EPA must register a pesticide if it
determines that "it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."
Unreasonable adverse effects are defined in § 2(bb) to require consideration of "the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide." Id at § 136(bb).
391.
15 USC § 2605(a).
392. Ronald Outen, Environmental Pollution Laws and the Architecture of Tobacco Road, in Multimedia
Approaches to Pollution Control: Symposium Proceedings 139, 142 (Natl Res Council, 1987). If one were to
design a law to achieve efficient, cross-media regulation in an integrated fashion,
[ilt
would need to be broad in scope, capable of reaching any environmental medium. To
achieve the greatest efficiency in regulatory decisions, it would need to be able to reach
polluting substances at any point that they exist in the marketing chain, as well as ultimate
disposal. You would want it to be risk-based, not technology driven, so that optimization
decisions could be made. You would want to be able, for example, to perform comparative
risk assessments in order to identify the most socially optimum distribution of pollution,
where environmental release is warranted by the benefit/cost balancing. And you would
want to be driven toward the least cost approach that would achieve whatever result is
determined to represent the most acceptable social risk.
Id. The only problem with this fantasy statute is that the law "is already on the books" in the form of
TSCA, and it has not worked very well in part because "[iut is too easy to get tied up in analytical
knots." Id.
393. See, for example, Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YaleJ Reg 1, 3, 6-7 (1989) (no agency has been able to regulate
more than three controversial chemicals in any given year; limited agency resources constrain agency
regUlatory capabilities); Sunstein, 57 U Chi L Rev at 415 (cited in note 193) (elaborate and costly
procedural requirements build "enormous delays and perverse incentives" into environmental
regulation schemes).
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A more satisfactory explanation for EPA's failure to implement
environmental statutes aggressively is that environmental regulation
inevitably requires choices that create winners and losers. Pollution control
regulations can impose significant compliance costs on politically powerful
business interests; presumably these regulations benefit environmental
interests that have acquired considerable political influence as well. Because
its regulatory decisions inevitably will benefit some interests and harm others,
EPA is reluctant to act decisively on its own initiative. 39 4 Thus, most
occurred only after
significant regulatory actions undertaken by EPA have
3 95
pressure.
outside
strong
to
EPA has been subjected
It is not difficult to understand why delay would be the response preferred
by a regulatory agency faced with a decision that inevitably will upset some
significant interests. Agencies often can justify delays on the ground that
more study needs to be undertaken. Because of the enormous uncertainties
that surround assessments of the effects of regulatory actions, there are always
issues that are good candidates for further study. While environmentalists are
likely to be more upset than industries about delays, they also may be tolerant
of those delays occasioned by further study if they believe such study
ultimately will produce results more favorable to their positions.
One of the reasons Congress has delegated such significant responsibility
to EPA is Congress's own reluctance to determine precisely who the winners
and losers should be in allocating the burden of environmental regulation. It
is not surprising that the same political conflicts that make Congress unwilling
an administrative agency's
to legislate with more precision also would hamper
3 96
implementation of the regulatory statutes.
Thus, although presidential oversight, in theory, can serve as a politically
responsive check on single-mission agencies, the Reagan Administration's
agency capture diagnosis was misguided in its application to EPA. Indications
that the medicine OMB review has provided to EPA is entirely different in
character from what would be prescribed to redress agency capture suggest
the need for an alternative explanation of regulatory review.
B.

Public Choice and a Theory of Regulatory Review

Despite differences in the structure of the various regulatory review
programs, a consistent pattern of presidential intervention to moderate the
cost of implementing environmental legislation has emerged. The tug-of-war
between the president and Congress over control of environmental policy can
be explained in part by the fact that the presidency and Congress have been
controlled by opposition parties throughout most of the history of EPA.
394. Dwyer, 17 Ecol I Q at 278 (cited in note 384).
395. This pressure can be in the form of citizen suits against EPA for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties, leading to court-ordered deadlines for EPA action. See EESI, Statutory
Deadlines (cited in note 379).
396. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 Harv L Rev 1183, 1190 (1973).
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However, it is possible to outline a more general theory of regulatory review
to explain the historical patterns that have emerged.
Because environmental protection has been consistently popular
throughout the last two decades, the enactment of environmental legislation
can produce immediate political benefits for Congress and the president.
Politicians can proudly point to new laws as demonstrating that they have
acted to protect the environment, even though the impact of the laws on
environmental quality may depend largely on the issuance and enforcement
of implementing regulations by administrative agencies.
Yet the process for developing regulations to implement the
environmental statutes does not promise great political rewards for several
reasons. First, the regulatory process is far less visible and understandable to
the environmentally concerned public than is the legislative process, despite
the participatory model of regulatory decisionmaking embodied in the
Administrative Procedure Act. 39 7 Second, industries subject to regulatory
action have greater incentives to participate in the regulatory process than
does the environmentally concerned public. While national environmental
groups will participate in rulemaking proceedings of national importance,
industries subject to environmental regulation will have a great incentive to
participate in any rulemaking that may impose significant compliance costs on
them.
Third, the benefits of environmental regulation, though often substantial,
typically accrue over long periods of time in ways that are not nearly as visible
as the impacts of compliance costs.

398

Thus, by postponing compliance costs,

a delay in implementing an environmental regulation may generate benefits
that are more immediate and tangible to consumers and the regulated
industry than are the long-term costs to the environment.
Fourth, because environmental regulation inevitably creates winners and
losers, environmental legislation creates new opportunities for gains by those
who can influence the course of the implementation process.3 9 9 The
regulated community has a tremendous incentive to seek to delay or weaken
implementing regulations. The president, in the short run, can reap political
rewards from the regulated community by exercising Executive Office
oversight that moderates the impact of environmental regulations on
industry. If this oversight is largely hidden from public view, the political
costs are likely to be minimal and are greatly offset by the benefits accruing to
40 0
the president from the grateful regulated industry.
397. See id at 1185; see also David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean
Air Act, 30 UCLA L Rev 740, 753-54 (1983) (the former arguing that broad delegations of power
promote responsibility only if the subject of the delegation is highly visible; the latter illustrating the
lack of visibility of the Clean Air Act implementation process).
398. For example, by reducing kirtually invisible levels of asbestiform fibers, EPA's asbestos ban
will prevent cases of lung cancer and mesathelioma that have a latency period of twenty years or
more. 54 Fed Reg 29460, 29469 (July 12, 1989).
399. See generally Rodgers, 4 J Land Use & Envir Law 377 (cited in note 222).
400. Ironically, OMB director James C. Miller, 111, has sought to defend Executive Office review
as a device to prevent agency capture because it raises the costs of lobbying and because OMB
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Having garnered the political benefits from enacting legislation, legislators
can reap additional benefits by attacking lax implementation of the laws by
administrative agencies and by amending the laws to force more aggressive
agency action. Because the president is responsible for the activities of
executive agencies, legislators also can score points against a president from
an opposing party by exposing efforts to weaken the implementation of
environmental statutes. 40 ' These factors help explain why the exercise of
executive oversight has been, and is likely to continue to be, highly
controversial.
C.

Legal Constraints on Executive Office Oversight

Questions concerning the legal bounds of Executive Office oversight of
agency rulemaking have sparked considerable scholarly debate. Critics of
OMB review argue that it has illegally displaced decisionmaking authority
vested by Congress in EPA and that it has produced decisions that are not
based on standards required by statute. 40 2 While some supporters of the
regulatory review program have acknowledged the danger of abuse, they
emphasize that the executive orders are carefully structured to preserve their
40 3
facial legality.
Executive Orders 12291 and 12498 attempt to avoid serious legal and
constitutional difficulties by tempering the expansive scope of the review
authority granted to OMB. Both orders provide that OMB is authorized to
take action only "to the extent permitted by law ' ' 40 4 and exempt regulations
from OMB review if such review would conflict with statutory or judicial
deadlines. 40 5 Executive Order 12291 also specifies that nothing in the order
"shall be construed as displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by
law.' '406
These provisions repeatedly are cited whenever the legality of OMB's
actions is challenged. The Department of Justice has acknowledged the
importance of interpreting the executive orders in a manner that avoids a
reviewers supposedly must deal with all conflicting interests. Miller, Shughart & Tollison, 43 Public
Choice at 85 (cited in note 374). Yet these very factors can have precisely the opposite effect. The
fact that OMB review raises lobbying costs works to the substantial benefit of the regulated
community that has far greater lobbying resources than public interest groups. Moreover, because
OMB staff "are naturally more responsive to an administration's friends than to its enemies," in an
administration that uses OMB to champion the interests of the regulated community, regulatory
review is likely to reinforce agency capture. Bruff, 57 Geo Wash L Rev at 554 (cited in note 298).
401. Legislators also may benefit from OMB intervention on behalf of their business constituents.
See Morrison, 99 Harv L Rev at 1071 (cited in note 173).
402. See for example, Brief of Representatives John D. Dingell, et al, as Amici Curiae, Public
Citizen v Rowland, No 84-1252 (DC Cir Jan 23, 1985) (OMB review has displaced agency
decisionmaking authority, prevented meaningful public participation, and caused the application of
statutorily impermissible criteria); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Control of Agenc ,
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12291, 80 Mich L Rev 193 (1981).
403. See, for example, Strauss & Sunstein, 38 Admin L Rev at 187-91 (cited in note 298).
404. Exec Order 12291, §§ 2, 3(a), 6(a), 7(e), 3 CFR 128-32; Exec Order 12498, § 4. 3 CFR 325
(1986).
405. Exec Order 12291, § 8(a)(2), 3 CFR 133; Exec Order 12498, § 3(c), 3 CFR 324-25.
406. Exec Order 12291, § 3(f)(3), 3 CFR 130.
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collision with constitutional principles of separation of powers. In its opinion
supporting the legality of Executive Order 12291, the Department
emphasized that "the president's exercise of supervisory powers must
conform to legislation enacted by Congress. " ' 40 7 Therefore, "[iun issuing
directives to govern the Executive Branch, the president may not, as a general
proposition, require or permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by
Congress." ' 40 8 To prevent the president from usurping authority delegated to
EPA, the executive orders are founded on the theory that OMB's role is
"advisory and consultative" and does not include authority to reject an
agency's ultimate judgment on matters delegated to it by law. 40 9
OMB officials have recognized the importance of this limitation for

preserving at least the appearance of legality for the regulatory review
program. 41 0 Fear that OMB would be subject to legal action or an adverse
judgment in court occasionally has resulted in rapid clearance for regulatory
4
packages. ''
Dictum in Judge Wald's majority opinion in Sierra Club v. Costle41 2 provides
the clearest judicial endorsement of the legality and propriety of regulatory
review. Judge Wald recognized not only the constitutional authority of the
president to supervise executive policymaking, but also the desirability of
41
such presidential oversight.

3

407. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Proposed
Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation" (Feb 13, 1981), reprinted in OMB Hearings at 486
(cited in note 121).
408. Id.
409. Id at 492.
410. For example, when he was serving as administrator of OIRA, James C. Miller, III, who later
became director of OMB, stated:
The limited application of [Exec Order 12291] is a crucial point, one that ensures [its]
legality and the legality of actions pursuant to it. If a statute expressly or by necessary
implication prohibits the consideration of benefits or costs or alternatives by an agency
during its rulemaking, then those provisions of Executive Order 12291 imposing them
would not apply. If a statute or court order establishes a date for rule-making action, then
Executive Order 12291 cannot delay that action. In other words, if Congress or the courts
have spoken on the matter, then the Executive Order process will conform to that
expression, not contradict it.
Id at 46.
411. See note 197 and accompanying text.
412. 657 F2d 298 (DC Cir 1981), rev'd on other grounds, Ruckelshaus v Sierra Club, 463 US 680
(1983).
413. Wald wrote that:
[tihe authority of the president to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived
from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable from the practical
realities of administrative rulemaking. . . . Our form of government simply could not
function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other
and from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always have the answers to
complex regulatory problems. An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to
a dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in
other agencies as well as in the White House.
Costle, 657 F2d at 406 (ruling that EPA's failure to mention a meeting between it and the president in
a rulemaking docket did not invalidate the subject regulations because they were not based on
information arising from the meeting).
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Judge Wald's opinion, however, also recognizes limits on the president's
supervisory authority. Her discussion of the relationship between the
president and the EPA administrator appears to assume that the administrator
retains ultimate responsibility for the regulatory decision. Judge Wald notes
that the administrator "needs to know the arguments" of White House staff,
not that he must ultimately adopt them.4 14 She recognizes that the president
may be successful in "prodding" the administrator into adopting a different
regulation, but she does not imply that the president has the authority to
4
dictate the result.

5

1

As a practical matter, the president's ability to fire the EPA administrator
gives him enormous power to influence EPA decisions. Moreover, Judge
Wald's opinion suggests that if the president is successful in persuading the
EPA administrator to change his decision, the regulations would still be
upheld unless they lacked adequate support in the rulemaking record. 4 16 But
this does not necessarily mean that the president has the authority to make
the decision for EPA. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion
that Congress could not limit or condition the president's constitutional
4 17
authority to supervise the actions of executive branch officials.
Historical understandings and the text of article II of the Constitution
support the notion that "the President is not authorized either to make
particular decisions statutorily vested in at least some subordinate officials, or
to direct those officials to make particular decisions-except insofar as the
prospect of removal operates as such a direction."' 4

18

According to this view,

if the EPA administrator refuses to make a particular decision that the
president wishes him to make, the president's only recourse is to discharge
him and appoint a new administrator who shares the president's views.
As a practical matter, few EPA administrators would defy the president at
the risk of losing their job. However, political constraints on the president's
removal power, as illustrated by the history of both the Watergate controversy
and regulatory review of EPA decisionmaking, 4 19 dictate that it will be used
sparingly. A clearer limitation on the president's supervisory authority is that
it may not be used to produce decisions that are based on statutorily
impermissible factors. The executive orders' statements that agencies are to
comply with the orders' directives only "to the extent permitted by law"
414. Id.
415. Idat408.
416. "After all, any rule issued here with or without White House assistance must have the
requisite factual support in the rulemaking record, and under this particular statute the Administrator
may not base the rule in whole or in part on any 'information or data' which is not in the record, no
matter what the source." Id at 407-08. But compare Public Citizen Health Research Group v Tyson, 796
F2d 1479, 1507 (DC Cir 1986) (declining to reach issue of OMB's authority because agency action
taken at OMB's behest was without support in the record, but noting that OMB's role in the decision
"presents difficult constitutional questions concerning the executive's proper rule [sic] in
administrative proceedings and the appropriate scope of delegated power from Congress to certain
executive agencies").
417. Morrison v. Olson, 487 US 654, 695-96 (1988).
418. Strauss & Sunstein, 38 Admin L Rev at 201 (cited its note 298).
419. See text accompanying notes 42, 56, 61, 111-13.
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reflect this limitation. 4 20 The president lacks the constitutional authority to
countermand valid statutory directives, for such action would infringe upon
legislative powers vested in Congress by the Constitution. As the Supreme
Court has held, the president's executive powers under article II of the
Constitution do not permit him to authorize executive officers to act in a
manner that is inconsistent with policies established by Congress. 4 2 I
This principle has been recognized by courts reviewing the products of
OMB review. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas held that "OMB has no
authority to use its regulatory review under Executive Order 12291 to delay
promulgation of EPA regulations

.

.

.

beyond the date of a statutory

deadline. " 422

The court reasoned that although a "certain degree of
deference must be given to the authority of the president to control and
supervise executive policymaking," action to block promulgation of
regulations required by statute "is incompatible with the will of Congress and
cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the president's Article II powers." ' 42 3
This decision illustrates the potentially serious threat that regulatory
review poses to separation of powers principles. Aside from OMB's
implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 4 24 the regulatory review
program is exclusively the product of the executive orders rather than of
legislation. An effort by the president to expand his own powers to dictate the
substance of environmental policy poses a particular threat to separation of
powers principles. As the Supreme Court recognized in INS v. Chadha, "[t]he
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be
resisted."

4 25

While scholars have recognized the danger that regulatory review would
exceed the bounds of executive authority, their enthusiasm for its theoretical
advantages in improving regulatory coordination has made them reluctant to
endorse substantial changes in the review process. 4 26 In contrast, public
interest groups, obsessed by OMB's abuses of regulatory review, have
advocated eliminating it entirely without considering whether regulatory
review could be transformed into a positive tool for improving regulatory
policy. 42 7 Thus, much of the commentary on regulatory review has focused

on either insufficiently pragmatic theoretical defenses of it or insufficiently
theoretical attacks. The section that follows explores the possibility that
420. Exec Order 12291, §§ 2, 3(a), 6(a), 7(e), 3 CFR 128-32; Exec Order 12498, § 4, 3 CFR 325.
421.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 587-88 (1952).
422. 627 F Supp at 571.
423. Id at 570.
424. See text accompanying note 116.
425. INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983).
426. See, for example, Reauthorization Hearings at 58 (cited in note 218) (testimony of Cass R.
Sunstein: "If OMB is introducing political considerations, understood as its own ideology,
independent of what Congress wants, then that is illegality and something ought to be done about it
....
But all the formal papers, even OMB's formal papers, say that is unlawful and not permitted.").
427. See id at 52 (statement of David Vladeck, spokesperson for Public Citizen).
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regulatory review could be restructured into a vehicle for improving
regulatory policy by addressing flaws in its theory and abuses in its practice.
VI
TOWARD A REFORMULATED MODEL FOR EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT

Improved coordination and increased accountability in decisionmaking are
highly desirable, but the history of Executive Office oversight of EPA
demonstrates that regulatory review often has not been used to promote such
goals. Rather, the Executive Office frequently has succumbed to the
temptation to use regulatory review to pursue more overtly political ends,
such as providing "regulatory relief" to industry, that may be at odds with
statutory directives.428 Consequently, regulatory review has exacerbated the
fundamental tension between political control and the impartial
administration of law. "In essence, OMB review institutionalizes the primacy
of politics. As a result, it inevitably clashes with a process that responds to a
very different ideal-an ideal that subordinates political control to formalized
proceedings, to decision making that is closely tied to documented evidence
and to judicial review." 4 29 While the political process itself can serve as an
imporzant deterrent to abuses of executive oversight authority, that
deterrence depends on public disclosure that is not guaranteed under
regulatory review regimes.
The failure of the Reagan Administration's regulatory review program to
achieve its goals of regulatory relief can be traced to the administration's
decision not to seek basic changes in the environmental statutes and to its
obsession with regulatory relief rather than genuine regulatory reform. 430 In
both respects the administration sought to short-circuit the constitutional
structure of federal policymaking to make changes that were consistent with
its own vision of desirable environmental policy, but were inconsistent with
the elaborate structure of environmental law. By employing regulatory review
to pursue such change, the administration prescribed strong medicine based
on an incorrect diagnosis of agency failure. This error transformed a
potentially useful tool for improving regulatory policy into an engine for its
further balkanization.
The distrust generated by the politicization of the review process has
stimulated a congressional backlash. As a result, Executive Office
intervention has largely been unsuccessful in providing "relief" to the
428. While it is clear that OMB frequently has tried to influence EPA decisions in a manner at
odds with statutory standards, this is not a feature of regulatory review that is unique to the Reagan
and Bush Administrations. Accounts of the RARG process in the Carter Administration indicate that
the Executive Office sought to weaken standards under the Clean Air Act by having EPA consider
economic factors not permitted under the statute. This is perhaps inevitable so long as regulatory
review focuses nearly exclusively on economic considerations.
429. Cooper & Wright, 50 J Politics at 882 (cited in note 212).
430. See, for example, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, A White House Strategy for Deregulation, in Charles L.
Heatherly & Burton V. Pines, eds, Mandate for Leadership: Policy Strategies for the 1990s, 87, 89
(Heritage Foundation, 1989); Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 255-58 (cited in note 26).
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regulated community. Rather, it has inspired Congress to intensify its own
oversight activities and to produce increasingly explicit legislation narrowing
EPA's discretion. Caught in a tug-of-war between the president and Congress
over control of regulatory policy, EPA has lost much of its flexibility to
develop and implement effective environmental policies.
Abuses of the regulatory review process make reform of the process more
urgent, but they do not warrant a complete abandonment of regulatory
review. A new model of regulatory review could transform the process into a
positive tool for ensuring that EPA performs its statutory responsibilities
more efficiently, expeditiously, and equitably. 4 3' Executive Orders 12291 and
12498 should be replaced with a restructured regulatory review process that
emphasizes the following policies.
First, any program of regulatory review should be founded on the
principle that fidelity to statutory requirements, rather than to the preferences
of the president or the regulated community, should be the touchstone of
regulatory decisionmaking by EPA officials. A program that pays only lip
service to this principle by sanctioning regulatory review "to the extent
permitted by law" simply invites abuse, particularly when it places
responsibility for conducting review largely in the hands of economists hostile
to statutory values. If the president deems the regulatory policies established
by the environmental laws unwise, he should propose modifying legislation.
If Congress resists the president's legislative initiatives, the president can seek
to enlist public support. But he cannot indirectly amend or repeal the
environmental laws by dictating that regulatory action be taken in a manner
inconsistent with their requirements.
Second, the regulatory review process should be used as a management
tool to ensure that EPA has sufficient resources and to monitor EPA's
timeliness in performing its regulatory duties. 4 32 This could help to redress
the chronic delays that have plagued the regulatory process and might
encourage EPA to pursue innovations that reverse the incentives for delay and
that shift the burdens of delay away from the beneficiaries of regulation.
While it is often argued that some of the environmental statutes contain
hopelessly unrealistic goals, 4 3 3 EPA has had considerable difficulty
431. Robert V. Percival, Back to Basics: An Environmental Policy for the 1990s, Envir Forum 21, 26
(March/April 1988); Robert V. Percival, Restoring Regulatory Policy to Serve the Public Interest, in Marcus
Raskin & Chester Hartman, eds, Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s, 48, 48-52 (South
End Press, 1988).
432. For example, the GAO reported in July 1988 that of the 66 deadlines in the 1984 Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments that had expired, EPA had met three of the four statutory deadlines
with hammer provisions, but only 24 (or 39%) of the 62 deadlines without hammer provisions. New
Approach Needed to Manage the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 74-75 (Gen Acct Office,
1988). When sued for failure to meet the deadlines, EPA maintained that the principal reason was a
lack of resources. It proposed a schedule for completing the various rulemakings requiring by
extending deadlines to November 1992. Under EPA's proposed schedule, it will not complete the
last of these actions until December 2004. See Environmental Defense Fund, No 89-598 (declaration of
Sylvia K. Lowrance).
433. Frequently cited examples are the Clean Water Act's zero discharge goal for water
pollutants, 33 USC § 1251(a)(1); the Delaney Clauses of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
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implementing even far more reasonable regulatory statutes. 43 4 One source of
this difficulty has been funding that is chronically inadequate to carry out the
agency's full range of responsibilities. EPA's implementation of early
environmental statutes was hampered by OMB's ability to set the agency's
43 5
budget without regard for what it would take to implement these laws.
During the early years of the Reagan Administration, OMB actually cut EPA's
budget dramatically in an attempt to impede its ability to implement these
laws. 43 6 A "kinder, gentler" reviewing body committed to assisting EPA in

performing its statutory responsibilities could make an important
contribution by integrating into the budget process a more realistic appraisal
of the demands placed upon EPA.
Because of OMB's bias against regulation, it rarely has been concerned
about delays in the regulatory process; rather, it has used regulatory review to
increase delay. In fact, OMB has taken agencies to task only for delays
involving initiatives to weaken or repeal regulations. 43 7 A more even-handed
concern about regulatory delay would be a step toward improving the
efficiency of EPA's notoriously lengthy regulatory processes.
Third, the regulatory review process should be restructured to increase
accountability for policy decisions. While ostensibly designed to achieve this
goal, the existing regulatory review process actually has achieved the opposite
effect by blurring the lines of responsibility. When the Executive Office
succeeds in blocking or weakening EPA regulations, EPA officials are forced
to engage in the pious fiction that they have been "convinced" by OMB's
arguments because of the recognition that OMB does not have the legal
authority to displace EPA decisionmaking. While this preserves the fiction
that EPA retains ultimate decisionmaking authority, in other circumstances it
allows EPA to escape responsibility for unpopular decisions actually made by
the agency by suggesting that OMB is the villain.
21 USC §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376(b)(5)(B) (1988), that bar the use of food and color additives shown to
induce cancer in man or animals; and section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7412(b)(I)(B),
which requires EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants to provide an "ample margin of safety." "By
enacting this type of statute, legislators reap the political benefits of voting for 'health and the
environment' and against 'trading lives for dollars,' and successfully sidestep the difficult policy
choices that must be made in regulating public health and the environment." Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat
233 (cited in note 384).
434. See notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
435. See, for example, EPA's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1975, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee, 93d Cong, 2d
Sess 210-13 (1974) (testimony of Russell Train).
436. Eads & Fix, Relief or Reform? at 148-55 (cited in note 26).
437. See, for example, Sandra Sugawara, OSHA Is Taken to Task for Failure to Keep Pace With the
Administration'sSchedule for Regulatory Relief Publication, Washington Post AI (Sept 27, 1982) (reporting
on a letter from OIRA Administrator Christopher DeMuth to Labor Department Solicitor T.
Timothy Ryan, Jr., complaining about "a troublesome regulatory lag" due to slippages in target
dates for completing regulatory relief initiatives and recommending steps to accelerate and expedite
action). But compare Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm to the Heads of Certain Departments
and Agencies, Completion of the 1986 Regulatory Program (May 28, 1986) (copy on file with author)
(expressing concern because agencies missed 38% of their own deadlines for making significant
regulatory action by two months or more).
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VII
CONCLUSION

There are two major alternatives available for preventing OMB from
displacing EPA's exercise of decisionmaking authority-restructuring EPA as
an independent agency, or restructuring the regulatory review process to
prevent a reviewing authority from exercising de facto veto power over
agency regulations. While the former option is clearly available in light of the
Supreme Court's recognition that Congress has the constitutional authority to
create independent agencies, 43 8 it is not clear that it is a desirable vehicle for
improving agency accountability. In some circumstances, efforts to weaken
the president's ability to fire agency heads will reduce accountability. For
example, had EPA been an independent agency during the scandal that
ultimately led to the resignation of EPA Administrator Burford, the public
surely would have been outraged had the president been unable to remove
her. Moreover, it is anything but clear that agencies that are independent in
principle are independent in practice. Indeed, experience has shown that the
independent agencies often have been the most subject to capture by the
43 9
regulated community.
A more appropriate means for increasing accountability for
decisionmaking is to restructure the regulatory review process so that EPA
retains the ultimate responsibility for regulatory decisions in both theory and
practice. This goal can be pursued by placing strict time limits on regulatory
review that prevent a reviewing entity from exercising de facto veto power by
blocking regulations indefinitely.
Moreover, disclosure policies should permit the public to monitor the
progress of all regulatory initiatives. The substance of regulatory review
should be placed on the public record so that reviewing courts and the public
can assess the rationality and legality of ultimate agency action. Decisions that
appear to be the product of pressure from the White House, rather than the
agency's best factual and policy judgments, should not be afforded judicial
deference, because the rationale for such deference no longer applies. Public
monitoring of the regulatory process would require disclosure of the status of
any pending regulatory proposal, even though such disclosure is not required
under the current interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. 440 While
this could facilitate lobbying by regulated industries, it also would help
prevent regulatory proposals from languishing in a black hole hidden from
public view.
Given OMB's history, it may be necessary to transfer regulatory review to a
part of the Executive Office that does not have such a narrowly defined
mission. The Council on Environmental Quality, for example, could be
revitalized to perform a broader function in coordinating environmental
438.
439.
440.

See Morrision v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988).
See Sunstein, 57 U Chi L Rev at 426-28 (cited in note 193).
11olfe v Dept of Health and Human Services, 839 F2d 768 (DC Cir 1988) (en banc).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

initiatives and in ensuring that EPA expeditiously and efficiently carries out its
statutory responsibilities. At the time EPA was created, the Nixon
Administration rejected the notion that CEQ should resolve disputes between
44
EPA and other federal agencies in favor of OMB performing this function. '
By placing control over regulatory review in the hands of an agency whose
primary mission has been to reduce costs to industry, the QOL program and
its successors have used regulatory review as a mechanism for weakening
environmental regulation. A more enlightened approach to regulatory review
would place control over this process in the hands of an agency whose mission
is to ensure that federal regulatory policies are implemented in a more
balanced fashion. While some form of regulatory review has been employed
by every administration since the creation of EPA, it has become a source of
considerable friction between the executive and legislative branches largely
because of the lack of balance with which it has been conducted. To
transform regulatory review from a check without balance into a positive force
for improving regulatory policy, the review process should be restructured to
emphasize the president's constitutional responsibility to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" rather than an administration's hostility toward
regulatory statutes.

441.

See Marcus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 21 (cited in note 22).

